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USE OF PROPAGANDA IN CIVIL WAR:
THE BIAFRA EXPERIENCE.
ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of propaganda in the Biaffan war. Nigeria, the show 
case of British colonial rule and Empire, and transfer to independence, was at the 
point of disintegration in 1967. A section of the country, the Eastern region had 
dared to do the unthinkable at that time, to secede. The British and Nigerian 
governments were determined that it would not happen. The break away region, 
which called itself Biafra was blockaded by land, air and sea, and starved of 
weapons and the means of livelihood. The only means available to it was 
propaganda. In the opinion of many commentators, Biafra employed propaganda 
admirably and effectively, sustaining the war for three years, against all odds. An 
investigation into the background of Biafra's successful propaganda thrust became a 
very compelling urge for me. But to arrive at that point, an examination is made of 
propaganda cultures that bear a family resemblance to that of Biafra. Because of the 
complete dearth of materials by media practioners, or the protagonists, or actors on 
the Biafran media/propaganda scene, it has been necessary to travel to and from 
Nigeria several times to interview the key participants. The issuance of 
questionnaires was unsuccessful as no one had or found time to fill them in. Data 
and Statistics were non existent in any cohesive form. There is still even now a 
reticence by the principal actors to discuss the issues involving the war. To discuss a 
familial pattern, or any other form of family migration which might support the 
argument of the success of Biafra's propaganda, three models have been examined, 
ie; Hitler's/Goebbels' German propaganda, (as a watershed in modem war 
propaganda, Mao Tse Tung's Chinese propaganda, and Ojukwu's Biafran 
propaganda. However, other examples like the English, American, Russian, and 
French civil wars and revolutions, etc; are employed in the arguments and 
discussions. The thesis examines psychological warfare, the origins o f propaganda, 
modem methods and concepts, the Biafran domestic and external factors; and 
suggests that the exploitative propaganda tools in most civil conflicts are religion, 
and/or tribal/ethnic/nationalistic tendencies. The difference is that in Biafra there 
was a first - hunger and starvation became a massively useful propaganda weapon.
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CHAPTER ONE. 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Hypothesis, and, Focus of the Study.
It may be helpful to start this thesis by posing certain questions -
1. What is propaganda in civil war?
2. Who makes propaganda?
3. Who receives propaganda?
4. Why propaganda?
5. What is the effect ( result) of propaganda?
6. What role did all these questions, or the answers to 
them play in the Biafra Case - The Role of propaganda 
in Biafra?
However, it is necessary at this stage to state that the purpose of this thesis is not 
the discussion and analysis of propaganda 'per se', even though to understand the 
subject and object of the discussion, a study of propaganda is inevitable. The thrust 
of the discussion is to relate propaganda experiences to civil war as generally as can 
be done, and most particularly to the Biafra experience.
An immediate examination of this objective indicates the dearth of material on the 
subject of propaganda in civil war, most especially on Biafra. Some work emerged
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after the first and second world wars, generally in the context of studies covering 
the wars. The cold war period also saw a few works, eg. Propaganda and 
Psychological Warfare by Terence Qualters, etc. In the years between the Gulf war 
of 1991 and 1995, many more books have come out dealing with propaganda in 
war, foreign policy, and advertising. Some of these include Propaganda edited by 
Robert Jackal, Propaganda and Empire by John M. Mackenzie, The Third Reich by 
David Welch, Propaganda and Persuasion by Garth S. Jowett and Victoria 
O’Donnell. Weekend in Munich by Robert S. Wistrich, Goebbels by Ralf Georg 
Reuth, Age of Propaganda by Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Ireland: The 
Propaganda War by Liz Curtis, Another relevant work in the context of this thesis 
was Revolution in Statecraft by Andrew Scott.
These and a lot of other materials were examined in arriving at the theme and 
hypothesis of this thesis. The analysis from these and other texts are discussed later 
in this chapter under the 'Review of relevant literature'. Nevertheless, there is a 
difference between propaganda in foreign policy and advertising, ( which can be 
conducted either in peace time or in war time), and propaganda in war.
Andrew Scott for instance believes that propaganda in foreign policy is a polite way 
of engaging in political discourse- of achieving aims without resorting to war and its 
attendant ramifications. He maintains that Athens engaged in such cultural 
diplomacy extensively during the 5th century A.D.- a process described as an 
'unhidden agenda'. *
Some ex-Biafra technocrats and military have written accounts of their experiences 
in the war, but unfortunately none of the media people have written anything on 
either their roles or that of of the media.
Against this background, this thesis is written on the assumption that propaganda is 
an important part of strategic planning in warfare, which therefore merits an 
academic study in its own right. It will be argued that there is little difference 
between propaganda in international wars and civil wars- except for their target
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constituencies. Civil war is a microcosm of global or international war, which could 
be internationalised through effective propaganda. For instance, did not the First 
World War begin as 'Civil War' in the Hapsburgh Empire?
In an effort to answer this and related questions, it may be helpful to organise the 
discussion under the following categories:
1. Motivation.
2. Mobilisation.
3. Sustenance (Sustainability)
4. Durability.
In order to understand why these sensitivities and sensibilities act as ingredients in 
propaganda or psychological warfare, it is necessary at this juncture to examine 
further the questions posed at the beginning of this introduction.
1.2. Review o f Relevant Literature and Thematic Analysis.
1.2.1 (a) What is Propaganda ? (b) ... (in civil war )?
The Oxford Dictionary of current English defines PROPAGANDA as an organised 
scheme (etc.) for often (tendentious) propagation of a doctrine or practice; (usually 
derogatory); ideas etc. thus propagated; colloquially biased information'.
A school of thought also looks at propaganda- as psychological warfare, hence the 
reference" propaganada war"- as borne out by an article in the Sunday Times of 
17th February 1991, titled "Propaganda Targets Deserters". ^
The word PROPAGANDA was originally an ecclesiastical latin term denoting the 
function of a committee responsible for the spreading of the Roman Catholic Faith,
i.e. 'de fide propaganda'.
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It was, according to J.H. Marshall of The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
transfered to a political context in 1790 with reference to an obscure alleged 
revolutionary organisation based in France, and was also used in the United States 
as a slogan- word to refer to the pro-slavery campaign after the Mexican war in the 
1850s (see H. Sperber and T.Trittschuk. American Political Terms; An Historical 
Dictionary, Detroit, 1962) 4
Its use as a specifically military term is difficult to trace without a careful survey of 
the relevant historical literature: the word does not appear in The Oxford Military 
Dictionary of the 19th century, but does feature in Edward S.Farrows* Dictionary of 
Militaiy Terms (London, 1918).
It does not appear to have any older equivalent and seems to have been used in the 
first world war, and become well established in the years leading up to the second 
world war.^
Macropaedia Britannica defines PROPAGANDA^ as the more or less systematic 
effort to manipulate other people's beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means o f symbols 
(words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia, hairstyles, designs 
on coins and postage stamps, and so forth). Deliberateness and a relatively heavy 
emphasis on manipulation distinguish propaganda from casual conversation or the 
free exchange of ideas. The propagandist has a specific goal or set of goals. To 
achieve these, he deliberately selects facts, arguments and displays of symbols and 
presents them in ways he thinks will have the most effect. To maximise effects he 
may omit pertinent facts or distort them, and he may try to divert the attention of 
the reactors (the people whom he is trying to sway) from everything but his own 
propaganda. Selectivity and manipulation also distinguish propaganda from 
education. The educator generally tries to present various sides of an issue- the 
grounds for doubting as well as the grounds for believing the statement he makes, 
and the disadvantages as well as the advantages of every conceivable course of 
action. Education usually aims to induce the recipient to collect and evaluate
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evidence for himself, and assists him in the requisite learning techniques. It must be 
noted, however, that a given propagandist may look upon himself as an educator, 
may believe that he is uttering the purest truth, that he is emphasising or distorting 
certain aspects of the truth only to make a valid message more persuasive, and that 
the courses of action that he recommends are in fact the best actions to take. By the 
same token, the recipient who regards the propagandist's message as self evident 
truth may think of it as educational; this often seems to be the case with "true 
believers"- dogmatic reactors to dogmatic religious or social propaganda.
n
"Education for one person may be "propaganda" for another. Schlesinger makes 
the point of news and information selectivity on British Television and Media in 
Putting 'reality' Together, when he enunciates the principle of "inclusion - 
exclusion". This involves a process of slant, bias or parochialism in editorial news 
selectivity and judgement for and on the British m edial
(b) Propaganda in Civil War
Information culled from research and archive files^ indicates that increased 
communications capabilities effected by the time of the American Civil War made it 
possible for each side in that conflict to conduct active propaganda, making appeals 
designed to strengthen its cause and weaken the opponent. The Emancipation 
Proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln in January 1863, irrespective of 
its force and merit was a masterful propaganda stroke, for once the war became 
characterised as a crusade against slavery, it became very difficult for any European 
government to support the Confederacy ...
The abolition crusade and the pro-slavery reaction laid the psychological basis for 
the war. Upon the outbreak of the conflict, press and pulpit, North and South, 
further stirred the emotions of the people.
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In the South, propagandists devoted their effort to asserting the right to secede and 
to proving that the aggressive North was invading Southern territory. In the North, 
the preservation of the Union, patriotism, and the crusade against slavery were the 
major themes. On both sides, atrocity stories abounded often, though not always, 
based on realities - largely concerned with the brutal treatment of the wounded, 
military prisoners, and political dissenters. Southern efforts in propaganda lacked 
coordination, but in the North the radical committee on the conduct of the war gave 
official direction to the gathering and dissemination of atrocity stories that professed 
to reveal rebel depravity and to show the felonious and savage nature of the 
Southerners. The Sanitary Commission and the Union Leagues were the Chief 
unofficial agencies in this work. Both sides attempted to influence European opinion 
and President Lincoln sent journalists and ecclesiastics to England and the Continent 
to create favourable sentiment. Illustrating this in "Propaganda and "Civil War, 
Propaganda and undercover Activities " in Dictionary of American History ed. by 
L.B.Ketz, the work also outlines a graphic thrust of both Confederate and Unionist 
propaganda which are analagous to the Federal Nigerian and Biafran propaganda 
during the Biafran War. Discussions and analyses will be made in this introduction 
and subsequent chapters to illustrate the similarites of these, and other possible 
comparisons.
1.2.2. Who makes Propaganda?
A rather obvious question with at first sight a similarly obvious answer. It is easy 
enough to state that both sides to a conflict engage in propaganda in order to 
mobilise and motivate their respective constituencies. It has already been shown that 
'constituencies' may be defined as the "reactors". Since in motivation, propaganda 
must necessarily appeal to the senses and sensibilities of the the target audience, 
reactors is thereby appropriately used in this context, but this thesis will utilise
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"constituencies" as a broad reactor’s indicator, creating the semblance of an 
"audience"," viewers", "listeners"," readers", capable of objective analysis o f the 
information with which they are bombarded.
They as recipients of the information, or messages are capable of making value 
judgements and therefore acting on their judgements.
However, on closer inspection the question of who makes propaganda in war is not 
as simple a matter as this indicates, although it maintains that "both sides to the 
conflict" are involved. There are instances where one side claims that the other is 
engaged in telling lies by way of propaganda whilst they themselves believe in telling 
the truth even though the claimant in this example controls its own information and 
its dissemination, therefore allowing it to be "economical" with the truth. For 
instance according to Gerard Mansell in Let the truth be told - the Politics of 
propaganda^ ,  Churchill and Eden maintained that Hitler fed his consistencies 
with lies in the form of propaganda during the Second World War. Churchill in 
contrast believed that war must be won by deeds not words.
On the contrary, Hitler’s view as he wrote in Mein Kampf. was that in war, words 
are acts’. As far back as 1933, in conversation with Hermann Rauschning, Hitler had 
laid stress on psychological dislocation of the enemy as a necessary preliminary 
stage to military offensive just as heavy artillery bombardment in the first World 
War had softened up the forward positions of the opposing army as a preliminary to 
the infantry assault. "Our strategy", he said, "is to destroy the enemy from within, to 
conquer him through himself. Mental confusion, contradiction of feelings, 
indecision, panic - these are our weapons". * * Churchill, Eden and the then Director 
General of the B.B.C, Lord Reith believed that propaganda involved lies and was 
shortlived - the truth was more sustainable and therefore preferable. But, they 
controlled and decided what they thought was the truth, censoring what was 
disseminated to their publics.-on the principle of "inclusion-exclusion". However,
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since this involved manipulation of information, it was propaganda, as defined 
earlier.
In so far as propaganda involves the manipulation of information to achieve victory, 
it may be said to consist of (a) psychological warfare (b) censorship (c) lies (d) 
distortion or omission, or being economical with the truth, all designed to arouse 
the emotions - sensitivities and sensibilities of the publics targeted. Western 
countries argue that autocratic and dictatorial regimes engage in propaganda. In 
modem times, however, protagonists of all kinds tend to employ some or all of the 
instruments listed, as bome out in the Gulf War in 1991.
For Example, the American propaganda machine, (as illustrated by the Sunday 
Times article earlier referred to), ^  with the use of television, radio, leaflets, and 
rumours of impending cataclysm in Iraq, may well have caused several thousands of 
desertions from the Iraqi frontline. It destroyed "the enemy from within" even before 
the first shots were fired. Peopaganda was again at the fore in the civil war in 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s with all sides trying to capture the eyes and ears of the 
world. In the Biafran case, both Nigeria and Biafra engaged in emotive propaganda. 
Biafra, however managed the propaganda better than Nigeria and therefore 
sustained higher propaganda results.
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1.2.3. Who receives propaganda?
These, as defined earlier are: the recipients, the reactors, constituencies, publics, 
l 1targets, or audience.1 J
Taking the definitive ground rules of modem propaganda earlier enunciated, ie; - 
(the manipulation of information to achieve a certain objective) - it is fair to assume 
that there is very little difference in intent between propaganda in international or 
global war and propaganda in civil war. Both have to motivate and mobilise in the 
first instance the ’’home front", before the action.
In Shakespeare’s Julius Ceasar. Mark Antony after Caesar's assassination urges the 
Romans to avenge Caesar with his famous speech of "Friends, Romans, 
Countrymen". After he had motivated and mobilised them, and they had rushed out 
to attack Bmtus and Cassius and their men, Mark Antony proclaims "Mischief thou 
art afoot. Take thou what cause thou wilt".
The most powerful war leaders have been orators who know their constituencies 
and how to inspire them to action,e.g. Hitler, Churchill, Mao Tse Tung, John F. 
Kennedy, Odumegwu Ojukwu, to name a handful. The publics are therefore those 
to whom the message of propaganda is addressed. They then react accordingly after 
making their own value judgements. But as the message to the different targets is 
essentially tailored to the needs of the propagandist, the content delivered to the 
home front may be at variance with that directed at the international and foreign 
publics. And it is no easy task for either side in a civil war to motivate and mobilise 
the sympathy and active support of the international community, especially since the 
rival messages put out by the warring factions may tend to be confused.
14
1.2.4. Why Propaganda?
The answer to this question can be found first and foremost in the definition of 
propaganda already given at the beginning of this introduction. It is important to 
note that propaganda precedes the war in order to motivate and mobilise the various 
constituencies at which it is directed. It intensifies during the war to sustain the 
morale of the army and civilian publics and outlasts the war.
Those unfamiliar with the history of the American war of Independence are likely to 
be more familiar with the term "Boston Tea Party". Because of its appeal to the 
senses, it tends to be stored in the subconscious.
Propaganda in civil war is an application of the same ground rule as in international 
or global war. How ev er the domestic sector achieves the same results by clever 
management of its limited scope, materials, and facilities. After all, both sides in a 
civil war concentrate their efforts in justifying their reasons to the outside world, 
(much more as the war progresses), rather than to the home audience. It starts from 
the inside looking out The reverse is the case in international wars.
This brings one to the notion of justification of war- the theory of the "just war".
The reason for going to war has to be justified to gain international as well as 
domestic support- material, political, physical and economic- and therefore a 
favourable terrain. The Russian Revolution, the Chinese Communist Long March, 
The Biafran cause in the Nigerian Civil War, to name a few all bear this out. The 
slogans vary, but the message tends to be similar: the liberation of the oppressed, 
and the creation of an egalitarian society.
The principles enunciated during the "Enlightenment", and taken up by the French 
revolutionaries are characteristic. A society "fair to all concerned" is a common 
denominator to all civil war propagandists around the world in premodem, and
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modem eras. Further propagandist themes include, the emancipation of a people 
from suppresion of basic human rights- religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc. The modem 
concept of prisoners of conscience is an indication of how civil struggles can arouse 
international concern. Allegations of pogrom, genocide and discrimination can also 
evoke international sympathy, as in the Biafra case. There, the United Nations 
together with regional international organisations such as the OAU and latterly EU 
can become propaganda forums, for people to air their grievances and attract the 
sentiments of a world, public. Churchill referring to the United Nations as part of 
this function had said that "Jaw! Jaw!" was better than "War! War!", and that as 
long as the world leaders had a piece of paper in one hand and a pen in the other, 
they would not reach out for the sword. The Gulf war of 1991 has, however belied 
such a belief.
John Renshaw states, in Overseas Broadcasters Circuit, that "The radio does more 
than just report the news. In moments of chaos, like the military coup in Paraguay 
on the 3rd of February 1989, it can very easily change the course of events. "The 
dramatic events in Paraguay illustrate one aspect of the power of the radio as a 
propaganda organ. In this case, the radio was virtually used to motivate and 
mobilise the populace into a state of revolution. ^  He was discussing the role of the 
media, especially radio, on the day of that military coup in 1989, which 
coincidentally was also Paraguay's Patron Saint's day.
In the case of Biafra, when the capital, Enugu, was "sacked" or "liberated", 
depending on one's point of view, Biafra's existence was sustained basically by the 
media, especially radio - to maintain the morale of the Biafran army and citizenry, 
and to sustain the sympathy of the international community- even when the 
government was relocated elsewhere in Aba, Owerri, Umuahia respectively as the 
war progressed.
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In pinpointing its target audience propagandists have to appeal to the sentiments of 
that audience. Generally, the reason for propaganda preceding a war is to 
demoralise the opposing army before the first shots are fired, and increasingly 
nowadays soldiers and ground officers like to give press interviews regarding war 
preparations, with a view to confusing or deceiving the enemy into unwise planning.
1.2.5. What is the effect of propaganda?
The data (already mentioned) culled from the research archives^ states that the 
United States Consul in Paris- John Bigelow, played a key part in the propaganda 
war in France. Seward, the Secretary of State, reached a wider public with leaflets 
extolling the opportunities provided by the Homestead Act, encouraging potential 
immigrants or helping public meetings- with resolutions endorsing emancipation.
The adminstration's appoinments to the main diplomatic posts in Europe were made 
for the usual haphazard mixture of reasons. The distinguished historian, John 
Lothrop Motley, became minister in Vienna; William L. Dayton was a safe, but 
undistinguished appointment as minister in Paris, but as luck and Seward would 
have i t , Charles Francis Adams became minister in London. The son and grandson 
of American Presidents (who had also been ministers in London) Adams had 
impeccable credentials for his vital role and more than lived up to them. His 
coldness and austerity may have prevented him from being a great social success or 
a prominent public figure, but he scarcely put a foot wrong in all the intricate 
diplomacy of the war years. He moderated athe effects of Seward's occasional 
excesses, but could be stiff and unyielding when the occasion required. He contrived 
to establish an effective working relationship with the foreign secretary, Earl 
Russell, and coped successfully with sporadic outbursts from Palmerston. If not 
much loved, he was widely respected and eventually emerged in his son's happy
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phrase as "a kind of leader of Her Majesty's American Opposition". He was the right 
man in the right place at the right time, and did much to preserve British neutrality 
and therefore preserve the American Union.
The nub of the matter as far as the United States foreign policy was concerned was 
to make sure that the civil war, remained only a civil war, while it rigorously 
maintained a blockade and all its implications so troublesome to neutrals anxious to 
avoid a conflict on the high seas. ^
The analogy to this in the Nigerian case was the Federal blockade of the Biafran 
territory by air, land and sea while maintaining to the outside world that Nigeria was 
only carrying out a "police action" to defeat rebellion and secession, and seeking to 
restore and maintain the unity of Nigeria- a point that struck a welcome cord with 
the British Government especially, and the American and Russian governments who 
did not want to see Nigeria break up.
Biafra on the other hand used media images and symbols of progrom, genocide, 
indiscriminate bombing and strafing of civilian populations in the churches, markets, 
and hospitals. This had the effect of arousing public sympathy around the world. 
Church organisations like Caritas, the World Council of Churches and other 
humanitarian organisations rose to aid what they understood as the starving and 
dying millions of Biafra. Auberon Waugh in his book "Biafra, Britain's Shame". 
displays graphic images of Kwashiokor (bloated bellies resulting from malnutrition) 
ridden children, women and men of Biafra. ^  The effects of such images and 
symbols tend to endure.
The credibility of the messenger ( propagandist), the believability of the message 
and the efficiency of the mode of delivery of the message are important ingredients 
in propaganda package presentation. The language used is also germane since the 
different reactors respond more effectively if the message is in a language they can 
understand and imbibe.
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One other important facet of this mesh is the tendency of protagonists to nurture a
1 Rpersonality cult around the leader, a sort of "objective correlative”/  as T.S. Elliot 
would put it. In Biafra it was Odumegwu Ojukwu, in Russia, Lenin during the 
revolution and civil war, and Stalin during the world war, in China it was Mao Tse 
Tung. It is important in time of crisis for the constituency to have a personality- an 
outstanding credible figure- on whom and to whom people look for inspiration and 
admiration as a credible source of the message.
For Britain and for many in the British Empire, Churchill fulfilled that position 
during the Second World War, being able to motivate and mobilise the public, 
whether his message was true or false. The majority of Germans seem to have 
believed in Hitler because he seemed to have an answer to their problems, and gave 
them a sense of superiority.
It was a message they were prepared to die for. In like vein, Ojukwu was constantly 
telling Biafrans through television, radio and leaflets, (amongst others) that "the 
price of liberty is eternal vigilance" and so that they had to make sacrifices for their 
liberation from the tyranny of the Gowon regime. The Federal Nigerian 
government's own counter slogan was "to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be 
done". Such propaganda tended to outlast the war. For example, some of the songs 
chanted by Biafrans as they went into battle are still occasionally sung by those who 
participated in or remember the war. This phenomenon seems to be a corollary to 
Bruce L. Smith's argument, in his Political Communication and Propaganda, when 
he refers to trust and credibility and maintains that the message and the messenger 
have to be believed, otherwise they are not effective ^
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1.2.6. Role of propaganda in Biafra.
Nigeria now has an estimated population of one hundred and twenty million. There 
are two hundred and fifty different languages. Within these two hundred and fifty 
various language groups, there are at least five hundred dialectical differences.
There are two main religious groups - Christianity and Islam. Other religions exist 
including traditional religions. There are two time zones between North and South- 
ffom Lagos to Maidugiri, from Calabar to Kano.
The geographical cultural, political terrain is as diverse as the political and religious 
terrain so described.
All this and colonial policy created a perfect setting for conflict following the 
immediate post independence period. However, the events that led to the Biafran 
war happened very rapidly. On the fateful morning of the coup of 15th January 
1966, people in Eastern Nigeria woke to hear Effiong Etuk on the early morning 
programme on ENBC/TV Enugu, announcing that there were soldiers in the studio 
asking him to stop transmission of regular programmes and play only martial music.
On hearing this on his car radio, one of the coup leaders, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna,
who having assassinated the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the
Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie Eboh, in Lagos, was supposed to ’dash' to Enugu
to assassinate Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of Eastern Nigeria, escaped into the
bush. Okpara was thus saved. Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern Nigeria, and
Chief S. L. Akintola, the self-proclaimed Premier of Western Nigeria even though
he had been expelled by his party, the Action Group, which formed the majority in
the Western House of Assembly,were both assassinated. The country was dazed.
The media was muted by martial law, with the radio and television only playing
martial music. As a result, for a while there was no overt propaganda. But according
to Auberon Waugh, covert propaganda was instigated in northen Nigeria by civil
90servants loyal to the assassinated Sir Ahmadu Bello Muslims and loyal northern
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21followers were forming groups and pockets of meeting groups spreading secret 
propaganda documents in offices, market stalls, and through the post in the North, 
to the effect that the coup was Ibo instigated against the Hausa, Fulani, Muslim 
groups. The message spread to its target audience and became credible. 
Consequently, the Chief of Army Staff, General Aguyi Ironsi, who had taken over 
the reins of the Federal Government in Lagos following the assasination of Sir 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in the January coup was himself assassinated in a 
Northern led revenge coup in July 1966, along with the Governor of Western 
Nigeria, Colonel Fajuyi.
Following these events, the media in the North became free to operate. The radio, 
television and newspapers directed overt propaganda against the Southerners in 
general and the Easterners in particular, the Ibos especially. There was counter 
propaganda from the South particularly from the radio and television in Enugu. This 
was overt propaganda, designed to motivate their respective constituencies. 
Propaganda aroused latent tensions between the North and the South, the various 
language groups and ethnic communities, galvanizing and mobilising them to war, 
sustaining them through the war and helping them rehabilitate after the war. Most 
commentators argue that the message and organisation of the Biafran propaganda 
was better and more effective than that of Nigeria. For example,Luke Uka Uche in 
"Radio Biafra and the Nigeria Civil War: Study of War propaganda on a target 
audience".^  maintains that during the Nigerian Civil War of 6th July 1967- 12th 
January 1970, Radio Biafra was literally seen as the Biafran Government, per se. He 
argues that even when the Biafran leadership fled the enclave before the end of the 
war, people still believed in the concept of Biafra because the Biafran Radio Station 
indentification was still "This is Radio Biafra Enugu". When eventually Radio 
Biafra went silent, that action formally concluded the thirty-month war. One of the 
opinion leaders interviewed for his research noted that once Radio Biafra announced 
the end of the war, he became convinced that the war had in fact ended. According
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to Uka Uche, this partly demonstrates the quasi government role the mass media are 
capable of playing in a crisis situation any where. For example, he claims that in July 
1966, Nigeria did not have any functionally operative government for more than 
three days at the time of the second bloody military coup d'etat, as the struggle for 
political leadership control raged among the military combatants. It was radio that 
constantly broadcast directives and literally governed in the absence of any legally 
constituted authority. When coups occured, government agencies, ministeries, 
departments and parastatals were always found to be in a great disarray as a 
leadership vacuum was created: nobody knew whom to be responsible to for 
directives. In these situations, people panicked and the radio medium seemed to 
have become their rallying point. In short during such periods, the radio medium 
became a "de facto " government. People sought directives from it, Uka Uche 
concludes.
This was just one facet of Biafra's propaganda package. The message was graphic 
and powerful and was addressed variously to the domestic and international 
constitutencies with Odumegwu Ojukwu being cultivated as the saviour of Biafrans 
from genocide and pogrom at the hands of the Federal Nigerian Government.
Nigeria on the other hand in a clear attempt to caricature Ojukwu, in order to 
reduce his cultivation as Saviour, portrayed him as a bigot who was leading his 
people to ruin. Western Countries use the same techniques against their opponents 
eg. Hitler, Stalin, Saddam Hussein, etc, have been variously described as mad, 
unstable men leading their respective countries to destruction. There was a process 
of migration and mutation of this and other propaganda principles and practices to 
Biafra, eg; Soon, Biafra's propagandists resorted to the caricature of Gowon. This 
thesis will expand on the propaganda methods employed by both sides in this bitterly 
fought war in which over one million Easterners lost their lives. It will examine how 
the international society got involved and the political configuration involved with
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Britain, the United States and Russia being on the same side, Nigeria's, while France 
and some African countries supported Biafra.
1.3. Methodology and Sources of Data.
This study has adopted three research methods:
1. Qualitative archival and library research, to provide data for analysis of the 
historical development of propaganda, Hitler's/Goebbel's propaganda, Mao Tse 
tung's propaganda, and, the development of Nigerian political, geographical and 
historical structures, which set the scene for the civil war.
2. Structured interviews with media participants and protagonists on both sides of 
the divide in the Biafra war, leaders and key civil servants of Nigerian, and defunct 
Biafran governments, foreign journalists, and British Council and High Commission 
officials. Semi-structured interviews and discussions were also conducted with the 
publics of Nigeria, and former Biafran territory, to test their reactions to the 
propaganda messages they received.
3. Quantitative content analysis of Nigerian, Biafran, and foreign media broadcasts 
and materials, speeches by American, British, French, Russian and African leaders.
It was important to examine and analyse the reactions of both Nigerian and Biafran 
publics to have a sense of their emotions during and after the war. Interviews and 
discussions were also conducted with the key military personnel of both, particularly 
the combatants at the frontline, and a qualitative analysis was carried out to 
determine how they were affected by the propaganda, and how that would have 
affected the conduct, and course of the war.
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Qualitative research of archival and library materials was done both in Nigeria and 
Britain. The British locations included the British Newspaper Library at Colindale in 
London, the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, The Library of the American Embassy in 
London, the library of the Nigerian High Commission in London, the Library of the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, the Bromley and Mottingham Libraries, the 
Imperial War Museum, the BBC Bush House Research Library and Archives, the 
BBC Broadcasting House Archives, the Catholic Centre for the Study of 
Communication and Culture in London, the House of Commons and House of 
Lords Archives, Palace of Westminster, the Archives of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Keesings Contemporary Archives, the Senate House Library, University of London, 
the City University Library, the University of North London Library, the Rhodes 
Library, University of Oxford, the Oxford University Press Archives, and the 
Tanzanian and Ghanaian High Commissions in London, the Royal African Society, 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the United Nations Association, the 
Library of the French Embassy in London, the Confederation of British Industries 
(CBI), amongst a host of others. Archival and library materials, newspapers, 
magazines, periodicals, were examined and qualitatively analysed.
The Nigerian locations included the War Museum at Umuahia, the Federal 
Government Arhives in Lagos, the Government Archives at Ibadan, the Government 
Archives in Kaduna, the Museum of Ancient History in Calabar, and the Archives of 
the Daily Times in Lagos, and New Nigerian Newspaper in Kaduna. The Archives in 
the East had been destroyed, as a result, nothing was forthcoming from there.
The only copy of the Biafra Sun, the Biafra Newspaper, was kindly donated by 
Father Michael Golden in Dublin.
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Interviews were conducted in Britain, Nigeria, Ireland, France, Geneva, and 
Portugal. It has been necessary to travel twice yearly to Nigeria throughout the 
period of research to be able to get anything done. Some of the places visited in the 
course of the research in Nigeria include Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, Umuahia, Aba, 
Owerri, Calabar, Ete, Okon, Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Ikot Ekpene, Port Harcourt, 
etc.(see map).
Several telephone call attempts to extract information and materials from the OAU 
Headquarters in Ethiopia were unsuccessful. A search of Geneva to find Markpress 
has also proved unsuccessful. Even the International Exchange enquiry was not 
helpful. The only information obtained was that William Bemhart, the Director, had 
folded up and returned to America. He, incidentally, was an American citizen.
The research has utilised extensively the knowledge gained from active participation 
in propaganda activities, and broadcasting on Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra, by 
the author. This has been enriched by discussions with and interviews of colleagues 
in the media in Britain, Nigeria, and defunct Biafra. The interviews with Generals 
Gowon and Ojukwu were immensely useful, and very enlightening, as to the 
political, and propaganda objectives of the two governments.
The thirty four volumes of Encyclopaedia Britannica, which had to be acquired for 
easy access, have been useful for references and pointers to other relevant materials 
and texts, for definitions, and for historical analysis, and development of theoretical 
arguments.
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1.4. Contextual Definitions.
Familial: denotes the family resemblance between the propaganda policies and 
activities of different countries.
Sensibility: is the capacity to feel physically or emotionally hurt; the tendency to be 
exceptionally sensitive to messages received.
Sensitivity: portrays acute reaction to external stimuli or mental impressions; having 
sensibility to, or responding emotionally to propaganda.
Motivation: signifies the stimulation of the emotions of the targeted audience by the 
propagandist. Whereas sensibility may be passive, motivation activates, leading to 
mobilisation.
Mobilisation: means that having been motivated, the targeted publics react by doing 
the things that the propagandist demands of them.
Negative compensation: occurs when, a state makes negative public statements 
about another whilst enjoying the patronage and sponsorship of that other state.
This is done to demonstrate independence of policicies and actions.
Positive compensation: occurs when a state that benefits from the patronage and 
sponsorship of another makes positive public statements about that other, and also 
openly gravitates towards it.
Horizontal powers: are states that are of the same or similar status militarily and/or 
economically as the propagandist.
Vertical powers: are those that are militarily and/or economically stronger, higher or 
more powerful than the propagandist.
Other terms are defined within the context of the chapters and passages.
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1.5. Arrangement of Chapters - TWO - SIX.
CHAPTER TWO: 'The Old Regime - (Pre 1939)' aims at tracing the origin, history 
and definition of propaganda (or psychological warfare). It will argue that 
propaganda is as old as war itself but the "modus operandi" pre 1939 was different 
because of the tools available at the time, the state of the world and international 
relations, and the behaviour of war leaders within the environment so prescribed. 
Was war "just or unjust"? Why was it necessary to justify war? It will examine 
whether propaganda was employed or involved in the whole process of'just war'. 
What lessons arose from the American Civil War and War of Independence, the 
Russian Revolution, the French Revolution. What does the "Boston Tea Party", or 
'Ojukwu's beard', or, 'Yabuku Wagon' mean in terms of propaganda?
CHAPTER THREE: Modem Methods and Concepts' continues with the theme 
from the preceding chapter in terms of De Fide Propaganda,, and asks; what did the 
Second World War bring? This chapter will examine German and Allied- British- 
attitudes towards propaganda. Hitler, unprecedented in history, set up the Ministry 
of Propaganda, run by Goebbels. What effect did this have on attitudes- and on the 
war? What has happened since the Second World War, It will analyse the lessons 
accruing from the Chinese, and other civil wars, as a basis for comparison with the 
Biafra experience. Are there meeting points for the old and the new? Is there a 
family resemblance in their propaganda structures?
27
CHAPTER FOUR: Biafra: The Domestic Factor.
From a combination of personal knowledge, interviewing of colleagues, archives 
and other sources on the war, this chapter will attempt to relive the experience of 
the media in Biafra and the effect thereof on the Biaffan war constituencies (internal 
and external). It will examine through comparison with other wars- already 
discussed in preceding chapters- what modes and systems were employed in Biafra 
and to what effect. It will examine the lessons for Nigeria and Biafra resulting from 
the war. What effect did the Biaffan slogan 'the price of liberty is eternal vigilance', 
and the Nigerian slogan ' to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done' have on 
the combatants.
CHAPTER FIVE: Biafra: The External Factor.
Since this thesis argues that civil war can be internationalised through effective 
propaganda, here it will be explained. The chapter will look at the involvment of 
Britain, U.S.A., Russia, France, The Vatican, Portugal, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Israel and others. It will examine how much 
propaganda influenced their decision to be involved (on either side) and the extent 
to which it was determined by self interest.
CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion.
Drawing from all the above, a conclusion on the arguments will be extracted.
The chapter will draw on the interviews with Gowon, Ojukwu, and other 
participants in the Nigerian civil war, to discover how effective and sustainable 
Biaffan propaganda was. It will examine Nigeria's post civil war rehabilitation and 
status, and examine the lessons learnt from the war. The future direction of Nigeria's 
ethnic integration will be analysed, and conclusions will be drawn on suggestions 
from the protagonists, on the cause of the war, and what they see as possible 
solutions.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE OLD REGIME: (PRE 1939).
2.1. Introduction.
This chapter will examine the theme that propaganda in war is as old as war itself.
In Chapter One, it was argued that propaganda has the constituents of psychological 
warfare and censorship - all amounting to the manipulation of information, to inform or 
disinform, in order to achieve victory against the adversary. The common denominator 
that spans the ages is the justification of war-the notion of the 'just war'. It is therefore 
appropriate to take a closer look at the notion; and the other constituents of propaganda 
pre-1939. In doing this, and in highlighting the arguments it will be necessary to 
juxtapose, compare, and analyse examples from different periods. There will be definitions 
and discussions of relevant contextual terms. Areas covered in the chapter include the just 
war, psychological warfare, and censorship.
2.2. The Just War:
The medieval European concept held that a ruler, by proper declaration and with proper 
motives, might employ armed force outside his normal jurisdiction to defend rights, rectify 
wrongs and punish crimes. He could, that is, take up arms for a just cause (which in 
practice was variously interpreted, but usually involved an appropriate response to a 
wrongful act). The concept developed as early as St. Augustine in the 4th century and was 
still accepted by the Dutch jurist and writer on international law Hugo Grotius in the 17th 
century. Its popularity thereafter declined,1 though, in the 20th century, it enjoyed a 
revival in somewhat new form with the idea that a nation might resort to armed force in 
self-defence or in the execution of collective obligations toward international peace 
keeping operations. From this description of the 'just war', it may be observed that the
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notion o f ’the just war’, tended to be propaganda oriented. Because of the authority of the 
rulers and war lords of the time, the constituencies to be motivated may have differed 
from what obtains in the 20th century, but the objective and the notion was the same. 
There had to be an appeal to the sensibilities of the other constituencies that could affect 
the course of the war vertically or horizontally.
There had to be 'justification' for going to war, and for sustaining it. The soldiers during 
the period had to be mobilised, and sustained at war, to defeat the enemy -the 'evil' or 
'devil'. 'Justification'^ in Christian theology was either (1) the act by which God moves a 
person from the state of sin (injustice), to the state of grace (justice); (2) the change in a 
person's condition as he moves from a state of sin to a state of righteousness, or (3) 
especially in Protestantism, the act of acquittal whereby God gives contrite sinners the 
status of the righteous. The term, is a translation of the Greek 'dikaiosis', (Latin - 
justificatio), originally a technical legal term derived from the verb "to make someone 
righteous".
To justify an action requires the building up of a credible case. The process of building up 
the case involves the cultivation of an image of the enemy as evil. The message to those at 
which the image is projected is, 'propaganda'. The message and the messenger have to be 
credible for the constituencies - 'reactors' - to respond to the intentions of the messenger. 
The 'enemy' has to be destroyed in the eyes of the constituencies to justify the taking up of 
arms to obtain 'justification' in the interest of'peace' and international order. The 
adversarial leader had to be caricatured to show that he was an eccentric who wanted 
conquest for his own selfish ends. He had to be made to look obnoxious to the foreign and 
domestic audiences. This practice establishes a trend that has spanned the ages.
The 'evil' ruler could not and would not by himself carry out actions that would 'redeem' 
himself, and free his subjects from persecution. Therefore it was up to the fair and
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righteous (the good) ruler, in the interests of humanity, to 'redeem' the 'evil' by taking up 
arms against him; to correct his evil ways, move him from 'a state of sin to a state of 
righteousness' and redeem his subjects from persecution. The propaganda message 
during the pre-1939 period of history was mainly targeted at the 'international' community 
laterally or horizontally, dependent on whether the constituency being addressed was a 
major, medium or minor power. During the early modem period, the domestic 
constituency did not require too much motivation because the authority of the messenger, 
the ruler, was absolute. It had to be mobilised however, to wage and sustain the war. The 
motivating message was for the people to serve 'the King and Country' by going to war 
and making the supreme sacrifice. Posthumous decorations, however noble, were 
nevertheless, propaganda messages to convince those who might hesitate, that there was 
everlasting reward in making the supreme sacrifice. The evolution of sovereign states in 
Europe was foreshadowed by the publication in 1625 of Hugo Grotius', "De Jure Belli ac 
Pads1' (on the law of war and peace), which held that states are bound by a code of legally 
binding duties and prohibitions.^
Efforts to regulate warfare grew when weapons became more destructive. The 
Declaration of Paris (1856) abolished privateering. In 1863, during the American Civil 
War, President Abraham Lincoln issued general orders No. 100, 'Instructions for the 
Government of Armies in the Field', which were based on the Lieber code, a codification 
prepared by Francis Lieber that had great subsequent influence on the first Geneva 
Convention which was adopted in Switzerland in 1864, to protect those wounded in war. 
Conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 codified many of the existing laws of war.
The Geneva Conventions of 1906, 1929 and 1949 expanded and refined the law of war as 
applied to civilians, prisoners of war, and wounded and sick military personnel. Several 
treaties banned particular weapons. For example, the Geneva Protocol on Gas Warfare 
(1925) prohibited the use of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare.^
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The issue of what constituted a just war was argued in a theological context. War was 
'just’ whatever its cause if undertaken by the highest authority, an independent prince. 
From the 18th century, through world war 1, each nation was deemed the sole judge of its 
need to wage war.^ This was the message of the 'age' and the authority was the 
messenger. However, the League of Nations Covenant held that aggression constituted 
serious international misconduct. The Kellogg-Briand Pact(1928) which condemned 
recourse to war influenced the Nuremberg trials of German war criminals after the second 
world war.
To galvanise international and domestic public opinion against an adversary, it was 
necessary to show that the aggressor had violated the law of war enunciated earlier and 
therefore was waging an unjust war against the 'messenger' or propagandist, or against 
weak, defenceless peoples. The message had to be strong, convincing and credible. The 
messenger had to be authoritative, dependable and believable. The total package was 
propagandist. The messenger had to be portrayed as almost a deity who was infallible, 
who could invite you to, and for whom you could, die in order to serve him. His cause, 
according to his message, was just and right, even though, the age recognised 'might as 
right'.7
O
David French0 says that Pitt the Younger did not rush into war with revolutionary France 
although his belief and his message to his domestic constituency was that the 'political 
nation had not lost its dislike of continental entanglements'. The British domestic 
constituency was informed that in 1789, the French revolution did not threaten Britain's 
European interests. This was reinforced by the rather reassuring message that the French 
were.doing what the British had done during the 'Glorious revolution'. This ' positive' 
propaganda to the British constituency, reinforced by the traditional insularity and 
nationalistic instincts of the British, became a credible option of many Englishmen who, as
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a result welcomed the consequent upheavals in France, hoping that they would have the 
effect of weakening their 'rival'.
Even in this case, the message had the positive effect of calming the British public, and not 
motivating and mobilising them to war against France, but it was negative as far as the 
international propaganda spectrum was concerned. This was because even when the 
French National Assembly declared war on Austria and Prussia in April 1792, abolished 
the monarchy and established a republic, Pitt did nothing. He would not go to war to save 
the French monarchy. This was a clear demonstration of the power of the French 
propaganda, which as stated, at the time was in accord with the traditional view of British 
national interests.
Whilst there was serious civil war in France, the intematioal community was contained 
with an effective, credible, and sustaining message. This is a demonstration of how 
domestically generated propaganda in civil war can have either a positive or negative 
effect on the intematioal spectrum. The object, in all cases was to create a more 
egalitarian society and bring justice to an unjust and cruel society.
David French says that during the American war of independence,^ Clausewitz's message 
to his audiences was that before 1793, war had been an affair for governments alone but 
that during the French revolution, 'suddenly war again became the business of the people' 
who threw the full weight of their nation's might into their struggles. He further states that 
the break between the limited wars of the eighteenth century and the era o f unlimited war 
beginning in 1793 (and temporarily ending in 1815), was less sharp than Clausewitz 
suggested. Its beginnings can be discerned during the Seven Year's war. The means which 
the combatants adopted may have been limited but for at least one belligerent, Prussia, the 
ends were not.
The anti-Prussian alliance tried to deprive her of more than just a province; they wished to 
reduce her to the ranks of a second-rate power. And, had he looked accross the Atlantic, 
Clausewitz might have noticed that in the 1770s and 1780s, the Americans had already
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shown how the full weight of the people might be thrown into a national war effort. The 
American war of independence was unlike the wars which had been fought in Europe for 
dynastic aims earlier in the eighteenth century. It was not so much a struggle for territory 
as a contest for the political allegiance of the American people. The Americans proclaimed 
that they were fighting to liberate themselves from the despotism of British rule. The great 
cause for which they believed they were fighting filled enough Americans with patriotic 
zeal to enable the congress to mobilise the colonies' resources in a way which had not 
been seen in Europe since the Thirty Year's war.
Embedded in this project were two important notions - (1) the notion of psychological 
warfare, which will be discussed in detail in another section of this chapter. (2). the notion 
of justification. The American war of independence was a kind of civil war, in that 
subjects of the crown in a colony were rebelling against the King and Country, and the 
metropolitan authority. Nevertheless, they felt justified to take up arms to 'emancipate' 
themselves from the oppressive rule of the metropolitan authority.
Central to the age of the 'just war' were the English civil wars. The English civil wars also 
have a bearing on the two notions considered in this chapter - the 'just war' and 
psychological warfare. Robert Ashton opens his book The English Civil Wars. ^  with a 
speech by James 1 to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at White-Hall on 
Wednesday the 21st of March, 1609. The speech goes:
"The State of MONARCHIE is the supreme thing 
upon earth: for Kings are not onely 
GOD'S lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon 
GOD'S throne, but even by GOD himselfe are 
called GODS".
A second quote comes from John Shelden's Table Talk:
"A King is a thing men have made for their own sakes, for quietness' sake"; and a third 
relevant quote comes from 'Example for Kings: or Rule for Princes to govern b v ':
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"As in natural things, the head being cut off, 
the rest cannot be called a body: 
no more can in politick things a multitude, 
or commonality, without a head be incorporate". * *
Such quotes - and it would not be difficult to find others, epitomised the ritual deification 
of the monarch. According to Robert Ashton, this message was so propagated that the 
monarchy was regarded as a divinely ordered institution, endowed with formidable, 
charismatic and supernatural powers.
One of the most spectacular manifestations of this was the power of magical healing, 
which the King was reputed to possess. Ironically, James 1 himself was sceptical of these 
magical powers. However, the appointment of Saul as King by God when the Israelites 
prayed to God for a King was often cited as proof of the divine and supernatural attributes 
of the monarch. Such an attitude created a feeling of awe among the subjects of the 
various Kings. Most historiographers have seen the attributes of divine Kingship as a form 
of propaganda. On 30th January 1649, the English cut off the head of their King. This was 
not, ofcourse, the first time that an English King had been done to death by his subjects. 
What differentiated it from earlier acts of regicide, such as the murder of Edward 11 in 
1327, and of Richard 11 in 1399, was that Charles 1 was not furtively murdered in a dark 
and secret place, but executed on a public scaffold in Whitehall after a trial which, 
although the King denied the legality of the court, was, it was claimed, conducted 
according to due process of law. In more modem times, the execution of annointed 
monarchs - the public execution of Louis XVI in Paris in 1793 and the murder of Tzar 
Nicholas 11 and his family in an obscure Russian provincial town in 1918 - have been held 
to symbolise the passing of an order, and the inauguration of a new one.
There can be no doubt that some, though by no means all, of that minority of 
revolutionaries who were responsible for the regicide of 1649 intended that it, too, should
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be symbolic of the birth of a new era, and many historians have been disposed to accept 
them at their word. To more than one person who lived through the events of 1649, 
regicide was in itself a blasphemy. ^  Robert Ashton cites Filmer as writing in 1652 that 
"even the power which God himself exercises over mankind is by right of fatherhood". 
According to Ashton, James 1 argued that "just as God is the father of mankind, so 'the 
stile of Pater patriae was ever and is commonly used to King'. Thus 'as the father...is 
bound to care for the nourishing, education, and vertous government of his children; even 
so is the King, bound to care for all his subjects".
The message was a patriachal argument directed at a constituency who were all of the
King's subjects. It was not only that the King was the source of all authority, he was also
the keeper of all his subjects, and caretaker of all their demands, and the supplier of all
their needs and desires. Apart from Filmer, other royalists, like, John Maxwell, Thomas
Jordan, Archbishop James Usher,etc; postulated and propagated this message during the 
1 317th century.-3 This propaganda message was so powerful that no one dared reveal any 
anti-monarchial feelings. The people's consciences were imprisoned with and by fear. The 
message contained a number of propaganda elements, such as:
(1) psychological injunction,
(2) positive compensation (see note 14),
(3) negative compensation (see note 15),
(4) justification.
A further examination of these propaganda elements aroused by the message indicate the 
following -
(1) psychological injunction; this is aroused in that the conscience and emotions of the 
subjects became stultified; ^
(2) positive compensation; the message acted as enduring motivation for the monarchial 
and patriachal protagonists and propagandists of the time;
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(3) negative compensation;^ this was intrinsic in the message because it had the effect of 
latent, though inert motivation for emancipation on the King's subjects, even from some of 
his beneficiaries, who became galvanised by anti-monarchists like Oliver Cromwell; and,
(4) justification; the question that may well be asked is, how in the face of such a powerful 
and compelling message, is rebellion justified? The problem becomes more complex, 
because, the monarch, as well as being the keystone of the arch of order, was also the 
source of all privilege, inequality and social distinction. Deference and privilege pervaded 
the social arrangements of the 17th century to an extent which requires a real effort of the 
historical imagination to appreciate.
The royalist Sir John Berkeley quoted no less a person than Oliver Cromwell as saying 
that "no men could enjoy their Lives and Estates quietly without the King had his Rights". 
Revolt even against a tyrant was unthinkable, for revolt simply compounded the disorder 
created by the tyrannical actions which produced it. ^
Nevertheless, despite the difference in historical context, similar elements are to be found 
at work in the immediate post independence period in Nigeria, when southerners felt 
deprived and oppressed by the Northerners who controlled the Federal government. Crisis 
and anarchy ensued in Western Nigeria. This, as will be discussed in chapter 4, led to the 
first military coup of January 1966, to a counter coup in July by Northern military officers, 
and to a military government again dominated by the North. The consequence was the 
civil war, resulting from a series of rapid events culminating in the South - particularly the 
East - accusing the North of genocide, and a pogrom on Easterners fleeing from the 
North, (see chs 4&5). In a situation of this nature, the deprived, the disenfranchised, the 
suppressed and oppressed, carried out covert propaganda, through the medium of secret 
meetings, word of mouth, and secret documents and pamphlets, in order to co-ordinate, 
motivate and mobilise their constituencies. The subsequent civil wars in England are 
replicated in the Biafran case. It is almost the inevitable consequence of absolute
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propaganda, censorship and subjugation. The justification for going to war to rectify the 
situation is usually simpler to attain, ultimately.
The justification in Biafra, as in the English civil wars, was that pleaded by rebels in all 
civil war situations - the emancipation of the oppressed and suffering, and the restitution 
of human dignity to the deprived. Cromwell and his men as well as Nzegwu with his 
fellow coup plotters in Nigeria, Ojukwu and all other civil war leaders have applied the 
same justification. The message of'FREEDOM' almost always has universal support and 
usually transmits from covert to overt propaganda. The surgical way to eliminate the 
domineering and overwhelming rival message, is the elimination of the source, eg. the 
monarch, the oppressors, the leaders of a regime, etc. This is what Cromwell achieved in 
the execution of the King, and the Nigerian coup leaders in the assassination of their heads 
of government. It is the most effective form of counter propaganda. It derives from the 
words of James 1 himself, quoted earlier, "the severance of the head from the body", 
rendering it non-functional.
2.3. Psychological Warfare:
The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines 'psychological' as a science of human
mind; a treatise on or system of this; colloquially, mental chracteristics.
It defines psychological warfare as - warfare achieving aims by weakening the enemy's 
17morale.
The Britannica describes 'psychological warfare' also called 'psywar', as the use of 
propaganda against an enemy, supported by such military, economic or political measures 
as may be required. Such propaganda is generally intended to demoralise the enemy, to 
break his will to fight or resist and sometimes to render him favourably disposed to one's
1 o
position.10
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Although often looked upon as a modem invention, psychological warfare is of ancient 
origin. Cyrus the Great employed it against Babylon, Xerxes against the Greeks, and 
Philip the second of Macedon against Athens. The conquests of Genghis Khan were aided 
by expertly planted rumours about large numbers of ferocious Mongol horsemen in his 
army; centuries later, in the American revolution, Thomas Paine's "Common Sense” was 
but one of many pamphlets used to strengthen the British-American colonists' will to fight. 
With modem scientific advances in communication, such as high speed printing and radio, 
together with important developments in the fields of public opinion analysis and the 
prediction of mass behaviour, psychological warfare has become a more systematic 
technique in strategy and tactics, and a larger ingredient in warfare as a whole. ^  This 
theme is taken up more broadly in subsequent chapters of this thesis - (chs.4&5.).
The foregoing definitions lend strength to the postulate at the beginning of the chapter, 
that the 'Act of Propaganda' is as old as war itself even though the word 'Propaganda' 
appears to have a relatively modem or immediate pre-modem usage. Secondly, the 
dictionary definitions reflect the argument in this thesis, that is, that propaganda is 
designed to appeal to the sensibilities and sensitivities of the recipient targeted groups. 
The abstract and emotive aspects of psychological warfare bring to the fore the 
constituent structural elements of propaganda - the ground rules earlier defined,ie.(l) 
motivation, (2) mobilisation, (3) sustainability, and (4) durability.
In the references made earlier to Robert Ashton's 'The English Civil Wars', it could clearly 
be seen that the mental and psychological ability of the English to rise against the King in 
civil war was stultified. The argument here is that propaganda precedes a war, intensifies 
and sustains through the war, and outlasts the war. The passages from Robert Ashton are 
a clear indication of propaganda preceding a war. In order to counteract such enormous 
'brainwashing' of a whole people, counter propaganda is necessary. The danger is that the
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counter propagandist may 'fall out' with the law and authority of the land. In that case, 
covert propaganda is resorted to.
Brainwashing usually means intensive political indoctrination. In distinguishing between
overt and covert propaganda; the former, is that in which the propagandist and perhaps his
backers are made known to the 'reactor' - constituency; and the latter, which may include
such things as unsigned political advertisements, clandestine radio stations using false
names, and statements by editors, politicians or others, who have been secretly bribed by
90governments, political backers or business firms.
In the case of the English civil war, and Biafra, where the authority of the King on the one 
hand, and the military on the other, was supreme, it was essential to use intense covert 
propaganda by way of secret documents, meetings, word of mouth, pamphlets (etc.). The 
constituencies, though these secret documents are in most cases purely psychological 
instruments, are exposed to counter messages, and are therefore mentally reconstructed to 
resist the status quo In the English civil war, the vindication for Parliament to go to war 
against the King, was stated thus -
M.. The matter, with us, is quite and generally 
mistaken,and the question altogether wrong 
stated,viz, whether we should obey the King or 
parliament? For the King and parliament are 
not like two parallel lines, which can never 
meet, not like two incompatible qualities, 
which cannot be both in one subject; 
not like the ARK and Dragon, whom one house will 
not hold; not like God and Mammon, 
which one man cannot serve:
For by siding with...the parliament, 
in those things which are according to 
law, we side with, and serve the King".
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From this it is easy to perceive the difficulties of parliament in what it intended to do, and 
in countering such propaganda as "...who can stretch out his hand against the Lord's 
annointed and be guiltless?" - an intense psychological line put about by the royalists - a 
quote from Samuel 26:9.
During the evolution of the theory of propaganda, early commentators observed that the
archeological remains of ancient civilizations indicate that dazzling clothing and palaces,
impressive statues and temples, magic tokens and insignia, and elaborate legal and
O')religious arguments have been used for thousands of years, presumably to convince the 
common people of the purported greatness and supernatural powers of Kings and priests.
In ancient India, the Buddha, and in ancient China, Confucius, like Plato, in Greece, 
advocated the use of truthfulness, "good" rhetoric, and "proper" forms of speech and 
writing as a means of persuading men, by both precept and example, to live the good life. 
Toward 400BC. in India, Kautilya, a Brahmin believed to have been chief minister to the 
emperor Chandragupta Maurya, reputedly wrote the Arthasastra '(Principles of Politics), a 
book of advice for rulers, that has often been compared with Plato's Republic, and 
Machiavelli's much later work The Prince. Kautilya discussed, in some detail, the use of 
psychological warfare, both overt and clandestine, in efforts to disrupt an enemy's army 
and capture his capital. Overtly, he said, the propagandists of a King, should proclaim that 
he can do magic, that God and the wisest men are on his side, and that all who support his 
war aims will reap benefits. Covertly, Kautilya states, his agents should infiltrate his 
enemies' and potential enemies' Kingdoms, spreading defeatism and misleading news 
among their people, especially in capital cities, among leaders, and among the armed 
forces. In particular, a King should employ only Brahmins, unquestionably (according to 
him), the holiest and wisest of men, as propagandists and diplomatic negotiators. These 
morally irreproachable, experts should cultivate the goodwill of their King's friends, and of 
friends of his friends, and should also woo the enemies of his enemies. A King should not
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hesitate, however, to break any friendships or alliances that are later found to be
disadvantageous. Similar advice is found in Ping-fa(The Art of WarTby the Chinese
theorist Sun Tzu who wrote at about the same time. He said:
"All Warfare"is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; 
when using our forces, we must seem inactive; 
when we are near, we must make the enemy believe 
that we are far away; when far away, we must 
make them believe we are near; hold out baits 
to entice the enemy.
Feign disorder and crush him ".^
In 16th century Italy, Machiavelli discussed like Kautilya and Sun-tzu, before him, the 
uses of calculated piety and duplicity in peace and war. In Shakespeare's plays, Mark 
Antony and the Duke of Buckingham display the principles of propaganda and discuss 
them in words and concepts that anticipate the present day behaviour of political scientists 
(see Julius Ceasar Actl 11 and Richardl 11, Actl 11). They refer to such propaganda 
strategems, as the seizure and monopolization of propaganda initiatives, the displacement 
of guilt on to others (scapegoatism), the presentation of oneself as morally superior, and 
the coordination of propaganda with violence and bribery. It is fair to deduce from such 
writings that psychological warfare and propaganda are one and the same thing or at least 
integrally assimilable with one another. It follows logically, that despite the fact that the 
word "propaganda" was not used in ancient times, the 'Act' existed through psychological 
warfare. It is as old as war itself. Another element which has surfaced from the above 
discussion is 'deception'. This will be discussed together with censorship. The other 
pointer that arises from the foregoing references, is the fact that apart from being as old 
as war, the elemental objective of propaganda has not changed -(ie.) to dismember the 
enemy psychologically and emotionally, in order to defeat him, whilst at the same time 
emotionally motivating the propagandist's constituency to go to war to defeat the assigned 
enemy. The process of deception referred to in the foregoing discussion was applied in the
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first world war, during the second world war by Hitler, and the Allies, during the Biaffan 
war by Nigeria and Biafra alike and as later seen during the Gulf war of 1991. 
Propaganda transcends time. It is necessarily a vital part of strategic military planning. It 
will be seen in chapters 4 & 5 how deception featured rather heavily in the Biafra war.
In cases where the propaganda status (eg. of the Kings, in England, or the military in 
Nigeria), is so immense, that counter propaganda, cannot reverse the psychological 
damage already done (to the counter propagandist's objectives), then it becomes 
necessary, to sever the head from the body: It becomes necessary to eliminate the 
messenger, the embodiment of the message that has become so overwhelming as to 
mesmerise the targeted publics.
In the English case, it was necessary to show that the King could be humiliated, and what 
better way to do it than to execute him publicly. The psychological effect was electric. It 
caused a reverse shock action. In the case of Biafra, the two earlier coups of 1966 (the 
first of January and the counter coup of July), were to achieve this aim. It proves that the 
"untouchables”, the "deified" are after all reachable. It causes the psychological and moral 
superiority of the propaganda status quo to evaporate, and in reverse, the counter 
propagandist becomes the "strong one", "the dependable one", the credible messenger, 
whose message ought to be taken seriously and believed.
Just as Genghis Khan used to frighten his enemies by planting rumours of huge ferocious 
Mongols in his army, in Nigeria similar stories abounded. There were stories of 'native 
doctors', 'juju men' or (as the European colonialists preferred to call them, witch doctors), 
leading their different warriors into battle. If one part to the conflict lost, it meant, 
according to folklore, that the 'juju man' of the victors was mystically stronger.
There is a clan in Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria called the Ukpum Ete/Okon clan. A civil 
war erupted in the clan (about 100 years ago), between Ete and Okon regarding the 
ascendency of the clan Kingship. Folklore has it that the leader of the Ete people was so
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mystically powerful that he could invisibly penetrate enemy ranks. He was impervious to 
bullets, arrows, matchettes, spears or any other offensive weapons. The two communities 
fought several skirmishes between them over territorial borders, and over the Kingship. In 
the final battle, Ete, because of the powers of its leader Obio-Akama, discarded bullets, 
pellets, cartridges, and all traditionally offensive weapons, and loaded their hunting and 
shot guns with sheep and goat dung. The Okon people had live bullets, pellets and 
cartridges in their guns. It is claimed that none of the Ete warriors died from that battle, 
whilst the Okon people were slaughtered, routed and annihilated. Since then, Okon has 
not dared to attack Ete again. ^
This legend represents the epitome of psychological warfare.
It accommodates all the hypotheses postulated by this thesis. It acted to motivate,
mobilise and sustain. It also outlasted the war. In his writings on the Ete warriors, Jackson
96Ufot, likens Obio-Akama as the English to King Arthur or King George the dragon 
slayer, and equates the Ete warriors with the Knights of the round table. They were 
indestructible, at least by human beings. Obio-Akama's tomb is a place of pilgrimage for 
all descendants of the clan, even now. All 'bona fide' male children of the clan are taken 
there for a ceremony when they are bom, because they are potential accessors to the 
throne - potential Kings. It is said that Obio-Akama never really died, but lives on.
These two communities of Ete and Okon became part of colonial Eastern Nigeria and 
were actively involved in the civil war. The influence of Biaffan and Nigerian propaganda 
on these communities will be discussed in chapter 4. It is clear however that psychological 
warfare or propaganda has its own cultural base and constituency. The reaction of the 
various cultural groups depend on the language and form of the message they receive, on 
the messenger, and on the interpretation of the received message, by the various segments 
or groups within a particular community. It is clear also that psychological warfare has no 
territorial bounds. As a concept, it is global. It has been transmitted from primitive times
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to modem times. If 'cowboy westerns' are anything to go by, psychological warfare was a
potent weapon in the hands of the Ameri-Indians who were fighting skirmishes for
survival against invading, occupying, and colonising 'white men'. Like the Ameri-Indians,
the wearing of leopard skins, charms, amulets and the carrying of offensive weapons as a
sign of prowess by an African warrior still endures amongst the Zulus of South Africa
even today. That is why it was difficult to make them discard these things, no matter how
much the South African Government and the African National Congress tried, during the
period preceding the multi party elections in 1994. It is like trying to strip them of their
last (psychological) propaganda weapon - like disarming them of their manly prowess. A
community does not have to be literate, or educated to imbibe and interpret propaganda.
It is in fact possible that an overly educated community would over-analyse and delay or
obstruct the effect of propaganda messages. This is ofcourse arguable. Psychological
warfare or propaganda is described as a system of education. The level at which this
education takes place is important. The culture of the society is also important, and varies
as from the Chinese community, through the English community, the Indian community to
97the African community. There have to be set goals for any propaganda message. This 
thesis prefers to describe those goals as objectives. The achievement of the goals or 
objectives depends on the measure of achievement at the end of the war. It is a matter of 
'finis opus coronat' (the end crowns the work).
Oral history deriving from the Ete and Okon communities, chosen as sample communities 
of Eastern Nigeria also suggests that covert psychological warfare was rampant during 
inter-communal and intra-communal wars. The implantation of rumours and agents to 
spread rumours within the enemy camp was a constant strategy. The issuance of 
pamphlets was not possible at the time, because of the people's level of education, but the 
rumours of invisible, invincible warriors, who could strike the enemy by pointing a finger 
to the sun, had impacted psychologically on the morale and emotions of the enemy.
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Overtly, town criers (who still exist today), were used to put out certain announcements, 
first thing in the morning, and last thing at night all around the propagandist's territory. 
One of the objectives of this in war time was to put out false messages to the scouts of the 
enemy - a process of deception - discussed in detail in the next section. Here, the point to 
note is that it was a clear case of information manipulation to achieve optimum 
propaganda effect and mislead the enemy.
By the time of the first world war, Christianity had arrived in Ete. With it came church 
bells. The tolling of church bells in a particularly coded message acted as a motivating 
morse code in the event of an attack on the community. It is not clear how this originated, 
or how it was deciphered. However, some selected members of the community were 
responsible for responding to the message of the church bells by the scouts, and for rapid 
mobilisation - a sort of "rapid reaction force".
At the other end of the world spectrum, in Russia, civil wars were as rife as they were in
Africa during the the old regime ie. the period up to 1939. Of great importance in this
context is the period of the Bolshevik revolution. The propaganda that preceded it, was
sustained during, and succeeded, this period, is part of the indelible history of Russia and
98the now defunct Soviet Union. According to John Dabom it is befitting to start with 
Karl Marx's motto, 'De Omnibus dubitandum' (one should doubt everything)! He states 
that on International Women's Day, 8th March, 1917, the government of Tsar Nicholas 11 
introduced a new round of bread and flour rationing in the capital, Petrograd. For 
thousands of women, housewives and factory workers, it was the final blow. They ignored 
the pleas of union leaders to remain calm. The banners carried on that day included more 
than demands for bread, but also an end to the war, and the overthrow of the autocracy. 
There were no casualties and the day seemed to end peacefully. However, the following 
day saw a mass strike involving half the factories in Petrograd. The demands for the 
overthrow of the Tsar now outstripped those for bread. It was on the third day, 10th
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March, that the police began firing on the striking workers. By 12th March, many of the 
conscript troops of the Petrograd garrison began to listen to the pleas of the 
demonstrators. Some remained hesitant, others moved over to join the crowd and fire on 
the police. The volhynian Regiment (among others) killed their commander and went over 
to the workers. Hitherto latent, inert, civil discontent, had suddenly been motivated and 
mobilised into a bread riot, culminating in a revolution. On 12th March, Russia acquired 
not one, but two new governments. The Petrograd Soviet of workers deputies which had 
briefly existed during the 1905 revolution was revived. On the same day and in the same 
building, the Tauride Palace, the Duma ignored the Tsar's call to disperse, and hesitatingly 
formed 'a Provisional Commitee'. This later became known as the provisional government. 
It was the politicians from this group who requested the Tsar's abdication on 15th March. 
This he did, once it became clear that he could no longer enjoy the trust of his army 
generals. The February revolution was over. It was regarded as a relatively bloodless coup 
since only 1,315 people were wounded or killed.
A society that thrives on revolutions, also invariably thrives on propaganda. As with the 
pre civil war, English Kings, and twentieth century military dictatorships, the Tsar was the 
Alpha and Omega of the Russian society before the revolution. Like all dictatorial and 
autocratic regimes, the subjects were reduced to non-entities, not only through physical 
domination, but also by the stories of the Tsar's enormous unquenchable powers. The 
message here was as uncompromising as that of the English Kings, and the military 
government in Nigeria, because, in any case the Tsar, the King, and the military, all ruled 
by physical and propagandist force. To counteract, the revolutionaries in any civil war 
have to address themselves to a simple uncomplicated message, in a language that would 
permeate the consciousness of the oppressed, and tap the sweet sap of the suppressed 
emotions, like an African tapper, tapping the sweet sap from a palm wine tree for public 
and mass drinking. In short, the message from the dictators and autocrats is total and
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uncompromising, whilst the message from the revolutionaries should be simple and
uncomplicated. The one is based on psychological pressure, on fear and intimidation; the
9Qother on redemption and emancipation - the common denominator in all revoltionaries.
The Russian situation witnessed carefully planned and executed covert propaganda against 
the Tsar, that motivated and mobilised the mass to take the action that resulted in the 
events of 8th to 12th March. It was an example of the revolutionaries understanding the 
needs of their constituencies, and using those needs to design a suitable message. In that 
circumstance, the message, even though propagandist, acts to motivate confidence, to 
coordinate and arouse inert and latent, mutual feelings, into spontaneous conflagration. 
After that, overt propaganda takes over, to sustain the actions of resistance, rebellion and 
revolution. John Dabom for instance, says that the Bolsheviks had come to power 
promising 'Peace, Bread and Land1, and 'All Power to the S o v ie ts '.O n  peace and land, 
Lenin wasted no time in drafting decrees in the first two days of the new regime. Bread 
was a more intractable problem, since that was not a matter to be settled by decree. These 
were all the things that the people were deprived of under the Tsar. The revolutionaries 
knew this, and responded to their demands. No one, had a clear idea as to what 'All Power 
to the Soviets' meant, or how it would operate. He says that one tendency which is clear 
however, is that before the signing of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in March 1918, the
-5 I
Bolsheviks passed through what is often described as their 'utopian' phase. 1 At this 
point, optimism was at its height, and Lenin expressed himself time and time again on the 
capacity of the ordinary masses to administer the new social order. This was given 
practical force in the decree on workers' control of the factories. Political prisoners were 
released, if they promised not to attack the Soviet power, and the Bolsheviks entered into 
a coalition with the largest peasant party, the 'left SRS'. Revolutionary propaganda is 
usually a question of 'them against us', and whoever exerts the greatest psychological 
impact, motivates the constituencies to gravitate towards the exerting propagandist or 
messenger. The 'floating voters' have to be swayed one way or another. John Dabom
51
again states that since the days of Alexander 11 the opposition to the Tsar was united by 
the call for a representative assembly. In the 1905 revolution, Nicholas 11 had only 
managed to regain control of the country by offering a parliament or Duma. This was 
immediately negated by the promulgation of the Fundamental Law of 1906, which 
maintained that the Tsar remained an autocrat; in other words, the Duma would have no 
real power: In the first two Dumas, the Kadets, and after them the Social Democrats tried 
to contest the Tsar's power and as a result, the Dumas were dismissed. In 1917, the 
February revolution was hailed by all opposition parties as the beginning of the long 
awaited 'democratic revolution'. At this point in the history of Russia, the people needed 
to be propelled into a particular course of action, the revolutionaries knew this, 
counteracted the Tsar's psychology of brainwashing, identified with the people, tuned their 
propaganda into their frequency, and, stimulated their consciousness.
Consideration of the Russian revolution, apart from answering the questions of who 
makes, and who receives propaganda, also answers the question of what is the effect of 
propaganda. The effect is implicit and the result is explicit. The effect is the motivation 
and mobilisation of the constituency, and the result is the event of 12th March - the 
overthrow of the Tsar, and the introduction of'democratic revolution'.
Sometimes, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary propaganda are like psychiatric 
treatment for people who have been subjected to prolonged mental brainwashing. The act 
is the reversal of conscious and unconscious beliefs and views held hitherto. It was not 
different in Russia, it was not different in Biafra, it is not different now. The Russian 
revolution also answers the question, which hopefully is self evident - why propaganda? - 
Without propaganda, the turning point would never have occured. It is propaganda that 
coordinated mutual feelings of discontent, and motivated the confidence to act in unison. 
This will again be treated in greater depth in the concluding chapter. Here was also an
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example of how civil war propaganda could be internationalised. John Dabom indicates 
that the Bolshevik view of the development of the revolution was intimately connected to 
the war, and the future international workers revolution, which Lenin believed would issue 
from it. Lenin's slogan in 1915 had been 'Turn the imperialist war into a civil war'. The 
Russian working class had done just this, but, although Brest Litovsk brought peace with 
Germany, it did not end the 'imperialist' war. The previous allies of Tsarist Russia (the 
Entente Powers, Britain and France), aided by the United States, Japan and the newly 
independent states of Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all declared war on 
Bolshevik Russia. Lenin maintained that his aim was to build a 'socialist order' (a worker's 
controlled state), inside Russia. He also envisaged that the international revolution would, 
within a matter of months rather than years, ensure the victory of the proletarian 
revolution, first in Russia, and then around the world, against all 'imperialist' dictatorships 
and governments.33 This was his message to his constituencies domestic and 
international. He was therefore surprised when the German workers and socialist parties 
had not risen up against the 'excesses' of the Kaiser. Nevertheless, communism and 
socialism did spread from Russia around the world, particularly to under-developed and 
developing countries seeking to shake off the yoke of imperialism and/or colonialism.
As in the case of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria (etc.), a 
copiously rehearsed, well organised and carefully targeted propaganda, whilst having the 
effect of psychological warfare domestically, does also have the tendency of either sucking 
in the international community financially, morally, physically and militarily; or alienating 
them, dependent on the targeted publics and the interpretations of the message received.
In either reaction, the messenger is affected negatively or positively. The effect of positive 
and negative propaganda will be taken up in the next section of this chapter.
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In large measure, the Bolshevik revolution was an outcome of the dissatisfaction caused 
by the gross mismanagement of Russian first world war effort. This in propaganda terms 
had vertical and horizontal effects, with the Russian populace demanding a change in 
governance, at least to extricate the country from the war.
Also, there was a bilateral influence in propaganda activity, with the Bolsheviks wanting 
to spread the 'proletarian' doctrine to the rest of the world after the overthrow of the Tsar, 
and the allies of the Tsar (Britain and France), trying psychologically to influence the 
Russian masses to resist the overthrow. They did this by intimidating them with the threat 
of repercussions and reprisals from the weight and range of forces lined up on the side of 
the Tsar, against the Russian populace. There was also Germany to deal with, which relief 
only came after the treaty of Brest Litovsk, already discussed.
However, this period saw an immense display and exploitation of psychological warfare, 
covert and overt around the world. For instance, Major General J.F.C.Fuller, describes the 
first world war as a 'Carnival of d ea th '.G en era l Fuller further states that fifty years 
before 1914, in the American civil war, when the muzzle-loading rifle prevailed, a 
participant wrote: "our infantry were tired of charging earthworks. The ordinary enlisted 
men assert that one good man behind an earthwork was equal to three good men outside 
of it" - an example of a currency of propaganda during the period (showing the prowess 
of the riflemen), also outlasting the war. However, General Fuller goes on to say that his 
troops were motivated to battle with the belief that the 'rifle bullet was Lord of the battle' 
in the first world war. The implication, the message was that the soldiers should be 
motivated to go into battle without fear, because they were protected by the greater fire 
power of the rifle bullet, as things had moved on since the American civil war period, 
when the muzzle-loading rifle prevailed. Rather, according to General Fuller, the prevalent 
belief amongst soldiers, arising out of the message to the constituencies, was that "it was 
the rifle bullet, which had rendered the defence stronger than the attack (here he was
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defending the incapacity of the generals to win profitable battles): it begot the rifle-pit and 
the trench, it sheathed the bayonet, it blunted the sword, it drove back the cannon, and it 
dismounted the horseman”.
Leon Wolf states that because of this, and other similar psychological messages, which 
created confidence in the combatants, they even took on bets on the war ending within 
one year. When things changed, they were no longer making bets that "the war would be 
over by next year". They had begun, he says, to whisper that "it might last a life time", 
usually followed by the mocking: "They say the first seven years will be the worst". 
Nobody sang "Tipperary" any more - that dashing inspiring tune of earlier days. It had 
been replaced by "Take Me Back To Dear Old Blighty". He goes on, sardonically they 
hummed to the tune o f " Auld Lang Syne"; and tunes like:
"We're here because we're here,
Because we're here, because we're here;
We're here because we're here,
or
Because we're here, because we're here".
This was a demonstration of positive psychological warfare (propaganda), turning 
negative when the objective is not achieved within specified parameters.
As in the case of the Bolshevik revolution, propaganda is legitimised when the objectives 
are not only just achievable, but achieved, even if the starting point was deception. When 
the objectives are not achieved within certain set parameters and goals, a negative effect 
results which becomes counter productive, as illustrated by the British soldiers (in the 
medium term) in the first world war. This does not mean that the war was not eventually 
won by Britain and the Allies; it only means that because the front soldiers, the survivors,
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expected to see their families in a year, when victory did not soon materialise, the 
opposite motivation crept in. It is essential therefore to sustain the propaganda and 
intensify it during the war, in order to sustain morale. It might be necessary to alter the 
message and the form of sending it, in order to achieve this. In this case the British 
soldiers, having found themselves in a 'catch 22' situation, had to rouse their own morale 
with the kind of songs cited above. A constituency not only galvanises itself, but 
inwardly believes in its ultimate, if protracted victory.
2.4.. Censorship.
The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines censor as an official with power to 
suppress whole or parts of books, plays, films, letters, news, (etc.) on grounds of 
obscenity, threat to security (etc.). (2).v.t. act as censor of; make deletions or changes in;
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(3). censorship n: censorial.
The Britannica defines censor, 0 plural censors, or censores, m ancient Rome; as a 
magistrate whose original functions of registering citizens and their property were greatly 
expanded to include supervision of senatorial rolls and moral conduct. Censors also 
assessed property for taxation and contracts, penalised moral offenders by removing their 
public rights, such as voting and tribe membership, and presided at the lustrum ceremonies 
of purification at the close of each census. The censorship was instituted in 443BC and 
discontinued in 22BC, when the emperors assumed censorial powers.
The censors, who always numbered two, were elected normally at five-year intervals in 
the 'Comitia Centuriata' (one of the assemblies in which the Roman people voted). 
Plebeians became eligible in 351BC for the originally patrician office. Judgements were
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passed only with the agreement of both incumbents, and the death or abdication of one 
resulted in the retirement of the other.
In traditional East Asia, a censor was a governmental official charged primarily with the 
responsibility for scrutinizing and criticizing the conduct of officials and rulers. The office 
originated in China, where under the Ch'in (221-206BC) and Han (206BC-AD220) 
dynasties, the censor’s function was to criticize the emperor's acts; but as the imperial 
office gained prestige, the censorate became mainly an instrument for imperial control of 
the bureaucracy, investigating acts of official corruption and misgovemment for the 
emperor. The censors checked important documents, supervised construction projects, 
reviewed judicial proceedings, kept watch over state property, and maintained a general 
lookout for cases of subversion and corruption. Although the functions of the censorate 
were maintained in the Chinese Nationalist, and to a lesser extent, the Chinese Communist 
governments, the institution effectively ended in China with the overthrow of the Ch'ing 
dynasty in 1911 However, a censorate apparatus was adopted by all the East and Central 
Asian states that copied the Chinese bureaucratic system. In Korea, because of the 
relatively weak position of the Korean King and the strength of the aristocracy, the 
censorate became a highly important organ, that not only scrutinized corruption, but 
criticized the policies of the monarch.
The Micropaedia Britannica^ defines censorship as the suppression or prohibition of 
speech or writing that is condemned as subversive of the common good. It occurs in all 
manifestations of authority to some degree, but in modem times, it has been of special 
importance in its relation to government and the rule of law. In the ancient world, the 
regulation of the moral, as well as the political, life of a people was considered a proper, if 
not necessary role of government.
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In the ancient Greek communities, as in Rome, it was assumed that the character of a 
people would and should be shaped by the government. Even the quite open society of 
Athens had limits, as indicated by the trial and conviction of Socrates in 399BC for his 
corruption of youth, and acknowledgement of unorthodox divinities.
In the Republic. Plato outlines a comprehensive system of censorship, particularly of the 
arts, as part of the development of the best possible regime.
Such censorship was an integral part of life in ancient Israel, where opinions and actions 
were routinely governed by the community. But, those in a position to know - the prophet 
Nathan, for example, were expected to speak out against abuses by those in power. This 
was possible because the community had been trained to share a group of moral principles 
grounded in thoughtfulness. It led to the encouragement in early Christianity of private 
individual testimonies of faith, bearing upon the eternal welfare of the soul.
Ancient China was perhaps the largest polity to be thoroughly trained on a vast scale. Of 
great importance were the systems of education and examination that determined one's 
place in a social structure that made much of the Confucian insistence upon deference to 
authority and respect for ritual. Under the Chinese system, control of information was 
retained by the authorities, who also determined the contents of the authoritative texts.
In Christendom, perhaps the most dramatic form of censorship was the Index 'Librorum 
Prohibitorum', by which the Roman Catholic church for centuries policed the literature 
available to its followers. Other methods used by authorities (Catholic and non-Catholic 
alike), to control what people believed or thought, were the development of creeds, such 
as the Nicene Creed', and the conduct of trials, such as those of Joan of Arc (1431), and 
Thomas More (1535).
The struggle against censorship in the Anglo-American world began to take its modem 
form in the 17th and 18th centuries. Of special importance was John Milton's
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Areopagitica1 (1644), in which he argued against a government's right to license (or 
previously restrain) publication. Milton's definition of freedom of the press, however, did 
not preclude the condemnation of material after publication, a matter taken up by the 'First 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America (1787).^
The question that now arises is, what is the role of censorship in propaganda? As has 
already been illustrated, propaganda is the manipulation of information to achieve the 
propagandist's objectives. Censorship, clearly involves massive manipulation of 
information. It will be seen in later chapters how in modem warfare, censorship is heavily 
applied in war time (civil, international or global), by dictatorial, autocratic and 
democratic states alike, to disinform or misinform the enemy. In monitoring and 
controlling what is disseminated from the propagandist's media and other sources, the 
enemy is not only kept in the dark about what the intentions of the propagandist are, he 
also receives only that information that the propagandist intends the enemy to receive. A 
vital part of this type of manipulation is deception. By controlling what goes out, and 
deliberately planting lies in the information available to the enemy, the possibility of 
altering or determining the enemy's war stategy is effected.
In Biafra, for instance, after the fall of Enugu, the Capital, Radio Biafra still announced 
that it was broadcasting from Enugu, throwing the Nigerian front line in the Enugu sector 
into confusion, whilst boosting the morale of the Biafran publics (military and civilian). In 
similar vein, during the Gulf war in 1991, by keeping tight control of, and manipulating 
what the press gained access to, General Norman Schwartzkopf gave the impression that 
he was planning an amphibious landing on Iraq, while all the time, he was in fact planning 
a land invasion. Thus censorship is a vital propaganda tool, and consequently, a major part 
of strategic planning. In the Biafran case, with the sacking (or liberation according to the 
Nigerian side), of Enugu, even when the radio was broadcasting from a mobile van or
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from a bunker, the fact that it still claimed to be broadcasting from Enugu, helped to keep 
up the morale of the domestic scene and create some credibility within the international 
community. In the first world war, had the British soldiers not been led to believe that 
they were going to win the war in one year, it is anybody's guess what their motivation to 
go to war would have been. In summary, censorship and psychological warfare involve 
vital strategic manipulation of information to achieve certain set objectives. These are 
essential and important propaganda tools.
In relating censorship to propaganda, it is possible to argue that different sorts of polities, 
ranging from the democratic to the authoritarian, have attempted a variety of social 
controls over propaganda.^ In an ideal democracy, every one would be free to make 
propaganda, and free to oppose propaganda habitually through peaceful counter 
propaganda. The democratic ideal assumes that, if each is free to make propaganda, the 
ideas best for society will win out in the long run. This outcome would require that a 
majority of the general populace be reasonably well educated, intelligent, public spirited 
and patient, and that they not be greatly confused by an excess of communication. A 
democratic system also presupposes that large quantities of dependable and relevant 
information will be inexpensively disseminated by relatively well - financed, public - 
spirited, and uncensored news gathering and educational agencies.
The extent to which any existing national society actually conforms to this model is an 
open question. That the world social system does not, is self-evident.
Censorship, as a propaganda instrument in war, does not only involve the control of what 
information the propagandist's media (and sources) put out to the domestic, external, and 
enemy publics, it also involves the control of what comes from the external and enemy 
media into the domestic environment, which is likely to demoralise the civilian population 
and the military. Censorship as an instrument of propaganda in war is an organised 
exercise in damage limitation to the morale of the propagandist's targeted audience.
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An element of control is required to be able to censor. Governments can censor what 
emanates from the government controlled media and sources whilst rebels, or freedom 
fighters, or civilian war lords (dependent on one's leanings), can censor whatever 
emanates from whatever media or sources they control. The period before the first world 
war saw much covert propaganda activity against the Hapsburg rule of the Balkan states. 
This culminated in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.
No doubt, this was a spark for overt propaganda, that transmitted from the civil, domestic 
Balkan act, and sucked in the rest of the world, leading to the greatest human carnage the 
world had ever witnessed - truly, a "Carnival of Death". This was an example of the effect 
of propaganda and manipulation of information (covert and overt), leading to a 
devastating result - a global conflagration.
Covert propaganda adopts the form of secret or (pirate) radio stations and well organised 
information dissemination sources, pamphleteering, secret meetings, oral transmittion of 
subversive messages. The overthrow of the monarch (as seen in the English civil wars), or 
the dislodging of the establishment, or occupying military authority (as in Nigeria and 
Biafra), is never a task to be taken lightly. The related propaganda involves the risk of 
discovery, and possible death on discovery. It has to be a well organised network. There 
have to be linkages and connections to and with the external constituencies sympathetic to 
the cause of the propagandist. The polity, on the other hand has to try to censor the 
revolutionary propaganda of the freedom fighters or rebels. In some cases, this involves, 
imprisonment, death, bombing, destruction or setting alight the radio stations and other 
sources of dissemination. It also involves large scale seizure of published material. Where 
the materials have already been circulated, the authorities can issue a decree banning the 
possession, reading, posting, or publication of the materials in any form - a process of 
official counter propaganda. In cases where the radio stations of the revolutionaries are 
clandestine, and cannot be immediately discovered, a process of'jamming' of the
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frequency is employed. This, and pamphleteering were also largely employed during the 
first world war. Nigeria similarly employed a lot of ’jamming' on Biafran radio stations. 
They also air-dropped pamphlets on Biafran territory. Another method of official counter 
propaganda, apart from the ones discussed above, is the publication of official counter 
propaganda materials, and the use of official media to send messages. Sometimes, these 
are forced down the throats of often times reluctant domestic society, and a confused 
external society. This can produce a negative effect on a highly disciplined, well organised 
population, who treat the official counter propaganda with disdain and scorn, and become 
more resolute to press on with their cause.
An example of how resolute a group can be is implicit in a chapter titled ’’The Bluff', in 
John Glubb's Into Battle -A Soldier's Diary of the Great War.43 chronicling his experience 
in the first world war. In most cases, the military constituency resorts to self motivating 
songs. As the odds against survival lengthened, John Glubb's military audience was 
entertained by a song that went thus -
"I want to go home! I want to go home!
I don't want to go to the trenches no more, 
where the whizz - bangs and shrapnel they 
whistle and roar.
Take me over the Sea, 
where the Allermans cannot catch me,
Oh my! I don't want to die, 
want to go home!”
According to Glubb, the song would be followed by loud cheers. He wondered whether 
the Boche intelligence had received copies of the song, and reported that the morale of the 
British army was cracking. That in itself, could have been a process of deception, meant to 
mislead the enemy into lowering its guard. It could be described as a horizontally 
transmitted military propaganda. There was also a popular song that was sung just before 
battle, called, "The Galloping Major".
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The corporal sang a parody of this:
"Whenever we go to war, 
we drive the enemy barmy,
Hi! Hi!
Never say die!
Here comes Kitchiner's Army."
The objective is implicit in the self motivating message of confidence. Any other type of 
message issuing from the military source at this time to the enemy, would have been 
censored, treated as treason, and resulted in the court martial of the 'traitor', unless of 
course, the individual was a scout or spy for the enemy, and transmitted his message 
covertly. Even then, on discovery he would be subjected to a traitor's punishment as 
defined. All this is a form of military censorship, which goes on, not only in war time, but 
all the time. As a constituency, therefore, the military is subjected, and subjects itself, to 
perpetual censorship. This is why the military should not be in government, because when 
they are, the military censorship so described, is transmitted and extended to the whole of 
the civil state. There can therefore be none of the required and necessary, fundamental 
freedoms whilst the military is in power.
Annette Tapert (Despatches from the Heart - An Anthology of letters jrom the, front). 
published a poem written in the trenches by Siegfried Sassoon, on 10th February 1916.^ 
It exhibits how the self motivation transmitted outside the immediate constituency (in this 
case the military), can have the opposite, negative interpretation by even other loyal, 
uninvolved constituencies (the civilian constituency). The poem is in three verses, and is 
published along with letters by other soldiers in the trenches, who were constantly writing 
to their loved ones, to let them know that they were still alive. The third verse of the 
poem goes thus:
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"...And, then he thought: to - morrow night we 
trudge
Up to the trenches and my boots are rotten.
Five miles of stodgy clay and freezing sludge,
And everything but wretchedness forgotten.
To-night he's in the pink; but soon he'll die.
And still the war goes on - he do'nt know why."
The civilian population, being confronted by these messages, these apparent musings from 
a soldier in the trenches, may tend to think that there was no justification for the war to 
continue, because the suffering in the trenches was unbearable, and that the soldiers were 
demoralised. It becomes arguable, therefore, whether even these sort of letters, and 
poems, should be censored also.
However, the songs, poems, and letters are indications of propaganda outlasting the war. 
The songs in themselves motivated and sustained morale during the war, but their 
endurance and indelibility have lived on. Generations, who otherwise would not have 
known, heard about, least of all remembered the first world war, would, through the 
songs, poems, and letters, paint mental pictures of the trenches during the war, and the 
people who fought in them. The effect of this is perpetual resentment for the perpetrators 
of the war. Therefore, even in the post war structure, propaganda still has a vicariously 
controlled motivating factor, forcing or enabling younger generations to go to war against 
old enemies. This is borne out in Israel - the age old struggle over Palestine between the 
Jews and Arabs; and in Yugoslavia, where the world is again witnessing almost a 
replication of the events that led (with Sarajevo again as a fulcrum), to the first world war. 
It is a conscious manifestation of subconscious feeling. The propaganda constituency 
becomes futuristic. This may not have in fact been the intention of the authors, but it does 
not obliterate the propaganda effect it creates.
I.T.V.Channel 4 shows paintings and poems of participants in the American civil war. As 
already discussed, these, together with the numerous 'cow-boy westerns' shown around
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the world, create, and send propaganda messages of winners and losers, engendering a 
dual effect on four different constituencies. First, the vanquished, particularly the Ameri- 
Indians feel offended and humiliated, second, the blacks feel the objectives of their 
propaganda war thrusts have not been achieved, third, the Caucasians of the victorious 
North, (except a few) feel superior and elated, fourth, the Caucasians of the South, 
resented defeat, and want a return to their fore father's status quo.
Ironically, in Nigeria, the Biafrans have not regrouped to continue the struggle. The 
reasons for this will be elaborated on in chapter 4. But, it is evident from the foregoing 
discussion that the effects of propaganda are durable, and far outlast the war (negatively 
or positively).
However, as Niccolo Machiavelli^ has shown, while some propaganda may have the 
effect of outlasting a war, it may not have had the same motivating effect during the war 
itself. His attempts to raise an effective militia strong enough to defend Florence were 
unsuccessful, except for a single defence against the M e d ic i , a n d  even that collapsed 
eventually. Machiavelli published extensively, to motivate the people of Florence, his 
bitterness arising from the fact that foreigners (notably France and Spain), were ruling 
Italy. His principal loyalty though, was to Florence, which he hoped he could motivate, 
and mobilise, and use as an example to the other city states of Italy to take pride in 
themselves, and 'stand up to be counted'. He was first a republican, and second, a patriot. 
He was derided by some at the time, and had a rather checkered career. Nevertheless, his 
writings such as 'the Art of War, and 'the Prince', have outlived him, and in retrospect, 
have been taken seriously.
There are some arguments now on whether war has moved on from being just an 'art', to 
being 'pure science'. While this may not be of concern in the context of this thesis, it is 
important to observe that some schools of thought have noted that propaganda has 
evolved from being a mere 'art', to the 'science of propaganda'.
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In the book, there is an interesting illustration of Machiavelli's attempt to motivate 
Florentines to build a good, strong militia, that would rescue the Republic, and 
subsequently act to encourage all of Italy to resist domination by foreigners.
"...Wise princes, therefore have always shunned auxiliaries, and made use of their own 
forces. They have preferred to lose battles with their own forces than win them with 
others, in the belief that no true victory is possible with alien arms. Now I shall never 
hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his conduct as an example. The duke used auxiliaries in 
his invasion of the Romagna, going there at the head of French troops. With those, he 
took Imola and Forli. But then, he decided that they were unsafe, and he turned to 
mercenaries in the belief that less risk was involved, hiring the Orsini and the Vitelli. In 
making use of these, he found them to be suspect, disloyal and dangerous; so he got rid of 
them and raised his own forces. And one can easily see the difference between these 
forces by considering the difference between the standing of the duke when he had only 
the French, and when he relied only on his own forces. He grew in stature at each stage; 
and he was held in real respect only when every one saw that he was absolute master of 
his armies."
The implication here is of a lack of motivation by the targeted constituency, resulting in 
the failure of the propaganda objective. It demonstrates how different segments of a 
particular constituency react to the same message. The Italian citizens would have been 
more motivated to fight for their 'Republics', than the mercenaries were;and they had to be 
motivated, to uphold the pride of the people. As a war strategy, this was analogous to 
the problems encountered by Biafra with conscripts from the minority areas, during the 
civil war.
There is of course a difference between conscripts and mercenaries, even in their 
motivation to war. Sometimes, mercenaries, fighting mainly for their money, are better 
trained professional soldiers, and can in certain circumstances be more reliable. Conscripts 
are usually reluctant participants, virtually in some cases, dragged against their will, to 
fight. There is no real commitment on their part. Several of such conscripts deserted their 
posts during the Biafra war, as did the Iraqi conscripts during the Gulf war, leaving open 
to the enemy large, easily penetrable flanks.
To justify his message, towards the end of'The Prince', Machiavelli writes;
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"It is necessary, therefore, to raise such an army, in order to base our defence against the 
invaders on Italian strength. Although the Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered 
formidable, nonetheless there are faults in both which would enable a third kind of army 
not only to hold them in battle but to be sure of conquering. The Spaniards cannot 
withstand cavalry, and the Swiss have cause to fear infantry-men, who meet them in 
combat with a determination to equal their own. Thus it has been found, and experience 
will prove that the Spaniards cannot withstand French cavalry and the Swiss succumb to 
Spanish infantry. There may have been no complete demonstration of this latter assertion, 
but there was some indication of it's truth at the battle of Ravenna, where Spanish infantry 
troops clashed with the German battalions, which adopt the same line of battle as the 
Swiss. In the encounter, the Spaniards, making good use of their bucklers, with great 
agility thrust their way between and under the German pikes, and attacked with impunity 
while the Germans were defenceless. If it had not been for the cavalry which charged 
them, the Spaniards would have annihilated the Germans. So, having grasped the defects 
of these Swiss and Spanish infantry, you can develop a new type, capable of withstanding 
cavalry and undaunted by other infantry. This will be ensured by raising new armies and 
employing new formations. It is things of this kind which, when newly introduced, bring a 
new prince greatness and prestige.
In order therefore that Italy, after so long a time may behold it's saviour, this opportunity 
must not be let slip. And I cannot express with what love he would be welcomed in all 
those provinces, which have suffered from these foreign inundations, with what thirst for 
vengeance, with what resolute loyalty, with what devotion and tears. What doors would 
be closed to him? What people would deny him that obedience? What envy would stand in 
his way? What Italian would refuse him allegiance? This barbarous tyranny stinks in every 
one's nostrils. Let your illustrious House undertake this task, therefore with the courage 
and hope which belong to just enterprises, so that, under your standard, our country may 
be ennobled, and under your auspices what Petrarch said may come to pass:
'Virtue 'gainst fury shall advance the fight,
And it i'th combate soone shall put to flight:
For th' old Romane valour is not dead,
Nor in the Italians brests extinguished'."
The above passage comes from the paragraph called 'Exhortation to liberate Italy from the 
barbarians', and is addressed to the 'new Prince' of Ita ly .^
The purpose of reproducing this long 'ode-like' passage, is to demonstrate the fervour of 
Machiavelli's love for his country, the objective of his propaganda message, and his power 
of persuasion. It is surprising that he was not listened to. The last paragraphs are 
particularly moving, and could motivate and mobilise most modem constituencies. It is
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possible that he, himself, his writings, or his propaganda, were rather futuristic for the 
people of Italy at the time, and so were anachronistic. Society, perhaps, was more 
practical at the time, and made little room for theorising. This is also, presumably, why he 
had to go into practical details of actual war strategies to assert his point, his conviction, 
and his message. It was a powerful message that he sent to the Italian publics.
Even though it may have seemed anachronistic at the time, the message has lived on after 
him, and in retrospect, perhaps, if he had been listened to and taken more seriously, the 
world map might have been drawn differently today. That, of course, is a matter of 
conjecture. The passage also shows that no words can be lost in propaganda. The 
language has to suit the environment in time and structure.
It may take one line to motivate some people; it may take lengthy passages to motivate 
and mobilise others within a given space and time: it still may take several repetitions of 
the same messages to motivate, mobilise and sustain some constituencies. Each case is a 
matter of tactics.
Mirian Kocham (The Last Days of Imperial Russia). ^  illustrates this when she says that 
in the midst of all the upheavals of the time in Russia, in January 1904, Russia embarked 
on an irrelevant, and in the event, wholly abortive war with Japan. Viacheslav 
Konstantinoviel Plehve, Minister of the Interior, had said that "in order to hold back the 
revolution, we need a small victorious war". War, on this occasion, did not constitute the 
universal panacea, despite the obvious propaganda strategic intentions.
It did not bind the disunited people of Russia together into one coherent, patriotic body. 
On the contrary, it brought to the fore all the discordant forces which until then had 
remained peripheral. The assassination by revolutionary groups continued. On 15th July, 
1905 Plehve, himself a symbol of the government's policy of repression, its contempt for 
public opinion, anti-semitism and bureaucratic tyranny, was killed by a social
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revolutionary's bomb. Dr. Dillon, the Daily Telegraph correspondent, happened^ to be 
passing when:
"...two men on bicycles glided past, followed by a closed carriage, which I recognised as 
that of the all-powerful minister. Suddenly, the ground before me quivered, a tremendous 
sound as of thunder deafened me, the windows of the houses on both sides of the broad 
street rattled and the glass of the panes was hurled on to the stone pavements. A dead 
horse, a pool of blood, fragments of a carriage, and a hole in the ground were parts o f my 
rapid impression. My driver was on his knees devoutly praying and saying, that the end of 
the world had come. Plehve's end was received with semi-public rejoicings. I met nobody 
who regretted his assassination or condemned the authors."
Most propagandists use external threat to seek to unify and galvanise domestic support in 
war. This goes for civil as well as international war. Biafra, for instance accused 'the 
muslim North' of wanting to exterminate 'the Christian South' of Nigeria, and called on all 
Christians to unite and fight for Biafra. It will be seen later how the domestic Biafran 
public, and the international, external public reacted to this type of propaganda (chs 4&5).
The cold war was sustained by both East and West on the basis of this type of propaganda 
of real or imaginary external, and/or nuclear threat, even though it was obvious that the 
super powers would never resort to war, least of all nuclear war. It was sustained for 
some forty years until the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the West at a loss on how 
to justify its continous arms build up and retention of nuclear weapons.
In a fragmented society, like Russia of the time, Biafra/Nigeria, Iraq, this type of 
propaganda is always 'risky', where absolute loyalties cannot be assured. Clearly, it failed 
in the Russian case, and produced, rather a negative interpretation of, and reaction to the 
intentions of the official propaganda message, from the domestic population. The 
populace was motivated in the opposite direction to the objectives of the official 
propaganda, leading up to the assassination of Plehve, and to a revolution.
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In the American civil war, the situation was different. There was a polarity between the 
North and the South. Apart from the usual 'spies' and 'traitors', there was loyalty on both 
sides, making the propaganda objective easier to achieve. In the South, propagandists 
devoted their efforts to asserting the right to secede, and to proving that the aggresive 
North was invading Southern territory. In the North, the preservation of the Union, 
patriotism, and the crusade against slavery were the major themes. Atrocity stories - 
largely of brutal treatment of the wounded, military prisoners and political dissenters - the 
usual accusations prevailed. As in the Nigeria/Biafra case, one side usually gets on top in 
the propaganda war. Whilst in the American case, it was the North that succeeded; in the 
Nigerian case, it was Biafra in the South. The war can some times be won and/or lost, 
dependent on the effectiveness of the propaganda of each side. The South, in the 
American civil war, badly needed arms, but its propaganda organisation was dismal, and 
could not mobilise the external constituency to help; Biafra started with nothing, was 
blockaded on land, air and sea, (chs.4&5), but its effective propaganda motivated the 
external contituency, bringing in much needed external help to enable it to sustain the war 
for three years.
2.5. Conclusion.
The age of the 'just war' in Europe was also the period that saw 'might' as 'right'. It was 
held that a ruler, by proper declaration, and with proper motives, might employ armed 
force outside his normal jurisdiction to defend rights, rectify wrongs, and punish crimes. It 
was therefore necessary for the ruler to justify the existence of these conditions. It was 
also essential for him to possess the might to overwhelm the offending state. One way of 
overwhelming the enemy was by psychological warfare.
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By making the enemy feel militarily inferior, he loses the will to fight. This could be done 
covertly and/or overtly. The other method employed was the prevention of the 'offending' 
authority from putting accross its own arguments and defence. This was done by way of 
censorship. But, this required control over the means of message transmition of the 
transgressor. All this means that although the word propaganda might not have been used 
militarily, the ingredients existed in psychological warfare and censorship, because modem 
propaganda employs the same methods, as the next chapter illustrates.
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CHAPTER THREE.
MODERN METHODS AND CONCEPTS.
3.1. Introduction.
The period after the First World War, leading up to the Second World War witnessed 
physical and psychological developments in propaganda activity.
It was a period when the word 'propaganda’, apart from being deeply rooted and applied 
in military activities, was developed and institutionalised. It has been seen how active 
propaganda activities were, leading up to the First World War. It is possible to argue that 
the setting up of the League of Nations was an attempt by some major world powers to 
institutionalise their propagandist manoeuvres on a global basis, in order to continue to 
dominate psychologically. Indeed, the League collapsed, because of the confusing and 
confused messages that emanated from it. It is also possible to argue that this was the first 
attempt at the international institutionalisation of propaganda. Having learnt from that 
failure, the second time round - with the United Nations - the major powers succeeded in 
effecting the institutionalisation of a propaganda forum; a place where 'jaw-jaw' was better 
than 'war-war'. *
The different nations of the world applied propaganda in their dealings with each other, in 
foreign policy and conflict, with greater intensity, developing and imitating whatever 
precedent there was.
The First World War had a devastating effect on the world. It had destabilised and 
debilitated the world's human and material resources. It had also taught governments 
some lessons. It had taught them the art of massive warfare. It consequently taught them 
the art of building up to war - the art of propaganda. The world probably believed that 
never again would there be another war of that nature, that would be so devastating to the
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human race. But no one anticipated the power of propaganda that was built up, 
scientifically and artfully manouvered and institutionalised within Germany. It was this 
power that led to the second greatest human carnage - the Second World War.
The Ministry of Propaganda, set up by Adolf Hitler and run by Goebbels was the 
culmination of marathon propaganda against the Jews, foreigners, and everything non- 
German, that had consumed German society. It led to the overthrow of the legitimate 
civil State, the holocaust, the aggression against the neighbours of the German State, the 
declaration of war, the putsch, and the Second World War. The whole of the Hitleric 
German State was borne out of propaganda, sustained on propaganda, and collapsed like 
a pack of cards with the collapse of the system. It was entirely systemic.
Since Nations of the world are copycats, this lesson was not lost on other States in their 
domestic, and external operations and decision making. Therefore, the birth of modern 
negative and positive propaganda became feasible.
The Biafran leaders must have been deliberating on these lines when they set up the 
Directorate of Propaganda during the Nigerian civil war. Also often called the Propaganda 
Directorate, it was responsible for organising Biafran internal and external war 
propaganda. The chapter is discussed under three headings - methods, concepts, and 
derivative concepts. Derivative modem concepts mirror modem concepts. The reflection 
is indicative of family resemblance - the capacity of states to imitate. In part, the latter 
might sound inevitably repetitive of the former.
There will be constant juxtaposition and interposition of the models and other examples, 
in order to expose the argument.
80
3.2. Methods:
The dropping of pamphlets behind enemy lines from overflying aircraft had already been a 
feature during the first world war. The jamming of frequencies of enemy radio stations 
was also used during the first world war. The oral and physical infiltration and penetration 
of enemy ranks both civil and military, with negative and damaging information was 
carried over to this period; it was a lesson learned from earlier warfare tactics. None of 
these methods collapsed with the first world war. The propaganda lessons of the first 
world war helped to improve on the utility, application, and method of propaganda. 
During the period, major world powers were still shuffling for influence, power, and 
atmospheric hegemony. Colonisation was rife, and so was the need to psychologically 
subjugate the colonised states in the various spheres of influence with and by tested 
methods,e.g;
a. Institutionalisation and other related methods.
By any standard of examination, the cardinal example of modem propaganda in war, is the 
German state of the post first world war, and immediate pre-second world war period, 
which was established by the National Socialists or Nazis. Inevitably, therefore, the 
propaganda of Hitler's Germany takes up most of the space in this chapter, which covers 
its methods and concepts.
Hitler was a corporal in the German army during the first world war. The experience of 
the war and the propaganda that accompanied it were not lost on him. The successes and 
failures of Germany in that war were also not lost on him. It is difficult to decipher what 
nurtured his ambitions then, but his rise to power through the economic depression of the 
interwar period is significant. A school of thought believes that the conditions and drastic 
sanctions imposed on Germany after the first world war, were so impossible to maintain 
and fulfil, that the resultant second world war was inevitable. Sir Edward Heath, in a 
speech after the Gulf war in 1991 referred to this when he argued against the repetition of
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9that kind of'mistake' by the allies, in imposing impossible and draconian conditions and 
sanctions on Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
Nevertheless, whether it was this or the severe world wide depression of the 1930s, 
following the first world war, that was responsible for the rise of Hitler to power is 
difficult to tell. What is clear is that Hitler found a combination of these factors fertile 
ground to germinate his propaganda, which nourished, sprouted, sustained, and grew into 
an institution - the Ministry of Propaganda. It was the first time in history that propaganda 
activities had congealed into an official institution.
The process was to legitimise official and State propaganda. Radio was the chief weapon 
for the German Ministry of propaganda. Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf: 'In war, words are 
acts'. This lays emphasis on pronouncements made by rulers in war time, and even also in 
foreign policy, and in politics in peace time. The difficulty arises when such 
pronouncements are calculated to deceive and mislead. If 'words are acts', the question 
arises, which or what acts are to be believed or not to be believed.
In July 1992, The British Sunday Times.  ^ serialised the diaries of Goebbels, Hitler's chief 
propagandist in charge of the Ministry of propaganda. The diaries covered the period 
leading up to Hitler's mysterious death and Goebbel's reported suicide.
As an example of propaganda in war, the German case illustrates the argument of this 
thesis. The build up of the propaganda preceded the war, was sustained intensely through 
the war, and as recent events in Germany have shown, lingered on long after the war, even 
when the system had collapsed. According to Peter Millar (The Sunday Times, 5 July 
1992 Goebbels' diaries give an insight into Nazi propaganda. They trace the moulding 
of the German society from 1933 to the putsch and through the war. The diaries highlight 
the 'Sudeten crisis' leading up to the Munich meeting with Neville Chamberlain, the British 
Prime Minister, and the disemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Polish crisis, and the 
outbreak of war in 1939; the murderous purge of 'unreliable' Nazi Party members in the
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1934 'night of the long knives'; Hitler's reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour; 
and the failed plot to kill Hitler in 1944'. Peter Millar maintains that the diaries reveal a 
callous cynicism on the part of the propaganda chief, notably in the passages leading to 
'kristalnacht', in which Goebbels rejoices in the orgy of destruction: 'the sky is blood 
red...the synagoge is burning...bravo! bravo!'
Hitler's explicit role in ordering the pogrom is spelt out as Goebbels describes in the 
diaries how he gives Goebbels the first news of the demonstration against the Jews in 
Berlin, and how he 'decrees' that the demonstration should go ahead: 'withdraw the police. 
It is time the Jews felt the wrath of the people. That's right. I give the instruction to the 
police and the party'. As a result, Goebbels' 'stosstruppen', special action brigades, were 
sent out to urge the rioters to start fires.
Goebbels goes on to describe how the following day, Hitler sat in his favourite Italian 
restuarant in Munich, chatting contentedly about the night of the carnage. Hitler's tactics 
were both to build up, through effective overt and covert propaganda, the emotions of the 
German people to prepare to fight against a real or imagined enemy - first, internally - 
within Germany, and second externally. The home front had to be so completely 
consumed by this propaganda that when the time was right, mobilisation against the 
enemy internally and externally was easy. He motivated the German people to hate, as 
already discussed, first the Jews, second, all foreigners, third, other surrounding countries 
which were neighbours of Germany, and fourth, the rest of the world. His propaganda 
brainwashed the German people, preceded, sustained the second world war, and lingered 
on in the minds of youths who are even now still prepared to think of him as their hero.
Goebbels' diaries are an incisive revelation of the psychological state of Hitler's mind, and 
of the message transmitted to the German people, as the following passage reveals: 'I give 
an account to the Fuhrer in the 'Osteria'. He is in agreement on everything. His opinions
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are very radical and aggressive. The action itself has gone off perfectly. 100 dead. But no 
German property damaged.'
Peter Millar maintains that the diaries also give an insight into Hitler's determination to 
lead Germany into war despite the caution of some of his advisers, and, the last minute 
dice-game played with Britain over the fate of Czechoslovakia in 1938, and critically in 
1939. Up to the eleventh hour, with plans for the invasion of Poland formulated, the 
diaries reveal that Hitler was still passing messages via an intermediary to Chamberlain. 
Chamberlain, condemned for his appeasement of the Nazis was seen by Goebbels as 'an 
ice-cold old English man', and a 'fox', but not one that scared Hitler: 'the Fuhrer will show 
Chamberlain his map and that's it. Basta...London is immeasurably frightened of 
force...the English...will undoubtedly cave in, when they come up against hard opposition'. 
Peter Millar suggests that Chamberlain appears to have played a harder game than has 
been appreciated, because Goebbels recounts: 'the Fuhrer gives him his memorandum. A 
bitter row follows about certain points. Things go so far that at one stage Chamberlain 
suddenly gets up to go; he has done his duty, there is no point in continuing and he can 
wash his hands with a clean conscience'.
Goebbels spent hours reading transcripts of the tapped telephones, of the French and 
British Ambassadors in Berlin as they discussed the sensational news of the Nazi-Soviet 
non aggression pact. Within days, however, Hitler had decided on war, as Goebbels 
related on 31st August, 1939: 'To the Reich Chancellery. Everything very quiet. The 
Fuhrer has made his decision...' Even after Britain and France declared war, Goebbels 
reveals that Hitler did not believe they were serious. The Nazi leader predicted 
Chamberlain's resignation, but Goebbels foresaw trouble with the entry of Winston 
Churchill into the Cabinet.
Hitler's carefully masterminded and orchestrated propaganda not only motivated the 
German people against the 'real or imagined' enemy, it also built up a cult image around
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him. He became a rallying point to all the German people. He was what in Ghanaian 
language is described as the 'Osajefo', the saviour. This was how the Ghanaian public 
described Kwame Nkrumah. Hitler, to the German’s became the ultimate messenger.
The act, however of setting up a Ministry of Propaganda was entirely new to the age, both 
in method and concept. The concept of this and other countries' propaganda exploits will 
be discussed in the second part of this chapter.
The reason why it is argued that the propaganda activities of Nazi Germany represented a 
watershed for the modem era is that directly or indirectly, during subsequent wars, 
propaganda - internal and external was planned and executed more seriously, meaningfully 
and strategically than before. As illustration of this, this chapter will examine the Chinese 
and Nigerian civil wars.
The origin of the 'Little Red Book', which became the ideology, not only of Mao's 
followers during the civil war, but later also of the entire Chinese State, was for Mao, a 
major propaganda success. It was highly successful in its methodical conceptualisation and 
execution of propaganda to achieve set goals.
The other core example in the context, not only of this chapter, but of this thesis, is the 
setting up of the Directorate of Propaganda by Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. This 
was a more direct imitation of the German example than even the Chinese case would 
appear to be, but the goals of all three were the same. There have been numerous 
examples since then of imitative actions that lend to the argument that propaganda is the 
same in all wars. The scope is only limited by the constituency, and the available 
technological capability of the messenger or propagandist.
The methods that seem to have pervaded the ages include:
3.2.1. The infiltration of enemy camps with debilitating rumours, as in the case of Gengis 
Khan, through the American civil war, through the world wars, the Chinese civil war, and 
the Biafran war.^
85
3.2.2. The dropping of propaganda leaflets behind enemy lines to confuse and demoralise 
frontline combatants since the days of the French Enlightenment civil wars, the American 
war of independence and civil war, the Russian revolution, the Chinese civil war, the 
Biafran war, and even latterly in the Gulf war of 1991.
3.2.3. The use of'print' media has existed since man could write. It has existed since the 
days of the Pharoes, when messages were sent on tablets, through fiery war messengers, 
asking the enemy to surrender or be destroyed, even before the first arrow or the first 
spear was thrown. It has increased in intensity with technological developments.
The intention always is the debilitation of the enemy's morale, in order to weaken his 
resolve to commit to battle. The English civil wars are no exception (as already 
discussed), to all these methods. The objective of war is to annihilate the adversary. The 
objective o f propaganda is to seduce, sedate, and set the enemy up for that annihilation. 
The goals of war therefore remain the same, because things which are equal to the same 
thing are equal to one another.
In summary therefore, it has been stated that in setting up the Ministry o f propaganda, 
Hitler institutionalised propaganda for the first time in history of warfare. This is an act 
that has been later, and largely imitated, especially in civil wars. Apart from the infiltration 
of enemy camps with demoralising rumours, the dropping of pamphlets behind enemy 
lines, radio was regarded as the most powerful instrument by Nazi Germany, during this 
period. Gerald Mansell,^ states that the German Ministry of Propaganda saw radio as its 
chief instrument.Ewald Banse, Professor of Military Science at Brunswick Technical 
College, wrote in 1934:
'It is essential to attack the enemy nation in its 
weak spot, to undermine, crush, break down its 
resistance, and convince it that it is being
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deceived, misled and brought to destruction by its 
own government...The originally well knit fabric of 
the enemy nation must be gradually disintegrated, 
broken down, rotted, so that it falls to pieces like 
a fungus when one treads on it in a wood'.
3.2.4. The caricaturing of rival leaders was also another device used during this period, 
which as seen before, also straddled the ages. This is a ploy that both sides of the military 
divide used immensely during the second world war. The reaction of the allied publics will 
be treated later in this section to determine the impact on them, and their reaction to 
Hitler's messages.
3.2.5. One new method that came into operation at this stage was the use of film. Often 
times, going to the cinema was such a popular leisure activity, that it attracted large 
audiences. Goebbels knew this. Consequently, he commissioned film scenarios that subtly 
promoted Hitler as saviour of the German people, built up animosity against the Jews, and 
extolled the virtues of the Germans as the superior race. The process of building up the 
protagonist is defined in this thesis as the process of 'edification'. As well as being 
methods of propaganda, caricaturing and edification of leaders were also concepts. They 
are discussed in full in the next section on concepts. Caricaturing is the attempt, usually by 
one side, to psychologically dent the image of the enemy leader or protagonist.
3.2.6. Counter Propaganda.
Even though Hitler's build up to the second world war propaganda was as a result of 
lessons he had learned about British propaganda during the first world war, the British 
public and the B.B.C were ill-prepared in many respects for the demands which the war 
was to bring.
Hitler in his Mein Kampf had observed that the Germans, in the first world war, were not 
defeated on the battle field, but through propaganda, mounted particularly by the British.
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Therefore, 'In war, words are acts', was not just a notion, but the basis of Hitler's 
philosophy of propaganda. This philosophy involved the conversion of ideas into ideals - 
the interpretation of words, symbols, motions, gestures - into action, a motivating force 
with cataclysmic results, as seen in the second world war.
In contrast, Churchill believed that war must be won by deeds, not words. These two 
conflicting philosophies formed the conceptual basis on both sides of the conflict. 
However, the methods of disseminating information whether true or false, were much the 
same. As in the first world war, pamphleteering was always a useful tool. It was possible 
to drop pamphlets behind enemy lines directed at the enemy public. They also came in 
useful for reaching out to the domestic public. Also, as in the first world war, Britain, 
through the medium of the B.B.C. played a major role in informing the public at home on 
what the government wanted to be regarded as true, and in encouraging the soldiers, and 
all those who were involved at the front. Later in the war, the talented and resourceful 
British practitioners of 'black' broadcasting, showed themselves well able to match 
Goebbels in the use of deceit and fabrication. But, whilst this method was the core of Nazi 
propaganda and ideology, British 'black' broadcasting, whatever its effectiveness - and it 
had its undoubted success - was never more than a fringe activity. It was not as deep 
rooted as it was in Germany. Censorship was a more commonly applied method by the 
British war lords, Churchill and Eden. The B.B.C. under Reith, believed that though
H
telling the truth was preferable to the direct lie, the truth had to fit the occasion.
Therefore, demoralising news was censored. Those 'truths' that would help the cause of 
the allied forces took priority. There was no overall strategy by the B.B.C. at the initial 
stages of the war for developing foreign languages.
Nevertheless on Tuesday, 27 September, two days before the Munich Conference, the 
B.B.C. was asked by the war office to provide facilities that very night, for the
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transmission of foreign languages. These included German, Italian, and French language 
versions of a broadcast to the nation, which the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was 
to make at 8 p.m. that evening.
The Foreign office, which had earlier undertaken to provide speakers and translation, 
found it could not. At 6 p.m. that evening, the Foreign office asked the B.B.C. if it could 
provide news bulletins in those languages, as well as translate the Prime Minister’s 
broadcast. A frantic search ensued. J.B. Clark of the B.B.C. tracked down a friend,
G. Walter Goetz, the German artist, who was drawing cartoons for the Daily Express, at a 
cocktail party, and sent him post-haste to Broadcasting House to do the German version. 
The Hon. Francis Rennell Rodd, later Lord Rennell, undertook the Italian version, having 
served as an intelligence officer in Italy during the first world war, and later worked in the 
Britsh Embassy in Rome. Duncan Grinnel-Milne, a B.B.C. announcer, read the French 
version. The English text of the Prime Minister's broadcast was at 8pm, reaching the 
translators page by page, between 8.15 and 8.30pm, and each page was translated as it 
came in, and broadcast while the remainder of the speech was still being translated.
The first broadcasts were transmitted on all B.B.C. wavelengths and replaced normal 
scheduled programmes on medium wave intended for British listeners at home. They were 
also carried on short wave on all Empire Service frequencies, where, as with the home 
services, they replaced advertised programmes. The Prime Minister's address in English 
was reported to have made a particularly big impression in the United States, where 
President Roosevelt heard it in the course of a cabinet meeting at the White House. The 
news bulletins on that day also included translations of an appeal by Mrs. Roosevelt, 
which had been suppressed in Germany, and of the replies to it from France, Britain, and 
Czechoslovakia. The following day 28 September, they included the text of an appeal to 
Hitler by President Roosevelt himself, and of King George Vi's proclamation, calling up 
naval reservists and marines.
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Daily broadcasts in all three languages continued thereafter, throughout the period of the
o
Munich Crisis, though the number of transmitters was gradually reduced.
This presumably formed the basis for the B.B.C. language services that exist to date.
It will be seen in chs. 4 and 5 how analogous to the Nigerian situation this was. The use of 
radio and the translation of broadcasts in the different ethnic languages were methods 
effectively used by both Nigeria and Biafra. However, it was possible for Britain to 
respond in such an overt method because it was not occupied by enemy forces. It was 
similarly possible for America to do likewise.
Countries which are occupied during war cannot use such overt methods. France, Poland, 
and Czechoslovakia, for example, and the other occupied territories, had to resort to more 
covert means of transmission of their propaganda messages. This is harder work.
In essence, therefore, the setting up of underground and sometimes mobile radio stations, 
pamphleteering, the planting of rumours, were used by both sides in the second world 
war. The essence remains the same - motivation and mobilisation. The sustenance of the 
act and effect of propaganda in all cases - overt and covert - is essential to bring about a 
positive aim to the messenger. Victory is always the ultimate aim. Ironically an occupied 
and beleaguered territory tends to have a greater interest in telling the truth, especially if 
it is about pogrom, genocide, and other atrocities perpertrated by the occupying or 
aggresssive power. This attracts sympathy to the cause of the occupied territory. 
Therefore, paradoxically, the occupied territory gains more, and loses nothing, by telling 
the truth. It also helps to motivate its own citizens, and fellow countrymen wherever they 
are. The occupying force in this case resorts to censorship, misinformation, and 
disinformation, in various cases, to protect its own position, and maintain the status quo.
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3.3. Concept.
3.3.1. Definition.
The word 'concept', according to The Oxford Dictionary of current English means, 
generalised idea or notion (eg. the concept of evolution).^
The Penguin Concise English Dictionary defines 'concept' as an abstract or general idea.10 
In the analytical school of philosophy, the subject matter of philosophy is held to be the 
salient features of the language in which men speak of concepts at issue. Concepts are 
thus logical, not mental entities. * *
A typical instance is discussed in the article on the 'concept of mind' (1949), by Gilbert 
Ryle, an Oxford analyst, ^  which implies that the purpose of the author is not to 
investigate matters of fact empirically (i.e. by the methods of psychology) about the mind 
itself, but to investigate it's 'logical geography'. Similarly, investigation of the logical 
features of discourse about pleasure or duty or remembering is concerned with the 
concepts of pleasure or duty or memory. To be able to use these linguistic expressions is 
to apply or possess, the concepts.
3.3.2. Concept Formation.^
This is the process of sorting specific experiences into general rules of classes. It figures 
prominently in cognitive development and was a subject of great importance to the Swiss 
psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980). Concept formation is a complex phenomenon 
which can be distinguished for discrimination, the relatively concrete ability to respond to 
differences among stimuli. Various laboratory experiments have been devised to 
understand how concepts are formed. The process seems to involve two main phases: in 
the first a person identifies important characteristics, and in the second identifies how the 
characteristics are logically linked. Beyond simple classifications, concepts also may serve
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as norms or models that account for the potential of some things to fluctuate in some 
respects while remaining constant in others.
While experimenters and theorists generally agree about observations of conceptual 
behaviour, there are wide metaphysical and epistemological differences concerning the 
nature and origins of concepts, the movement between intuitive and rational thought, and 
the question o f 'cognitive universals'. The stimulus - response theory of U.S. psychologist 
B.F.Skinner disallows reference to mental contents, stating that learning occurs through 
trial and error.
The cognitive theory of Piaget contends that learning entails an understanding of unifying 
relationships and essences. The U.S. psycholinguist Noam Chomsky argues that cognitive 
structures are structurally innate in human beings. Piaget argues that a child's interaction 
with environmental 'universals' such as space, time, casuality, chance, number and identity 
(conservation of mass) makes possible his cognitive development.^
3.3.3. Derivative Concepts from Nazi Propaganda Methods.
In the light of part (1) of this chapter, and the foregoing definition of concept and concept 
formation, it would be fair to ask: What concepts derived from Nazi, propaganda 
methods? What was Goebbels' dimension within the prevalent cognitive patterns of the 
German environment of that time? What 'cognitive universals' can be discerned from his 
and Hitler's propaganda actions and methods?
On the morning of 22 August, 1939, Hitler held a conference with his military chiefs at his 
rustic retreat on the Obersalzberg, 6,208 feet above Berchtengaden. ^  The intention was 
to build on the propaganda effect and success of the earlier capture of Austria in 1938, 
and in March 1939, Czechoslovakia, against the advice of his generals. Undaunted by the 
threat by England and France to spring to the aid of Poland in the event of an attack, 
Hitler announced to a gigantic, enthusiastic rally of Nazi party faithful in Berlin, in 1939: 
'conquest is not only right but a duty'. ^
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It will be recalled that during the first world war, the Fuhrer had served for four years as 
an infantry corporal, in the muddy trenches of France, where he had been wounded and 
decorated for gallantry. Just over two decades later, without benefit of university or 
military-staff training, he was Supreme commander of the German armed forces.
The lessons of this experience had not escaped him. He was therefore determined that 
never again would the Germans suffer both a propaganda and military defeat of that 
nature, as he explained in his ’Mein Kampf. He was bent on first a propaganda, and 
consequently a military victory. It became a matter of recognising the 'cognitive 
universals', or cognitive patterns of the world at the time, and pre-empting them. 
Buttressed, goaded, and reinforced by the victories over Austria and Czeckoslovakia 
without a shot being fired, Hitler told his military chiefs in Berghof: 'there probably will 
never again be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore of great 
value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or lunatic. There is no time to lose.
17
War must come in my life time'.1
Also, to create optimum propaganda effect, he announced that he had signed a Treay of 
friendship with the Soviet Union, a communist nation, and as such, a sworn archenemy. 
Though it would be but a brief marriage of convenience, it enabled him to declare 'we can 
now strike at the heart of Poland... as Great Britain and France will not dare to come to 
Poland's rescue without the aid of Russia'. ^  He angrily lashed out at the leaders of 
England, France and Poland: 'our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich. I am 
only afraid, that at the last minute some "schweinhund" will produce a plan of mediation'. 
There is no escaping the principle of 'cognitive universals', ^  or cognitive patterns here. 
It was the determinant, it would appear, for Hitler's every action. Hitler's demeanour 
seems to have been crystallised by the concept of vendetta. His whole being and existence 
had formed the concept of revenge for Germany's first world war defeat in propaganda
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war and military combat, even though, as he claimed, and as most Germans believed, 
Germany was not defeated on the battle field, but by propaganda.
It can be assumed that his 'Mein Kampf was in fact a 'charter', the idealisation of his 
conceptual formation, which then congealed into the creation of the Ministry of 
Propaganda. As will be seen later, this institutionalisation of propaganda was to have an 
effect on Biafran propaganda operations during the Nigerian civil war. This novel concept, 
Germany's Ministry of propaganda, was run by someone described as a charismatic figure, 
with excellent bedside manners - Goebbels.
3.3.4. Goebbels1 Ministry of Propaganda.
In an article titled "Goebbels and propaganda: the psychological dimension", David 
Wedgewood-Benn^ argues that there was one characteristic of Goebbels which had long 
been well known, although perhaps too little highlighted. This was the incessant 
preoccupation with psychological consequencies of whatever he was trying to achieve. 
Goebbels is rightly remembered as unscrupulous, mendacious, as a practitioner of dirty 
tricks, as a systematic repressor of dissent, and, more generally as a symbol of totalitarian 
propaganda. But this still leaves out a key ingredient; the psychological dimension. For no 
matter what his propaganda message at a given moment Goebbels always planned it in a 
highly intelligent way, with reference to its likely impact on the feelings and prejudices of 
the target audience.
The minutes of Goebbels' secret wartime conferences, one of the main channels through
which his directives were conveyed to the media, provide some particularly graphic
illustrations of this. Thus on 13 April 1940, just four days after Germany had occupied
Denmark, Goebbels laid it down that propaganda to that country should be 'generous in
all matters which do not cost us anything', and should aim to convince the Danes that
91'whatever is happening now is the lesser evil'.
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This is analogous to Biafran propaganda to the minorities in Biafra to keep them within its 
fold. The Federal government, on the other hand, tried to turn them into subverting 
Biaffa, with its own counter propaganda. One method applied by Nigeria, was the 
creation of States for minorities from areas that were still within Biafran control, which 
the Nigerians then had no way of administering.
However, according to David Wedgewood-Benn, in May of 1940, when the German 
armies were invading France, the Nazis set up a clandestine 'black' radio station purporting 
to be run by French communists and aimed at promoting defeatism. However, at the 
conference of 30 May, a complaint was noted that its programmes were too 'doctrinaire
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and dull, and Goebbels therefore asked to see the scripts. Meanwhile, on 7 July 1940, 
after France's capitulation, Goebbels gave instructions that the authors of anti-British 
press articles 'must not themselves get angry but must merely fan...anger, ie. they must not 
lose sight o f the effect.^
In Biafra, general guidelines were given, but there was a regular daily morning conference 
setting daily parameters. It thus became more a matter of self-censorship. No one 
'breathed down any body's neck'. There was no pre-censorship of scripts. The punishment 
for 'straying out of course', was after the crime, ie. if there was a deviation from the 
guidelines, and if that deviation acted against the interest of the Biafran war effort. As in 
Goebbels' case, the Director of the Propaganda Directorate, Dr. Ifegwu Eke, would 
demand to see the scripts, with his team of advisers. There were also occasional 
complaints of scripts being too doctrinaire, and therefore counter-productive.
According to David Wedgewood-Benn, a psychological strategy was no less clearly 
visible in Goebbels' directives, following the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April, 1941, 
which had itself followed on from a military coup in Belgrade the previous month, in
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protest against Yugoslavia joining the Avis. Goebbels' briefing on the day of the invasion
was not only carefully thought out, it had a surprisingly contemporary ring about it. In
propaganda to Yugoslavia (a term which was not to be used), the primary blame for the
war was to be pinned on the Serb generals' clique. In relation to Croatia, the official line
should begin 'quite gently at first to remind Croats of the way the Serbs had treated them'.
At the same time, clandestine stations beamed at Croatia were instructed that 'the only
limit...is the credibility of what we say. Repeat again and again, at considerable length,
94what the Croats had to suffer at the hands of the Serbs'.
Nigeria and Biafra were strong believers in this method of "repetitive stress propaganda", 
for optimum effect.
Throughout his career, Goebbels relied on far more than censorship, or even the power to 
give orders to the media. He had a well developed flair for public relations, and was much 
exercised with the problem of credibility. The importance of the credibility of the 
messenger, and the believeability of the message was discussed in ch. 1 of this thesis. 
Before and during the early stages of the war, he had made considerable efforts to woo 
the foreign journalists in Germany (even though they increasingly became subject to 
pressure and intimidation). On 14 August, 1940, he stressed 'what a useful weapon
nc
American press representatives in Germany are in the neutralisation of enemy lies'. He 
complained on the same occasion about bureacracy', which had allegedly hampered visits 
by foregin correspondents to German occupied France.
During the civil war in China between Mao Tse Tung's and Chiang Kai Shek's forces,
9 f sboth are known to have placed a lot of emphasis on wooing the foreign press. It is 
believed that during the 'Long March' by Mao and his troops, a number of journalists 
braved the elements and travelled some way with him, whilst others overcame the 
difficult terrain in most cases to catch up with him during his stops.
96
The cultivation of the foreign press was as important to Biafra as it was to Nigeria, since 
both had to justify their respective cause to the world. Some members of the foreign 
press, as will be seen later, became crusaders for the Biafran cause. The matter of vertical 
and horizontal justification to the external constituency was discussed in the introduction, 
and in ch.2 of this thesis.
Goebbels realised that propaganda could boomerang. Therefore, on 13 March, 1943, 
when the tide was already turning against Germany, Goebbels ordered restraint in 
publishing cartoons of Allied leaders which ’for the most part produce a totally different 
reaction from that intended', and might actually popularise the person 
attacked - the double edge of the 'concept of caricaturing'. Indeed, Goebbels, unlike some 
of the other Nazi leaders, seems at all times to have warned against the possible 
boomerang effect of conducting propaganda on the assumption that Germany had already 
won the war.
David Wedgewood-Benn postulates that all in all, one needs to separate two strands in
Goebbels' technique. The first - based on media control, the intimidation of dissenters and
the attempt to establish a monopoly of information - was of course a formidable weapon
which could be described as 'coercive persuasion'. It closely resembled the Stalinist model,
although it was not so heavy-handed. This explains the past Soviet unwillingness to
publish the Goebbels' records. The second strand, which might be called 'manipulative
persuasion', was something quite distinct. It involved a careful attempt to gauge the
dispositions and prejudices of the audience, and then exploit them to serve the
propagandist's purpose. Hence the meticulous attention to Danish and Croatian
77susceptibilities. Nor did the message consist only of lies: Nazi propaganda to
Yugoslavia had a long lasting effect in fanning undoubtedly genuine grievances. The 
residual reverberations of that effect can be seen in the civil wars that led to the break up
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of Yugoslavia, and are continuing today in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. As explained in 
ch. 1„ new generations are fighting old wars, indicating the sustainability of propaganda, 
and the argument that propaganda outlasts wars.
And indeed, the most long lasting of all the Goebbels' propaganda achievements was 
based on entirely truthful information. This was the revelation of the Katyn massacre of 
Polish prisoners of war in Russia in 1940. It was Goebbels, in April, 1943, who first broke 
the story which continued to run until April, 1990, when Moscow at last admitted Soviet 
guilt.
Biafra was in a similar situation, when it reported the genocide perpetrated against the 
Southerners - mostly Easterners - in Northern Nigeria before secession and the subsequent 
civil war. Nigeria tried for a while to deny these claims, until it finally admitted them, and 
General Gowon had to apologise. Nigeria and Biafra also applied the two concepts of 
'coercive persuasion' and 'manipulative persuasion' in their approach to their different 
publics - domestic and external.
So did the Chinese in 1956: Chiang Kai SheK, who had greater control of the country and 
its media, used 'coercive persuasion' more than Mao Tse Tung who for logistical reasons 
and lack of media control, used 'manipulative persuasion1. The use of 'coercive persuasion' 
presupposes the capability, and the availability of the control facilities and means of 
propaganda transmission.
Perhaps the most candid statement of the Goebbels' propaganda philosophy was the one 
minuted at his conference of 30 October, 1942. On this occasion, Goebbels emphasised 
that 'it is... a mistake to conduct propaganda in such a way that it will stand up to the 
critical examination of intellectuals'. This was because 'the most primitive arguments are 
the most effective and meet with the greatest agreement among the masses'. 'Intellectuals 
always yield to the stronger, and this will be the ordinary man in the street'.
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David Wedgewood-Benn maintains that techniques of this kind are rather like a virus, 
with a constant tendency to migrate and undergo mutations in the process. This thesis 
had, in ch. 1, defined this process as that of imitations and replications, in arguing that 
there is little difference in the various war propaganda. This was particularly true of the 
two world wars, when each side closely studied the propaganda of its adversary. Many 
Germans managed to persuade themselves that their military defeat was brought about by 
the supposed skill of British propaganda, coordinated by Lord Northcliffe, the press 
magnate said to have been half admired, half abhorred in Germany. Nazi propaganda was 
purported to be a response to and partial imitation of British propaganda methods. David 
Wedgewood-Benn states that it is not surprising that one of the main postwar experts on 
Goebbels should explicitly have compared him with Northcliffe - since both in different 
types of society, w ere 'unorthodox masters of mass appeal and mass manipulation1. It is, in 
any case, certain that Goebbels absorbed many of the journalistic techniques which 
Northcliffe, among others, had helped to pioneer.
But what about the rev erse process - the possible influence on the Western democracies? 
At least one expert on Nazi Germany, Richard Crossman, did on one occasion suggest an 
indirect influence Crossman, had played a prominent part in helping to organise Anglo- 
American 'black propaganda' aimed at Nazi Germany - propaganda of a kind very similar 
to that which Goebbels himself had pioneered.
3.4. Derivative Modem Concepts.
3.4.1. Definition.
What, therefore, are the consequencies of second world war propaganda?
Force and fraud have been recognised as the two cardinal virtues of war since the Chinese 
conqueror Sun Tzu recorded his military theories in 550 B.C: 'Undermine the enemy first,
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then his army will fall to you. Subvert him, attack his morale, strike at his economy,
corrupt him. Sow internal discord among his leaders, destroy him without fighting him'.
This declaration by Sun Tzu, should be juxtaposed with Hitler's declaration in *Mein
Kampf: 'in war, words are acts'. He had also in conversation with Hermann Rausching in
1939 declared: 'our strategy is to destroy the enemy from within himself. Mental
30confusion, contradiction of feelings, indecision, panic - these are our weapons'.
Alongside the two foregoing declarations should be placed the already cited writing by 
Ewald Banse. These declarations and writings, along with Machiavelli's, unconsciously 
formed the precepts for modem propaganda. All that happened afterwards was the 
process of 'migration and mutation' or 'imitations and replications' of these precepts, in 
the modem conduct of propaganda war generally. An examination of the statements, 
writings, and declarations from Sun Tzu in 550 B.C. through Machiavelli to Hitler, 
indicate a continuity in the general concept of propaganda, varied only by developments in 
communications systems. There is no anachronism in propaganda. The successful 
propaganda is that which appeals to 'primitive instincts', and not to 'intellectual analysis'.
Nevertheless, the development of information systems since the first world war, and 
subsequent use of these in propaganda activities has heightened and enhanced propaganda 
as a strategic instmment of war. As already discussed, the watershed for the modem era 
was the second world war. During the second world war, both the Allies (particularly the 
British, later the Americans), and the Germans blended these ancient precepts with 
modem technology to fight a secret war of devious machinations, as each side sought the 
edge that could mean the difference between victory and defeat.
Many 'shadow warriors' on both sides were involved in what Winston Churchill called 'the 
sinister touches of legerdemain'. Their principal weapons were not bullets or arms - but 
intrigue, deceit, fakery, stealth, skullduggery, and periodic mayhem. No holds were
O 1
barred. No scheme was too brutal or immoral. The survival of nations was at stake.
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It is therefore essential to re-emphasise the particular distinguishing features of this 
watershed period, in order to extract therefrom, derivative modem concepts,eg.
(1) The concept of institutionalisation of propaganda.
(2) The concept of edification.
(3) The concept of caricaturing.
(4) The concept of the charter.
There are other peripheral concepts which are not considered in the context of this thesis. 
In considering these concepts, it will be helpful to consider three models:
(1) The German Nazi model.
(2) The Mao Tse Tung, Red army, Chinese model.
(3) The Biafran model.
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3.4.2. The Concept of Institutionalisation.
The Ministry of propaganda set up by Hitler's Germany was virtually unprecedented. It 
was a departure from the tradition of either the Ministry of Information, or the War 
Office, or the Foreign Office handling the dissemination of information in war time.
The Ministry, run by Goebbels, became a power house for the coordination of Nazi 
propaganda activities. By the use of radio, film, theatre, pamphlets, print media, rumours, 
etc; it conjured up powerful images in the minds of the German people. It created a 
multifocal dimension - one, was the way the German people saw themselves, as the 
superior race; the second, was the way the Germans saw the outside world, as an inferior 
race which must be conquered. It glorified war. The third dimension was, the way the rest 
of the world saw Nazi Germany, as a group of people misled, heading for the destruction 
of themselves, and the rest of the world. They were led by a 'mad man', who must be 
stopped before it was too late. It was therefore in its concept a positive and negative 
force. It conjured up different images to its different constituencies.
Whether from admiration or not, the other two models considered here learned from 
Germany's experience. During the civil war in China, and the 'Long March', Mao Tse 
Tung did not have the facilities within his control to set up a 'Ministry'. Nevertheless, his 
manipulation of information was very akin to the lessons learnt in the second world war. 
When Chiang Kai Shek's forces encircled him and his forces in Southern China, to escape 
annihilation, he set off on the long march to Northern China. In the process, he conquered 
uncharted terrain, swamps, crocodiles, mountains, forests, malaria, other diseases, hostile 
native warriors, and Chiag Kai Shek's forces. The images created by this super human 
achievement were more than any institution would have been able to manufacture for him. 
He, became, and was the institution. The Red army, however, did not regard itself as the 
superior race. Rather, it regarded itself as the servant, and saviour of the Chinese people.
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Later, after Mao's success over Chiang Kai Shek, and the creation of a Communist state in 
China, the Ministry of Propaganda was officially created. The process of 'migration and 
mutation', had certainly extended from Germany, through China to Biafra. The Biafrans 
imitated and replicated the institutionalisation of propaganda. It had an advantage over 
Mao, because it already controlled the facilities, and means of propaganda transmission 
right from the beginning. Its Propaganda Directorate under Dr. Ifegwu Eke, a university 
don, combined fellow intellectuals, as in the case of the German Ministry, as well as Mao's 
handling of propaganda. Regular meetings every morning coordinated the daily 
propaganda activities of Biafra. It replicated in principle the notion of adapting intellectual 
and modem imputs into conjuring up primitive emotions in the minds of the Southerners 
first, and the Easterners, subsequently. Unlike the Nazi and Chinese cases, however, world 
public opinion was more sympathetic, even when their governments were not, as will be 
seen in chs.4 and 5.
3.4.3. The Concept of Edification.
The process of edification involves the injection of propaganda images principally into the 
domestic publics, who then build up the image of the protagonist, who in turn becomes 
the credible messenger. In the German case, it was Adolf Hitler, in the Chinese case, it 
was Mao Tse Tung, in the Biaffan case, it was Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.
In Nazi Germany, Goebbels contrived to build such powerful images of Adolf Hitler, that 
it is understood that the very mention of Hitler's name brought the soldiers to attention. It 
was like flying the national flag or playing the national anthem. Hitler was kept out of the 
scene as much as possible, for fear of overexposure. Hitler, who was merely a corporal in 
the German army during the first world war, was wounded in France, and later decorated. 
It is assumed that he started his build up after the war, having learned the propaganda 
lessons of that war. In Goebbels, he found a man who could intensify his crusade as the
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Fuhrer - the saviour of the German people. He capitalised on the period of the depression 
in Germany. He whipped up primitive emotions in the German people against the Jews.
He became a demigod to the Germans, and a belzeebub to non Germans, especially the 
Jews in Germany. The means of transmission in the Ministry of propaganda were used 
with optimum effect to bring this about.
Unlike Hitler, Mao Tse Tung was a highly educated leader. Unlike Hitler, he did not have 
a Ministry of Propaganda at the beginning of the civil war. This was created later. 
However, he had an intellectually rich committee that marched and worked with him. He 
had daily early morning meetings. He mapped out both the military and propaganda 
strategies at these meetings. He worked late into the night. Like Hitler, he was built up 
from scratch. Like Hitler, he came from a poor background, with only propaganda to 
bring about his edification to the point of deification. He was variously described by his 
followers during the civil war, and later by the Chinese people as :
(1) Mao the Romantic Revolutionary,
(1) Mao the Peasant's friend,
(3) Mao the Young Politician,
(4) Mao the Upholder of the People's Will,
(5) Mao the Creator of the People's Communes,
(6) Mao the Supreme Commander of the Red Guards, and later the Red Army,
(7) Mao the Statesman,
(8) Mao the M yth.^
He was accredited with driving out the Japanese from China, and with driving out the 
Kuomintang, and crushing Chiang Kai Shek. The success of the long march crowned his 
glory. He had learned his lessons by studying the propaganda tactics of the Germans, and 
comparing them with the successes and failures of communist propaganda under Stalin. 
The one was systemic, the other was ideological. He was built up to look better than both,
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more intelligent than both, and more humane than both. He was edified as leader of the 
communist world rather than Soviet Union's Stalin.
During the long march, Mao was asked by a foreign journalist who caught up with him: 
What was the greatest gift he would give his people to make them follow him to the 
death. He answered: You give them arms to defend themselves; You give them food to 
eat; and you give them an unflinching belief in you as their leader, and in your leadership. 
He was then asked: If any of these were missing, what would you give them. He 
answered: You give them food to eat; and you give them unalloyed belief in you as their 
leader, and your leadership. He was further asked, if he had to take away from those two, 
which one of them he would retain. He answered: You give them unqualified, unflinching, 
unalloyed belief in you as their leader, and in your leadership. He was quoting an earlier 
Chinese sage and warrior, Sun Tzu. This, however, enunciated Mao's concept of 
edification. The difference between him and Hitler, is that Hitler led from the rear, whilst 
Mao led from the front. In the modem context, they both preceded Ojukwu, and Biafra.
The Biafran propaganda machine was more systemic than ideological. Unlike Hitler, but 
like Mao, Ojukwu was highly educated, having graduated from Oxford before going to 
Sandhurst. Like both Hitler and Mao, he was a soldier. Along with Gowon, he was 
regarded as one of the best gunners in the Nigerian army.
Society had never seen him as a future leader. He was not built up from scratch. He was 
bom with a 'silver spoon in his mouth'. When the coup plotters of 1966 tried to enlist his 
help to overthrow the Federal government, he declined.
Even after he had been appointed Governor of Eastern Nigeria, he was not looked on as 
a future leader, but just one of the Governors. His edification was therefore both contrived 
and accidental. It was accidental in that he happened to be appointed to replace Hilary 
Njoku as Governor of Eastern Nigeria at the time of General Ironsi's assassination in a
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counter coup in July 1966. There were many possible leaders for the East. But, he was 
there.
He was a soldier. His father was a prominent and wealthy Ibo man. He was well educated 
- something very much admired by the highly educated and enterprising Easterners - 
indeed by all Nigerians. There were very few highly educated people in the Nigerian army 
then. The army was regarded as a profession for dropouts, and lowly educated. It was 
therefore convenient for him to speak for the East, in negotiating with the Federal 
government in Lagos, whose head was Yakubu Gowon, another military man, a fellow 
gunner with a similar reputation. Better still, at the time, Ojukwu was a senior officer to 
Gowon in the army.
That is when the connivance at edification started. The Directorate of propaganda built 
him up as the instant Saviour. This rose to a crescendo at, and after the Aburi accord 
under the aegis of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Ojukwu was highly intelligent, and used his 
intelligence well. Like Hitler and Mao, he had a commanding personality. He became the 
protagonist - the credible messenger. Television, radio, music, the theatre, were brought 
to bear in the edification, as in Hitler's and Mao's cases. Music was written and made with, 
and in Ojukwu's name As in Hitler's Germany, and Mao's China, his sayings were deemed 
to be instructive wisdom He was also portrayed as the credible arbiter between Biafra and 
the outside world - the external constituency in propaganda terms. He had tremendous 
presence, and used it well in his television and radio broadcasts.
3.4.4. The Concept of Caricaturing.
This is the flip side of the coin to the concept of edification. Mostly, it is carried out by, 
and with opposing or enemy propaganda. The object is to destroy the image, and puncture 
the status and personality of the protagonist enemy. The belief is that if the head is cut off, 
or severely dismembered morally, the body cannot function. It is in this vein, that Britain
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and its allies tried to label Hitler as a mad man who sought world conquest. Conversely, 
Hitler tried, to show that Winston Churchill by getting involved in the war, was leading 
the British people to their ruin.
This state of affairs was replicated in the Chinese civil war. Chiang Kai Shek presented 
Mao Tse Tung to the outside world as the 'communist rebel', and to the domestic Chinese 
public as a 'bandit chief, who was leading the people to ruin.
Again there are parallels in Biafra and Nigeria. Immediately after the declaration of the 
Republic of Biafra, Gowon used the Nigerian media to undermine Ojukwu. The message 
wanted Ojukwu captured dead or alive, and brought back to Lagos. ^  Ojukwu was 
described variously as a rebel, a bigot, ambitious, and leading the Eastern Nigerian people 
to ruin. It was claimed that he was not interested in Biafra; that his father had sent him to 
Oxford to study, so that he could return and govern Nigeria; that he was only using Biafra 
as a footstool. Because Ojukwu had grown a beard when the war started, the Nigerian 
media made quite a play on this. The beard was supposed to have enhanced Ojukwu's 
presence and personality. Some heavy artillery pieces, which were manufactured locally in 
Biafra from scrap, were now nick-named Ojukwu's beard. It was said that Ojukwu's beard 
was destroying the Nigerian soldiers in their droves. The Nigerians felt that this over 
enhanced Ojukwu's image, and edified Ojukwu, Therefore, every so often, propaganda 
was put out from the Nigerian side that Ojukwu's beard had fallen off, as a result of a 
chronic illness, and that he was no longer mentally and physically fit to lead the Biafran 
people. This is analogous to Hitler and Mao being variously described as mad men, 
mentally and physically unfit to lead their people.
Just as Hitler tried to counter by caricaturing Churchill, Mao countered by describing 
Chiang Kai Shek as an imperialist stooge, who cared nothing about the Chinese people. 
Mao accused Chiang Kai Shek of seeking self gratification only, with the help of the
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Americans. The Biafran media, on their part, gave as much as they received, if not more. 
They claimed that Gowon was uneducated; that is why he could not understand Ojukwu's 
English at the Aburi accord (see ch.4). It is being held now that, for this reason, Gowon 
decided to go back to school after being overthrown as Head of State - evidence of the 
sustainability of propaganda. Gowon had his second son soon after the launching of 
Apollo 12. Peter Edochie, a continuity announcer, came on the air on the voice of Biafra, 
and said that Gowon was faster than Apollo 12; that he did nothing in Lagos but produce 
babies; that he was unfit to govern a country as educated, as populated, as rich as
-2 C
Nigeria. Gowon was severally caricatured in the daily news talks emanating from 
Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra - delivered by Okokon Ndem, Nwora Asika, and Paddy 
Davies (myself). The anagram of his name was used: Yabuku Wagon, instead of Yakubu 
Gowon. Wagon in Nigerian 'pidgin' English is a dilapidated truck, just managing to totter 
along. Yabuku means absolutely nothing. Like Chiang Kai Shek, he was accused of being 
a stooge, although in his case of the Hausa/Fulani, even though he was from 
Benue/Plateau, which had for long engaged in an uprising against Hausa/Fulani rule. He 
was accused of hanging on to power with foreign help. He was described as the 'Sho Sho 
upstart'. Sho Sho is Gowon's native village.
3.4.5. The Concept of the Charter.
The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines 'Charter' as a written grant of rights, 
especially by Sovereign or legislature; written constitution or description of organization's 
functions etc.
The Penguin Concise English Dictionary defines 'Charter' as a document granting a
privilege or recognising a right; document incorporating a borough, university or 
37company.
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A charter is a document granting certain specific rights, powers, privileges, or functions 
from the sovereign power of a state to an individual, corporation, city, or other unit of 
local organization.-^ The most famous charter, fMagna Carta1 ('Great Charter*), was a 
compact between the English King John, and his barons, specifying the King's grant of 
certain liberties to the English people. Elsewhere, in medieval Europe, momachs typically 
issued charters to towns, cities, guilds, merchant associations, universities, and religious 
institutions; such charters guaranteed certain privileges and immunities for those 
organizations, while also sometimes specifying arrangements for the conduct of their 
internal affairs.
By the end of the Middle Ages, monarchs granted charters that guaranteed European 
overseas trading companies monopolies of trade (and in some cases government) within a 
specified foreign geographic area. A corporation that was so endowed was called a 
chartered company. Virtually all of the British colonies in North America were established 
by charters; these charters granted land and certain governing rights to the colonies while 
retaining certain powers to the British crown.
Modem charters are of two kinds, corporate and municipal. A corporate charter is a grant 
made by a government body giving a group of individuals the power to form a 
corporation. A municipal charter is a law passed by a state government allowing the 
people of a specific locality to organize themselves into a municipal corporation ie., a city. 
Such a charter in effect delegates part of the state's powers to the people for the purpose 
of local self government.^
In most countries, the Head of State, is the head of government, and commander in chief 
of the armed forces. Therefore, their utterances are very important, in propaganda terms, 
and make the headlines. It was particularly so in the three models considered here. In war 
time, because power resides in the head of state and/or gvemment, who is also the
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commander in chief, their speeches receive optimum media, political, and diplomatic 
attention. This attention is heightened if the speech becomes a motivator, a charge, or a 
charter.
That is why the 'Mein Kampf by Hitler, the 'Little Red Book' by Mao, and the 'Ahiara 
Declaration' by Ojukwu represent charters, in the tradition of the above definitions. They 
were more than just authoritative instruments; they were propaganda gun powder. They 
may not have been 'Magna Carta'. But, they were a combination of thoughts, musings, 
commands and grants issuing from the protagonist authority, a charge to the people they 
represented - Germany, China ( the Red Guard, the Red Army, and China), and Biafra, 
respectively. The three documents granted their different publics rights, privileges, and 
responsibilities. They also charged them psychologically, motivating them to mobilise for 
military action.
The 'Mein Kampf has already been discussed extensively.The 'Little Red Book1, Mao's 
Charter, became virtually a Bible - the Mao-Chinese brand of communist ideology. A lot 
of the thoughts therein became a way of life in Mao's China.
A typical thought from the book was:
'The only group in the countryside that 
has always put up the bitterest fight 
is the poor peasants...
Without the poor peasants 
there can be no revolution...
To reject them is to reject 
the revolution'.^
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This was Mao striking a propaganda blow at the conscience of China. He was making the 
apathetic, the seemingly unaffected in China, aware of their rights to egalitarianism. He 
was motivating them to action. China had to listen, and did, as he muses again:
'All the nationalities of 
China have always been 
unwilling to submit to the 
oppression of foreign peoples 
and have striven to shake it 
off by acts of resistance.
They accept union only on 
the basis of equality'.
The 'Ahiara Declaration', came after the unimplimented Aburi Peace Accord between 
Ojukwu and Gowon, under the aegis of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Like the Mein 
Kampf. and the 'Little Red Book', it was a charter, yet like them, also, a tremendous 
propaganda ploy. It had an uncanny resemblance in form, style, and structure to the 
'Arusha Declaration' (earlier by Julius Nyerere himself), and the 'Little Red Book'. 
However, the significant point here is the continuity; the process of migration and 
mutation, imitation and replication.
3.5. Conclusion.
German Nazi propaganda was the watershed for modem propaganda in war. The Ministry 
of Propaganda, set up by Hitler and mn by Goebbels, made use of every available facet of 
the media - stage, film, print, and the electronic broadcast media - to transmit its message. 
It sought to brainwash the German people, and it did. Because states of the world are 
copy cats, this lesson was not lost on them. A process of mutation and migration, or 
imitation and replication then ensued, with family resemblances of the German propaganda 
example occuring in subsequent wars of the modem era. Therefore, the methods and
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concepts that emanated from the Germans are reflected in the other two models applied in 
this thesis - the Chinese and Biafran examples. This family reflection is described as the 
T)erivative modem concepts'. Biafra, as will be seen in the next chapter, apart from 
reflecting the concepts, also derived and employed some of the German methods, for 
instance, in the setting up of the 'Directorate of Propaganda'.
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CHAPTER FOUR.
BIAFRA - THE DOMESTIC FACTOR.
4.1. Introduction.
This chapter being the core of the thesis, is in two parts.
It has been divided further into appropiate sub-sections to accomodate a detailed analysis 
of the domestic scene. Part A includes: Prelude, The Dawn, The Spark, The Blaze; whilst 
Part B includes: The Operation of the Biaffan Media, The Biaffan Media and the Biafran 
People, The Sun Set, Back to the Fold, Epilogue.
As Biaffan propaganda is the case study for this thesis, it has been necessary to segment 
this chapter in this way, in order to have a clear picture of the Biafran case. The next 
chapter -5 - will deal with Biafran propaganda and the external (international) factor.
Even though this thesis is not concerned with the civil war itself, nevertheless, this chapter 
will examine the remote and immediate causes of the war, the war period and it's 
aftermath, and consequently the propaganda sorrounding all those periods.
The chapter also examines ethnic attitudes on both sides of the divide. It will comment on 
the exploitation of the different ethnic nationalities by both Nigeria and Biafra, and draw 
conclusions from the fall-outs. Some material exists on the media in Nigeria, the media in 
Africa, and related topics. Materials also exist on the civil war itself. Extensive research 
reveals that there seems to be nothing available on the part played by the media in Biafra. 
This chapter will, therefore, invariably draw heavily from interviews of Biafran people and 
propaganda Directorate colleagues. The media include ENBC/TV, Radio Biafra, Voice of 
Biafra, Biafran Television, Nigerian media, politicians, and the publics on both sides of the 
conflict. Some of the Biafran media staff are now working in various fields in Nigeria.
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Information will also be gleaned from the sources noted at the end of this chapter, and 
from any available sources on the civil war itself.
The chapter will relate to the principles and concepts of propaganda already enunciated, 
on a comparative analysis, (as will chapter 5).
It will pose the question of the influence of propaganda on the different players within 
Biafra on the one hand, and Nigeria on the other. It will examine Nigeria’s reaction and 
response.
It will discuss the influence of the media and propaganda generally on the peace process, 
and the lessons thereof.
Finally, the chapter will examine what happened to Biafran media people at the end of the 
war. It will show what happened to the Radio and Television stations, etc; at the end. It 
will discuss the attitude of the protagonists, and their fate afterwards.
There will be an examination of the immediate post war peace and reconciliation that 
ensued in Nigeria as the guns went silent. Was this unique? Was there a precedent? Or, 
did Nigeria set the example for the process of migration and mutation, imitation and 
replication, in other parts of the world?
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PART A.
4.2. Prelude.
The scene for the civil war in Nigeria was set long before the war itself. It was set, some 
would argue, almost from when Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960. 
A achool of thought holds that nature itself conspired to complicate the Nigerian situation. 
Nigeria is a land of great climatic, territorial and ethnic variety. * The British, at 
colonisation, discovered that from the 400 mile long coast of tangled swamp and 
mangrove, a belt of dense rain-forest ran inland to a depth of about a hundred and fifty 
miles. This was Southern Nigeria, split into East and West by the Niger River flowing 
South from its confluence with the Benue River at Lokoja (see map).
In the Western part of the South, the predominant group was the Yoruba, a people with a 
long history of powerful kingdoms. Because of the British penetration through Lagos,
Western culture first reached the Yoruba and other tribes of the West at about the same 
time as it reached the peoples of the Riverine areas of the East.^ In the Eastern part of the 
South lived a variety of peoples, predominant among them the Ibos, who lived on both 
banks of the Niger, but mainly East of it. Ironically, in view of their later speedy 
development and progress which finally enabled them to overtake the other ethnic groups 
of Nigeria in terms of European-style development, the Ibos and the other peoples of the 
East were regarded as being more backward than the rest by 1900.
North of the forest line was the woodland, verging into savannah grass and prairie, and 
finally to semi-desert and scrub. Along the Southern fringe of the enormous area runs the 
Middle Belt, inhabited by non Hausa peoples, who at the dawn of the twentieth century, 
were mainly pagan and animist in religion, but were nevertheless vassals of the
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Hausa/Fulani, the latter having originally come South from the Sahara in conquest, 
bringing with them their Muslim religion.
All in all, Nigeria is a huge country (almost twice the size of Spain), and about four times 
the size of Great Britain.
As the colonial authority, Britain made little, if any, attempt at unifying the country. 
Rather, it left it largely as it found it, apart from the amalgamation of 1914, discussed later 
in this chapter.
The film showing the attainment of independence sets the scene of how things looked at 
the handing over of the baton, from the British to the indigenous Nigerian government. 
The speech of the Governor General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe on the film "Nigeria Attains 
Independence", by the Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, was a plea for what looked 
like a coalition of Regions to come together and work together. Yet, from the start, the 
different media in the regions were fanning up tribal and ethnic differences instead of 
uniting the country.
The Nigerian Constitution handed down by Lord Lugard immediately before 
independence, had prior to that, created three regions - The East, The West, and The 
North.^ The Mid-West was carved out of the West after independence.
The media in these regions were utterly independent of, and sometimes at variance with 
each other. Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service, Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Service, 
and Radio Kaduna were powerful instruments used by the respective regions to keep 
Nigeria apart through the promotion of ethnic and tribal differences. The aim, ironically, 
was to capture the centre, Lagos. ^
According to the Confederation of British Industry (C.B.I.)^ and United Nations 
Populations office figures,^ Nigeria has a population of about 120 to 125 million. The
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C.B.I. also forecast in the same report that by the year 2000, Nigeria would overtake the 
United States of America in population growth.
Nigeria has two hundred and fifty different languages. Within these two hundred and fifty 
different language groups, there are at least five hundred dialectical differences.
Barely three years after independence, in 1963, there was a census in Nigeria. The result 
of this head count has never been accepted. Since then, there have been three other 
censuses in Nigeria, in 1977, 1988, and 1991, all of which have been disputed by the
Q
different ethnic groups. Even the census of 1953 -54, organised by Britain, and held 
under their auspices, was rejected. However, after the 1963 census, the media in the West 
and the East of the country accused the Federal government of distorting the census 
figures in favour of the North, in order to attract more amenities to the North. Radio 
Kaduna responded aggressively in its numerous news talks.
This set a tumultuous scene in Nigeria. Such overt propaganda was inciting and 
confrontational. Yet, at the time, many assumed that it was no more than adversarial 
politics of the kind practised in Westminster. Nigeria was after all regarded by the British 
as a colonial show piece and trail blazer.^ Yet’ several elements of propaganda, as 
enunciated earlier, can be discerned even at this early stage in the discussion of 
Nigerian/Biafran experience, eg;
4.2.1 Overt propaganda:
The media activities were a clear indication of overt propaganda. There were no punches 
pulled. All was given to maintain the loyalty of particular niches and constituencies. ^  
More was even given to capture the interest of the 'wavering souls' in the opposing camps. 
The language was abrasive propaganda, the mode of transmission was clearly overt.
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He had been in Biafra during the early days - the exodus and the declaration of 
independence. He was recalled by the BBC, but returned to Biafra independently, because 
he was moved by what he saw in his earlier visit.
Biafra's early propaganda thrust were three fold - pogrom and genocide, religious war 
fare, and oil and economic war. (see ch. 4). All three relatively impacted on the world 
stage, but, as has been seen, despite strong words, did not motivate any external 
mobilisation in aid of Biafra. But, famine - and the pictures of Kwashiorkor children, 
women and men achieved what religion, genocide and pogrom, and oil, did not.
Famine has struck countless communities throughout history, but the impact had always 
been local and gone largely unnoticed in the rest of the world. In this case, the isolation 
was swept aside because the media was made to take interest - an excellent case of 
manipulative persuasion.
The Biafran famine was caused directly by the civil war. It was a clear and unambigous 
case of politics provoking a famine.
Father Mike Doheny, an Irish Holy Ghost Father, who had lived as a missionary in 
Eastern Nigeria from 1945 to 1959, recalls:
We'd never seen hunger, never.
There was no shortage of food.
People lived very simply,
there was a lot of disease
but no starvation as such,
and when we saw it for the first time,
when we saw Kwashiorkor,
it really shocked us to our foundations.
We weren't prepared for it
and we could'nt understand it for a long time'.^
Kwashiorkor, a protein-deficiency disease principally affecting children, had arisen 
because of the blockade of Biafra on land sea and air by Nigeria. Previously, Eastern 
Nigeria had been self sufficient in fruits and carbohydrates, while importing salt from
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4.2.2 Covert propaganda:
A lot of covert propaganda also ensued. For instance, when civil servants in the North, in
a series of meetings, plotted the removal from the region of civil servants and workers of
the South, particularly those of Eastern origin,* * they planted rumours within the
Northen populace to the effect that the Eastern civil servants were there, not to help the
North, but to take the jobs of the Northerners and keep them under perpetual 
1 o
domination. This inflamed latent, inert ethnic differences, leading to the first Kano 
(Sabongeri) riots of the 1950s. Such covert propaganda, was of course economical with 
the truth. It failed to mention that Northern apathy towards modernisation, in part because 
of its Islamic culture, meant that the work place and the civil service could not be filled by 
the British alone. Thus a few of such available posts - clerks, junior executives, 
accountants, switchboard operators, engineers, train drivers, waterworks superintendents, 
bank tellers, factory and shop staff, post office workers, and the like - were filled by 
Yorubas: most were filled by the more enterprising Easterners. By 1966, there were an 
estimated 1,3000,000 Easterners, mostly Ibos, in the Northern Region, and about another 
500,000 had taken up jobs and residence in the West. The bulk of the market stalls in the 
major commercial centres of Kano arid Kaduna were owned by Easterners.
It is against these communities that the covert propaganda was directed. The similarity to 
Germany's experience between the wars is inescapable. Hitler's overt and covert 
propaganda against the Jews led ultimately, in Hitler's case to the holocaust; and in the 
Nigerian case, the propaganda against the Easterners led to the Kano riots of the 1950s 
and early 1960s, and the subsequent genocide and pogrom against the Easterners in the 
North. It was partly because of this, and partly because of their resilience and industry, 
that the Ibos described themselves as the Jews of Nigeria. The Ibos argued that the Jews
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were persecuted in Nazi Germany for their resilience and industry, similarly, they were 
persecuted in Nigeria for the same reasons.
It would be entirely fair therefore to extract a process of migration and mutation, imitation 
and replication even here, (except for the gas chambers).
4.2.3. Propaganda preceding the war:
It is clear from the preceding that even though at this stage, ^  civil war was not 
contemplated by any one in the country, a lot of propaganda preceded the war. It was the 
trigger. It enkindled fears in the minds of the ordinary people of the North, who otherwise 
would have lived peacefully with the Easterners, and infact had lived peacefully with them 
over the years. It was propaganda that inflamed the inert and latent feelings of jealousies, 
envy and hatred that propaganda itself had implanted. In propaganda terms, it appealed to 
the sensitivities and sensibilities of the Northern populace. It was a case of manipulative 
persuation. It was this build up, this preceding propaganda that caused the spark.
4.3 The Dawn:
The scene thus set characterised the pattern of political philosophy and thought in Nigeria. 
It decided the events that followed. However, it is important to point out that it was not 
always the East and the West against the North.
During the ensuing elections in 1959, into the Federal House of Representatives, and 
subsequent to the elections, the Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Service was transmitting 
messages to the Eastern Regional people different from the pre-census era. The simple 
reason was that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had resigned his appointment as Premier of 
Eastern Nigeria to contest the Federal House elections in 1959, in order to become
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Governor General, had gone into coalition with the leader of the Northern Regional party, 
Sir Ahmadu Bello.
The alliance thus formed between the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), and the 
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), therefore altered and 
reshaped the attitudes of the media in the North and in the East. They both accused Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group (A.G.), and Premier of Western Region, 
of tribalism.
The Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service was by far the best broadcasting system in the 
country at the time, and fought back with aspersions on the other two parties and their 
leaders. It extolled Chief Awolowo as the Saviour of the Yoruba people, and the only 
possible saviour of Nigeria. It promoted him as the best person to govern Nigeria.
This was the new trend in the political set up. the coalition of the NPC-NCNC won the 
elections to the Federal House of Representatives, after the 1959 Federal House elections. 
The NPC held the North with 148 seats, the NCNC held the East and a proportion of the 
West (mostly those non-Yoruba parts which were later carved out as Mid-West State), 
gaining 89 seats, and the Action Group (AG), took most of the Yoruba speaking West, 
but gained only 75 seats ^
However, because of the powerful and penetrating transmission of the Western Nigeria 
Broadcasting Service, combined with the vigorous and flambuoyant campaigns of Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, the Action Group penetrated and captured constituencies in the North 
(particularly in the Middle Belt area), and the East, (amongst the minorities agitating for 
Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers' State - COR State). ^  Chief Awolowo campaigned with 
helicopters, traversing, and spraying the country with political propaganda pamphlets; and 
launching and floating air-borne propaganda balloons, edifying and extolling Chief 
Awolowo and the Action Group. The Action Group, nevertheless, was in opposition at 
the Federal level. ^
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It can thus be argued, that the propaganda element of caricaturing was applied here; the 
caricaturing of Awolowo by the media in the East and North. By contrast, Ahmadu Bello 
and Azikiwe were edified, along with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, of NPC and the 
Federal Prime Minister (whom Ahmadu Bello described as his 'lieutenant'), as the leaders 
who had the interest of the country at heart. Awolowo was caricatured as a tribal, ethnic, 
sectional leader of the Yoruba tribe. ^
The Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service, for its part, caricatured Nnamdi Azikiwe as an 
opportunistic Ibo leader. It claimed that Zik, as he was popularly and favourably known, 
was only interested in 'ZDC', because all he wanted was to be Governor General, and later, 
President. WNBS described Ahmadu Bello as not in fact wanting the unity of Nigeria, but 
as a conniving Fulani tribal leader who was interested only in spreading Islam to the 
Southernmost part, and indeed all parts of the country. ^  While WNBS described 
Abubakar as a stooge of Ahmadu Bello’^C hief Awolowo was described as a pillar of 
strength, and a paragon of intelligence.
Apart from these different propaganda statements from the media and press from the 
regions, the utterances from the different leaders, Awo, (as he was popularly and 
favourably called), Zik, and the Sardauna (as Ahmadu Bello was popularly known, being 
also the Sardauna of Sokoto), buttressed what emanated from the media and press. 
Witnessed here therefore were the propaganda elements of edification, caricaturing, 
brainwashing, coersive, and manipulative persuation. Nigeria was an epitomy of the 
principles of migration and mutation, imitation and replication. No holds were barred. 
Ethnic, religious, and political differences were abundantly exploited.
4.4. The Spark:
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A curious vista therefore emerged. Whilst the West and the East accused the North of 
distorting census figures for its benefit, Zik and the Sardauna were in coalition; in a 
marriage of convenience. Sir Ahmadu Bello (NPC), however, remained Premier of the 
Northern Region; Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC), was Federal Prime Minister; the 
Rt. Honourable, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC) was Governor General, and later 
President, and a-political. Chief Obafemi Awolowo (AG) was Federal leader of 
opposition.
As if to complicate matters further, another twist was introduced to the political and 
propaganda horizon of the time. Zik, having been promoted from Acting Governor 
General, to Governor General, to President, became a-political surrendering his leadership 
of the NCNC. Ahmadu Bello declared that the Ibos were never friends of the Northerners, 
nor of any one else, and broke off the alliance between the NPC and the N C N C .^
Then a systematic accusation of tribalism was instigated on Radio Television Kaduna 
(RKT) against the East. The Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation and Television 
(ENBC/TV) responded in like manner against the North and the Federal government. The 
Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service and Television (WNBS/TV), sided with 
ENBC/TV, reinforcing its own on-going propaganda against, what it called, the 'bigoted' 
leaders of the North, with Ahmadu Bello at the head.
By this time, another dimension was introduced to reinforce media activity. Eighty percent 
of the newspapers in Lagos were at the time owned by people from the mainly Western 
region, and had country wide circulation. The Northen regional newspapers circulated 
principally in the North and, because of the low percentage of literacy in English in the 
region, some were published in Hausa. The papers from the East were calculatedly, kept 
out of circulation in Lagos by the mainly Western regional mafia-like media based in
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Lagos, the Federal capital, the centre of activity, and seat of the Federal government. This, 
clearly was censorship. The aim was to make it impossible for the Biafran message to be 
transmitted, domestically or externally, because the external sector could have picked up 
the message in Lagos.
4.4.1. The Media and the Advent of Broadcasting:
It is essential at this stage to understand, the strength of the media in Nigeria.
Broadcasting arrived in Nigeria in 1931 in the form of a relay service of the British Empire 
Service from Daventry, England, to L a g o s . O n e  year later, the Lagos station 
experimented with rediffusion service. The Nigerian Posts and Telegraphs Department 
(P&T), was authorised to devise a plan for programme distribution to subscribers in 
Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, operating in conjunction with the Empire Broadcasting Service.
The first rediffusion service started in 1936, distributing programmes originating from the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), in London, as part of its overseas service. 
Between 1940 and 1950, rediffusion spread to Ibadan, Abeokuta, Ijebu Ode, Port 
Harcourt, Calabar, Enugu, Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Zaria, and was installed in most offices to 
supply regular news and musical programmes during working hours. It was also installed 
in the official residences of civil servants. Some private homes were later allowed to 
subscribe.
The Nigerian Broadcasting Service began formally on 1st April, 1951 with some limited 
to produce programmes catering for the interests of the audience in Nigeria, but with a 
colonial bias. Relay of news, current affairs, and other programmes still emanated from 
London.
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The NBS later became the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation on 23rd August, 1954, 
following a bill in Parliament creating an instrument for the establishment of the 
Corporation. At self government, the Corporation devolved branches of the Corporation 
to the three regional headquarters, Ibadan in 1952, Enugu in 1954, and Kaduna in 1956; 
the Midwest, carved out of the West after independence, got its own station in 1962.
Television broadcasting began in Nigeria on 31st October, 1959, one year before 
independence. It was, as it turned out, the advent of television in Africa. The first station 
(in Africa), was thus established in Ibadan by the then government of the Western region 
of Nigeria, and its jingle said so: "First in Africa". It was called the Western Nigeria 
Television (WNTV). It became an essential arm of the Western Nigeria Ministry of 
Information, and therefore of government.
In October 1960, the Eastern Nigeria Television was established in Enugu (ENTV). Not 
to be outdone by Ibadan, its jingle said it was "Second to None". Again, it was a 
parastatal of the Eastern Nigeria Ministry of Information. This was also the year and the 
month Nigeria became independent. Two years lapsed before Radio Television Kaduna 
(RKT) was established, in 1962. It too was an arm of the Northern Nigeria Ministry of 
Information. Ironically, later that year, 1962, the Federal government at the centre, Lagos, 
rather belatedly established its own Television station, the Nigerian Television Service 
(NTS), Lagos. It should have led the way. This service, which was confined to the Federal 
Capital, Lagos, was set up and operated under a management agreement with an 
American Network, NBC-International, on a purely technical cooperation contractual 
basis. It was not long however before it was brought into the fold of the already existent 
Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), at the termination of the management contract 
with the American Network.
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Before independence, the only independent media were the print (as was the case in many 
African countries). The most prominent amongst these was the West African Pilot, Such 
indigenous, privately owned papers were set up by people who had been abroad and 
studied there making contact with the West Indians and Black Americans whose struggle 
for the emancipation of the black man gave rise to Pan Africanism.
As can be seen, at the time, the tradition was for state and federal governments to set up, 
be responsible for, cater for, and subvent the electronic media. (This has now been altered 
by a decree in 1992). The result was a propaganda war between regions that were 
opposed to or at variance with the federal government, and the federal government itself, 
or between regions of opposing or different political complexions. The North - South 
dichotomy was at the core of these exchanges - culturally and politically.
4.4.2. Historical (socio-political) terrain:
Nigeria is regarded as the 'Giant of Africa', because of it's population, size, economic 
potential, and complex language spread. During its early colonial heritage, it was ruled as 
two different entities - the North, with experimental headquarters at Zungeru, and the 
South, with headquarters in Calabar. Zungeru is, incidentally, within the same 
geographical location of the new federal capital territory, Abuja. In 1914, Lord Lugard 
brought about the amalgamation of the North and South in a fragile union.
There were differences in language, religion and culture between the two entities. The 
British however created this marriage of convenience to be able to administer the territory 
better through a single process of indirect rule. But, according to Frederick Forsyth this 
sort of arrangement had its own disadvantages which overweighed whatever apparent 
advantages it had: "Indirect rule maintained the federal structures, confirmed the 
repression by the priviledged Emirs and their appointees, prolonged the inability of the
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North to graduate into the modem world, and stultified future efforts to introduce
99parliamentary democracy".
However, all the British were interested in was the enhancement of their trade in raw 
materials to feed the industries at home. Luke Uka Uche states that contemporary 
evidence suggests that the European traders were anything but civilising agents: "Many of 
them had adopted legal trade only as a last resort when the original slave trading 
occupation had grown too hazardous. Brutal and disreputable as many of them were, they 
often suffered greatly from the precariousness of their position at the mercy of 
unpredictable coastal rulers". Samir Amin, Cedric Robinson, Michel Beaud, Chinweizu 
also adopt this theme and argument in their discussion of colonialism, and the spread of
9 - 5
capitalism - Chinweizu more forcefully than others.
The history of Nigeria and the background to the conflict are longer and more 
complicated than described here. However, this brief background is meant to assist in the 
understanding of the beginnings of the process of factionisation, fractionalisation, and 
dissent - the dawn of disenchantment leading to the spark and blaze.
Official media during the pre-independence period was used by the colonial authorities to 
establish trade and cultural development, suitable for colonial peoples. The private press 
took on the duty of fighting the colonialists to bring about the emancipation of the 
territory from colonial rule. Printing was relatively cheaper and circulation was easier. 
Pamphleteering could also be carried out covertly. Ironically, nationalism was first 
promoted by non-Nigerians. Consequently, the enlightened, educated, indigenous, African 
graduates returning from abroad, who owned the private press, regarded it as a duty to 
fight colonialism. They included Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah and Tubman. Uka 
Uche suggests that the road to nationalism was paved by freed slaves from the West 
Indies and the United States of America. People like Blyden, Garvey, and Dubois, etc;
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sought the cultural emancipation of the 'negro'. Their concern was on Africa as a whole, 
rather than the seemingly artificial units drawn up by the European colonial powers.
In the 1920s, Herbert Macauley emerged as the Father of Nigerian nationalism, and, with 
his Lagos "Daily News'' started unleashing nationalist attacks against the British.
He was later joined by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who had just returned from studying in the 
United States of America. In the 1930s, the West African Pilot was formed. When the 
British turned on the heat against the nationalist papers, Nnamdi Azikiwe fled to Accra, 
Ghana, from where he continued to operate.
From this, it can be seen that whilst the print media was involved in emancipation, the 
electronic media was used (mostly radio at this time), to establish British culture and 
enhance British rule The early educated people in Nigeria were trained as teachers, who 
would subsequently impart their often limited knowledge to the rest of the country - a 
feature identified also in other colonial countries.
Those who were able to proceed to study law, medicine, and engineering, were sponsored 
either by their communities, or their hard working families. These of course were few. 
People were taught to think British, buy British, wear British, and adore the British, 
particularly in the South of Nigeria. The North remained largely intact, because of its 
feudal, hierachical, and largely muslim structure and culture.
The economy was geared towards the enhancement of British trade, and the development 
of the "Mother Country". Early broadcasters were trained either in London by the BBC, 
or by BBC trainers sent to Nigeria to organise training courses.
Graham Mytton observes that the history of the mass media is longer and more complex 
along the West Coast of Africa: "The press in English speaking West Africa grew up in a 
nationalist tradition. Newspapers were the mouthpieces of emerging campaigning 
nationalist politicians".^ This is perhaps because printing was cheaper and newspapers
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could be smuggled undetected to fellow compatriots fighting against colonialism, - a 
lesson in covert propaganda that was later adopted even before the war. One writer has 
made the observation that to study either nationalism or the press in British West Africa is 
to study 'the other'!. This is very true of conptemporary civilian politics in Nigeria, where 
the mass media occupy a central place. However, the British used the radio to establish
? c
their influence. This was because radio had a wider coverage, was received at all levels-
literate and illiterate - and transmission was easier. It was therefore an effective
0 ( \instrument of overt propaganda transmission. The newspapers, as indicated, were 
nationalistic. Television missed all that. The British had set about abolishing indegenous 
cultural societies, institutions, and traditions, describing them as fetish, heathen, and anti- 
Christian, particularly in the South.
Briefly therefore, whilst the South was being christianised and largely educated, the North 
remained largely uneducated and muslim.
The north was regarded as predominantly muslim at the time and therefore not susceptible 
to this intrusion. Also the British were anxious not to upset the Emirs and their feudal 
system, because it was a convenient instrument for indirect rule. This in itself created a 
cultural imbalance, which transmitted to the educational structure of the amalgamated 
halves. Television when it arrived one year prior to independence, rather than enhancing 
political and cultural unity, was employed to exacerbate the North-South dichotomy.
Thus, television, arrived at the peak of national intra-party political activity in Nigeria. The 
various political factions in the country used it to exploit all the existing ethnic, religious, 
language and dialectical diversities in the country, to foster their respective aim to succeed 
to, and capture the centre, Lagos.
It became more a propaganda tool set between region and region, party and party, and in 
certain cases, between the central Federal government and the regions.
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Being audio-visual and instant - the potential force of television was brought to bear on 
the propaganda war.
Dr. Michael Okpara had become Premier of Eastern Region and leader of the N.C.N.C. 
Chief S. L. Akintola became Premier of the Western Region, but not leader of the Action 
Group. An interesting vista opened up at this time. The WNBS/TV accused Chief 
Akintola of sabotaging Chief Awolowo in support of Sir Ahmadu Bello. Chief Akintola 
was dismissed from the Action Group, and removed from office by the Governor of 
Western Nigeria. The Action Group, which held the regional parliamentary majority 
accused him of maladminstration. He refused to go and broke into the Premier's office to 
occupy it. The Action group had appointed Chief Adegbenro as the Premier of Western 
Region to replace Chief Akintola. He formed a new goverment, whereupon a fight broke 
out on the floor of the Western House of Assembly. This was the spark that ignited the 
riot in Western Nigeria. The media in the East and the West warned the Federal 
Government of the impending crisis. The Federal Government, the media in Lagos, except 
the newspapers acquiesced. So did all the media in the North. Akintola appealed to the 
Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, without going through the Western 
Regional Governor. The Prime Minister acting in collusion with the leader of the NPC and 
Premier of Northern Nigeria, overuled the Western Regional Governor and upheld 
Akintola's appeal.
Even though in May 1963. the Privy Council in London ruled that Akintola's dismissal by 
the Governor was valid, the Prime Minister, the Northern Premier and Akintola refused to 
accept it, and stuck to their guns. By now Akintola had formed his own party and allied 
with the NPC to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA).
Dr. Michael Okpara now leader of the NCNC in the East went into alliance with Chief 
Awolowo's Action Group to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). 
Awolowo accused of plotting to overthrow the Federal Government, was tried, found
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guilty, and imprisoned, along with Chief Anthony Enahoro, who had been his Minister of 
Information in Western Nigeria.
UPGA boycotted the 1964 General Elections. The President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and the 
National Chairman of the NCNC, Dr. G. C. Mbanugo advised against a boycott in "the 
interest of the unity of the country", counselling that the boycott would have "no 
constitutional effect". Dr. Michael Okpara, now joint leader of UPGA with Chief 
Adegbenro, insisted that it would have "a political effect". The NNA, with Abubakar as 
Prime Minister were inevitably returned to power at the Federal House without any 
representatives from UPGA.
There was intense media and propaganda activity. Despite Akintola, the media in the West 
was still loyal to Awolowo (who was at this time in jail), to Adegbenro and to UPGA.
The media in the East backed the Western media in its orchestrations against Akintola, the 
Federal and Northern Nigerian Governments. The media in the North was vehement in its 
retaliatory and counter propaganda. The Federal media was split. The electronic media 
controlled by the Federal Government supported the Federal Government. So did the 
Federal government owned newspapers like the Daily Times, the Morning Post etc. The 
independent newspapers and magazines were still strongly in support of Awolowo, 
accusing the Federal Government of accumulating "trumped up charges" against 
Awolowo, whom they claimed was innocent.
It was the signal for a complete breakdown of law and order, even if it could truly be said 
to have existed before. Rioting broke out across the length and breadth of the Western 
Region. Murder, looting, arson, mayhem were rife. On the roads, gangs of rural thugs set 
up road blocks, by cutting down trees, and stopping motorists to demand their political 
affiliations. The wrong answer brought robbery and death. Within a few weeks, estimated 
deaths were between 1,000 and 2,000.
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In face of the turmoil, Balewa, who had been so quick to declare a state of emergency in 
1962 because of an uproar in the Western House of Assembly, remained quiescent. In 
vain, the media, student bodies with propaganda leaflets, several bodies and personalities 
across the country, appealed to him, to declare a state of emergency, dissolve the Akintola 
government, and order fresh elections. He declared he had "no powers."
The mighty Federation of Nigeria was crumbling into ruin before the eyes of foreign
observers, who had only a few years before heralded Nigeria as the great hope of 
77Africa Yet to the outside world hardly a word of this penetrated. Indeed anxious to 
keep up appearances, Balewa’s government invited a Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
conference to meet in Lagos on the first week of January 1966, to discuss the question of 
restoring law and order in rebellious Rhodesia.
Mr. Harold Wilson was pleased to attend. While Commonwealth Premiers shook hands 
and beamed at each other on the apron of Ikeja international airport, a few miles away 
Nigerians were dying in scores, as the army moved in on the UPGA supporters. ° The 
army could not restore order either, and at the insistence of the General Officer 
Commanding, Major-General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguyi Ironsi, the troops were 
withdrawn.
The majority of the ordinary infantry-men at that time serving in the Federal army were 
drawn from the Middle Belt, that is, the minority tribes of the North. These troops, 
particularly the Tivs who formed the highest percentage among them, could not be used 
to quell the Tiv riots still raging in Northern Nigeria, for they would probably not have 
turned their guns on their kith and kin. Thus most of the army units available outside 
Tivland were heavily salted with Tivs.
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For the same reason that they could not be used in Tiv-land, they were not much use in 
the West either. Their sympathies lay not with the Akintola regime, for was not Akintola 
the ally and vassal of the Sardauna of Sokoto, persecutor of their own homeland? They 
tended to sympathise more with the rioters, being in themselves in much the same positon 
vis-a-vis the Sardauna/Akintola power group.
By the second of January 1966, it had become clear that something had to give. 
Subsequent portrayal by the Gowon military regime of what followed as an all-Ibo affair 
fails to take into account the inevitability of either a ’'demarche’' from the army, or 
complete anarchy.
On the night of the 14th of January 1966, in the North, the West and the Federal Capital 
of Lagos, a group of young officers struck. Within a few hours, the Sardauna of Sokoto, 
Akintola, and Balewa were dead. Also dead was Chief Okotie Eboh, Balewa's friend, 
most loyal lieutenant and Federal Minister of Finance, and with them the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria. It was a bloody ’Coup d'etat’. The leader of the coup was Major Chukwuma 
Nzeogwu, an Ibo from the Mid-West state of Nigeria.
If the twists and turns of the Nigerian media and propaganda scene sound complicated, it 
is because it is complicated. John Wilkinson, retired Director of Corporate Affairs at the 
BBC, current Patron of the One World Broadcasting Trust in London, remarked recently 
that within the Nigerian Media Scene "there is never a dull moment". The responses, the 
twists and turns are in reaction to the twists and turns of the political spectrum.
One of the questions that arose in the course of this research was how the propaganda 
activity could be so intense without the necessary facilities, compared for instance to the 
situations in Mozambique and Angola. Clearly the situations are different. Unlike most 
other African and indeed developing countries, Nigeria was immensely facilitated by way 
of media provision, as has been seen. It learned its lesson well from the British. It had the
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men and material to initiate and sustain its propaganda activities. The different political 
factions employed both covert and overt propaganda methods in their attempt to destroy 
their opponents.
The media and propaganda objectives followed the usual cognitive patterns:
(1) to motivate their supporters
(2) to mobilise their support and spur them into 
action, physically and psychologically, and,
(3) to sustain their actions, in order that the 
protagonists could continue to ride high.
Covert activities were carried out by way of rumours, secret clan, ethnic and supporter's
meetings. It involved the injection of derogatory information against the opponents.
Whilst being caricatured, the opponents countered by extolling the factional leaders in
order to edify them.
At the risk of constant repetition, it has to be noted, however, that the idea of civil war in 
Nigeria was never contemplated, not even at the trial of Awolowo. So the difference here, 
at least at this stage, was the presence of positive propaganda for factional and ethnic 
subjugation, like the ones carried out by Northern Nigeria. For instance, in 1947, 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared to a British Official: "We do not want, Sir, our 
Southern neigbours to interfere in our development....I should like to make it clear to you 
that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the Northern people would continue 
their uninterupted conquest to the sea". This brought accusations from the South, in a 
negative form of propaganda, that the Muslims of the North want to "dip the Koran in the 
Sea".
In May 1953, a delegation from the Action Group (AG) was due to visit Kano, the largest 
city in the North. Intense fomentation of public opinion against the visit was undertaken
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by Mallam Inua Wada, Kano Branch Secretary of the Northen People's Congress (NPC). 
In a speech two days before their unscheduled arrival, Wada told a meeting of section 
heads of the native adminstration: "Having abused us in the South, these very Southerners 
have decided to come over to the North to abuse us... we have, therefore organised about 
a thousand men ready in the city to meet force with force..." The Action Groups's visit
O 1
was cancelled, but on the 11th of May, a series of massacres began. Failing to find 
Yorubas, Hausas set about the Easterners with what the official report compiled by a 
British Civil servant termed "a universally unexpected degree of violence". In his 
autobiography, Sir Ahmadu Bello recalls that "Here in Kano, as things fell out, the 
fighting took place between the Hausas ... and the Ibos: the Yorubas were oddly enough 
out of it."
The official report was a conscientious effort. The rapporteur condemned Wada's speech 
as "very ill-advised and provocative". Of the conservative estimates of 52 killed and 245 
wounded, he comments that: "it is still a possibility that more were killed than have been 
recorded, in view of conflicting statements by ambulance men and lorry drivers (who 
carted away the living and the dead)". Of the whole affair, he observed that "no amount of 
provocation, short term or long term can, in any sense justify their (Hausas) behaviour". 
But perhaps his most notable utterance was in the conclusion: "The seeds of the trouble 
which broke out in Kano on 16th May 1953 have their cunterpart still in the ground. It 
could happen again, and only a realisation and acceptance of the underlying causes can 
remove the danger of recurrence." There was no realisation nor any attempt at one.
And it did happen again!
Whilst this type of propaganda was positive in terms of the North, it was negative for the 
South and especially for the Easterners who suffered the ultimate negative effect. What 
happened in the North in 1953 was replicated, as will be seen later in this chapter, in
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1966/67. It was, to use a contemporary term, "ethnic cleansing", of the kind that occured 
in Bosnia in the 1990s.
To counteract, the Southern leaders and media indicated that they always knew that the 
intention of the North was not to unify the country but to conquer the South and "dip the 
Koran in the Sea." They said that they would never stand for that; that the Northerners 
were filthy illitrates who were unfit to rule the educated progressive and dynamic South. 
They accused Sir Ahumadu Bello of being a religiuos bigot and Abubakar of being his 
stooge, and unqualified to rule the country.
Even though there was no deliberate and systematic build up to the war, the propaganda 
exchanges, the caricaturing, the edification were almost similar to the other two models 
discussed in this thesis - Germany and China. The difference of course is that there were 
no strikingly outstanding personalities like Adolf Hitler and Mao Tse Tung, except that Sir 
Ahumadu Bello, in the eyes of the South fitted the description of Hitler and Stalin in his 
treatment of the Southerners, and his acquiescence at the massacre of the Southerners. 
Frederick Forsyth and Auberon Waugh argue that some may even say he tacitly 
encouraged and motivated his people to it, as his autobiography seems to suggest. It is 
clear also that during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference on Rhodesia in 
Lagos, the Federal Government applied two propaganda techniques:
(1) Censorship
(2) Manipulative persuasion.
(1). Censorship: Since they were in control of the electronic media in Lagos, the seat of 
the conference, they dictated whatever was transmitted overtly.
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(2). Manupilative Persuasion: In so doing, they hid the truth from the other Heads of 
State and Government, who by their very presence, may have even lent credence to the 
acts of the Abubakar Government. The Federal Government's organisation of the 
conference was a manipulation to divert attention from the tumult within the country. It is 
also entirely possible that through the process of censorship, an element of "coercive 
persuasion" was applied domestically whilst the outside world was being manipulated.
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4.5 THE BLAZE.
The events that led to the Biafra war happened very rapidly.
On the fateful morning, people in Eastern Nigeria woke up to hear Efiong Etuk on the 
early morning programme on ENBC/TV, announcing that there were soldiers in the studio 
asking him to stop transmission of regular programmes and play only martial music.
On hearing this on his car radio, one of the leaders of the coup, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, who 
was on his way to Enugu to take command and assasinate Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of 
Eastern Nigeria, abandoned his vehicle along with his lieutenants, escaped, and went into 
hiding. Okpara was thus saved. That morning also, The President of Cyprus, Archbishop 
Makarios, who had been officially visiting Eastern Nigeria, was being seen off by Dr. 
Michael Okpara and Sir Francis Akanu Ibiam, the Governor of Eastern Nigeria. When the 
army having waited for Emmanuel Ifeajuna in vain, finally seized the airport in Enugu and 
confronted Okpara, he refused to enter the jeep that he was ordered into. Both 
Archbishop Makarios and Sir Akanu Ibiam virtually bundled him into the vehicle. This, 
some commentators maintain, helped save him from being shot on the spot. It is claimed 
that Archbishop Mkcarios's experience in coup plotting may have helped here. Sir 
Ahmadu Bello of the North was killed by the coup leader, Major Chukuma Nzeogu, 
accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant Hassan Usman Katsina, a Hausa/Fulani muslim 
officer.
Chief S.L. Akintola, self declared Premier of the West and ally of Sir Ahumadu Bello was 
assasinated. The Prime Minister Sir Abubakar was killed. Chief Okotie Eboh, who, even 
though he was from the Midwest, and of the NCNC, was close to Sir Abubakar, and so 
was killed.
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The country was dazed. No information came from the media who were playing only 
martial music. The newspapers could not publish. There was total confusion. Then it 
emerged that the Chief of Defence Staff and General officer commanding, Major-General 
Aguyi Ironsi, had taken over in Lagos and invited the leaders of the coup to surrender to 
him. When it became apparent that only leaders of the NPC and allies had been 
assassinated, while the leaders of the Action Group and NCNC were spared, Radio 
Television Kaduna came out with vigorous news talks against what was now in their own 
estimation, a Southern (East and West combined) organised coup against the Northern 
leaders and their allies. The Northern papers which came back into circulation, carried 
inflammatory editorials and messages in Hausa and English. These papers circulated in the 
army. The coup was blamed on the Ibos. There, therefore followed some disturbances in 
the North. In May 1966, a riot broke out where the southerners, and particularly the Ibos 
at Sabongeri market in Kano, were massacred again. There was a record with the tune 
"ewu ne be akwa", which had been released many years before. The literal translation is 
"the goat is crying". The Ibos have a tradition of playing loud music in their stalls to 
attract customers. This record had been on the charts for a while, but on this particular 
occasion, their Northern counterparts claimed that it was a mockery on the Northeners. 
The Northern traders covertly met, passed the word round, motivated and mobilised their 
forces and struck.
There followed an urgent meeting o f the Eastern House of Assembly where the Speaker 
called on the Federal leader Major-General Aguyi Ironsi to take action to stop the killings. 
Nothing happened. Rather Ironsi stated that he wanted to form a unitary government 
which would bring peace and harmony to the country. To please the North, since he was 
an Ibo, he appointed two of his immediate aides from the Northern officers1 ranks.
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While Major-General Ironsi was on an official visit to Western Nigeria, the Northern 
officers carried out a counter coup in July 1966, where General Aguyi Ironsi was 
assassinated. Killed with him was his host, Governor of the Western Region, Colonel 
Fajuyi. For a while there was no effective government in Nigeria. The media were hungry 
for news, and the public was looking to the media to inform, guide and direct. The media, 
as John Renfeld stated, in such confused and chaotic situations, assumes a very important 
instrument. Luke Uka Uche also follows this theme, as will be seen later in this chapter.
He and John Renfeld argue that the media fills the vaccuum in these circumstances and 
becomes a sort of'de facto' government.
Meanwhile, there was widespread masssacre of Easterners in Northern Nigeria. The 
propaganda from the Northern media had penetrated the army.
The ENBC/TV accused Northern Nigeria of "genocide and progrom" on the Easterners. 
The rest of the media in the East joined in. Pictures of the exodus from the North and tales 
and scenes of the genocide on radio and television, filled the Easterners with revulsion 
and anger. While Radio Kaduna wanted the Ibos out of the North, the ENBC/TV wanted 
them to return to the East and help build up the region. There was mass exodus from the 
North to the East.
Lt. Colonel Chukwuma Odumegwu Ojukwu who had been appointed Military Governor 
of Eastern Region came on Radio and Television and made constant announcements, 
threatening retaliatory action if Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who had succeeded Major- 
General Ironsi, did not apprehend and punish the perpetrators of the genocide, and 
recompense the Easterners.
The Easterners were accused by the media in the North and Lagos (at this time the 
Federal Government was fighting back) of playing up the scope and effect of the
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massacres. However, Mr. Schwarz, an independent journalist and an independent eye 
witness, refers to them as "a pogrom of genocidal proportions". Nor were they directed 
solely against the Ibos. The word Ibo is a singular generic term in the North - actually the 
Hausa word is Nyamiri', which is derogatory as well as descriptive - for all Easterners 
regardless of ethnic group. Thus not only the Ibos suffered, though they were undoubtedly 
in the majority. Efiks, Ibibios, Ogojas, and Ijaws were also singled out for butchery. As 
they came home and told their tales, a wave of rage swept across the East, mingled also 
with despair and disillusion. There was hardly a village or town, family or compound in 
the Region that did not take into its fold one of the refugees and listen to what he had to 
say. Thousands of the refugees were marred for life, either mentally or physically, by what 
they had gone through. Almost every one of them was penniless, for the Easterner 
traditionally invested his money in his business or in property, and few could bring away 
more than a small suitcase when they fled .
There is no better propaganda coup than the images and actual sights of the exodus of the 
suffering, the maimed, the homeless, the penniless. For Ojukwu, this was an important 
motivating force for all Easterners, and he publicly demanded the creation of a new 
constitution creating a confederation, where Easterners could be accomodated in a 
peaceful Nigeria. The federal media carried a rejection of this demand by Yakubu Gowon. 
Moreover Ojukwu had come into possession of a draft document by the Federal 
Government creating more states (about fourteen). There were several meetings in Lagos 
in an attempt to resolve the consitutional impasse.
In early September 1966, a number of Northern troops from Ibadan, capital of the West, 
raided Benin City in the Midwest, and snatched from prison a number of officers in 
detention for their part in the January coup. The Northerners among the detainees were
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released in the North, whilst the Easterners were murdered. And, although Gowon had 
promised that those responsible would be punished, this did not happen.
Firstly, Gowon's dismissal of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference on 30th November, 
on the grounds that the Eastern delegates had not attended it since the original 
adjournment on 3rd October, was seen by the media in the East as dictatorial. The Eastern 
media claimed that the delegation from the East could not travel to Lagos because they 
were afraid for their lives. There then followed a bald announcement, a public admission 
by Gowon, as carried by the Federal media, that a new constitution would be drafted 
based on between ten and fourteen States. In the same broadcast on 30th November, 
Gowon stressed for the first time ever, that he would be inclined "to use force if 
circumstances compel". Naturally, the Eastern media saw this as provocative.
On the question of repatriation of troops, which had been considered at one of the 
constitutional conferences, Gowon explained that he had only meant that Easterners 
should be repatriated to the East, and Northerners in the East should return to the North. 
Although the Western ’leaders of thought conference' had unanimously agreed with the 
firm stand taken by the East on the repatriation from the West as well, Gowon said he had 
to keep Northerners there, as there were no Yoruba troops. At this, Colonel Robert 
Adebayo, Governor of the West, and a Yoruba, protested. But, the main question was the 
form of Nigeria, and of its army, in the immediate future.
Here, Ojukwu argued:
"As long as this situation exists, men from Eastern Nigeria would find it 
utterly impossible to stay in the same barracks, feed in the same mess, fight from the same 
trenches as men in the army from the Northern Nigeria...For these basic reasons the 
separation of forces, the separation of population is, in all sincerity essential, in order to 
avoid further friction and further killing."
Hassan Usman Katsina of the North and David Ejoor of the Midwest agreed.
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Gowon was asked by the leaders of the East, and by the media, to apologise for the crimes 
against the Easterners, punish the culprits and recompense the Easterners. There were 'no 
regrets' by Gowon, despite an earlier promise. According to the Biafran media, Gowon 
had promised, during one of the meetings of the Council of State, to recompense the 
affected Easterners, and to publicly apologise to them. The media and propaganda war 
intensified.
Apart from Adebayo's protest, the Western media sided with the East. Awolowo 
announced that if the East broke away from Nigeria, the West would follow suit, creating 
an Oduduwa Republic. Chief Awolowo and his retinue visited Ojukwu in cabinet in 
Enugu, and confirmed this by way of an understanding. Ojukwu's hand and that of the 
Assembly in the East were thus strengthened. This turned out to be a propaganda ploy by
** C
Awolowo. When he got back to Lagos, there was a stalemate.
Ojukwu declared to a joumalist:,fI cannot wait indefinitely for Lagos, so I have to make 
other arrangements".^
Then came the 'Aburi Accord1. Aburi was Nigeria's last chance before the putsch. There 
was, country wide, increasing popular pressure that the regional military Governors 
should meet to sort out the problems, a view strongly shared by Colonel Ojukwu. But 
since there was nowhere within Nigeria he felt he could go in personal safety, it was 
agreed to hold the meeting at Aburi, Ghana, under the auspices of General Ankrah of 
Ghana, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.
It was there in ex-President Nkrumah's luxurious country seat in the hills above Accra that 
the Supreme Council of Nigeria met on 4th and 5th January, 1967. Present were: 
Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, the four Regional Military Governors, - Colonel 
Robert Adebayo (successor to the assassinated Colonel Fajuyi), and Lieutenant Colonels 
Katsina, Ojukwu and Ejoor. Four others from Nigeria were also on the Council,
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representing the Navy, Lagos Territory, and two from the Federal Police. But the real 
talks hinged on the five Colonels.
The deliberations returned to the central issues of the Constitution and separation of 
forces. Also discussed and agreed were the matters of compensation for the fleeing 
Easterners from the North. Since the problem of refugees and abandoned property stuck 
out like a sore finger, there was an agreement to set up a commission to handle these. 
Again Gowon promised to express public regret about what had happened - (see appendix 
for details of the Aburi Accord)
Within a few days of Gowon's return to Lagos, the Aburi agreement began to die on the 
vine. Federal civil servants, led by the permanent secretaries, met in Lagos and resolved to 
advise Gowon that it was not in the interest of Nigeria to honour the Aburi Accord - (see
-> o
appendix).
It is obvious from the foregoing that several elements of propaganda were present and 
employed. Personalities were edified and caricatured to suit the propaganda objectives of 
their different constituencies. Because the different interest groups had control of the 
means of transmission, overt propaganda was widely employed. Covert propaganda was 
applied, through secret meetings, word of mouth, and pamphleteering. Ethnicity/tribalism 
was exploited. Sensibilties were evoked, and the reactors were motivated and mobilised. 
The principles of migration and mutation, imitation and replication are easily discemable. 
Nigeria had virtually become a propaganda theatre. Media activity was at it’s peak.
The collapse of the agreement was a further provocation. Predictably, the media in the 
East screamed. Rather, within ten days, the Federal Government published a book called 
Nigeria 1966', which gave the Federal, ie; Northern, version of everything that had 
happened since the January coup. At the time it caused a furore in the East. When
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Ojukwu protested over the phone that it had been agreed not to publish any more official 
versions, Gowon told him that there had been a leak. Later, Ojukwu learned that far from 
being a leak, the booklet had appeared simultaneously in London, New York, and several 
other capitals with all the usual publishers' ballyhoo, including cocktail parties at the High 
Commissions and Embassies. When Ojukwu protested again on the phone, Gowon put the 
phone down on him. The conversations were recorded by Ojukwu and broadcast on the 
media in the East.
Ojukwu had to protect himself against the wrath of the people in the East, who at this 
time demanded separation against his wishes; he preferred confederation. Therefore, after 
transmitting these conversations on the Eastern media, he also transmitted the Aburi 
deliberations, which he had secretly and unknown to the other participants, recorded. So, 
whilst Gowon attempted to seize the propaganda initiative with the world-wide, 
simultaneous, publication of the book Nigeria 1966', Ojukwu's counter propaganda thrust 
was a deadly blow aimed at the heart. It found its targeted point.
To modify the effect of this, on 26th February, 1967, Gowon called a press conference in 
Lagos, in which to put his own views and interpretation of the Aburi Accord. At the press 
conference, he presented the minutes and final agreements at Aburi. He also juxtaposed 
these with the texts of the minutes of the Federal civil servants in Lagos, (see both 
appendices) This was his way of criticising the Aburi Accord.
It also turned out to be a further propaganda coup for Ojukwu. Gowon was furious that 
Ojukwu had secretly recorded the Aburi deliberations, and broadcast the recordings. The 
broadcast tapes portrayed Gowon as unreliable, and unserious, while Ojukwu's 
intelligence superseded all the others present.
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The media in the East claimed that Ojukwu "went to Oxford and Sandhurst while Gowon 
only went to Sandhurst; as a result, Ojukwu's Oxford English was too difficult for Gowon 
to comprehend". Ojukwu was edified. Gowon was caricatured. Gowon accused Ojukwu 
of betrayal and arrogance.
"On Aburi We Stand", became the slogan on all the media in the East. It became such a 
propaganda punch line, that it acted as a negotiating ploy and euphemism everywhere one 
went in the East.
Ojukwu refused to attend further meetings of the Supreme Military Council until the 
Aburi agreements had been implemented, partly because the meeting scheduled was in a 
Benin City liberally sprinkled with Northern soldiers, partly because he knew he could go 
no further. In a broadcast at the end of February, he said: "If the Aburi agreements are not 
fully implemented by 31st March, I shall have no alternative but to feel free to take 
whatever measures may be necessary to give effect in this Region to those agreements". 
On that day the departure of Eastern Nigeria was fully expected. Journalists arriving in 
Enugu for a press conference already had their headlines mapped out. Instead, still playing 
for the last chance of staying inside 'One Nigeria', Colonel Ojukwu told them that he was 
issuing a Revenue Edict appropriating all Federal Revenue collected in the East as a 
means of paying for the rehabilitation programme.^ The decree did not affect oil 
revenues, as these were collected in Lagos. The reporters were stunned; they had 
expected brimstone, and were being confronted with a fiscal programme. Mildly, Ojukwu 
told them the East would only pull out of Nigeria if she were attacked or blockaded. This 
was a clear instance of manipulative persuasion. By blowing hot and cold, he was 
attempting to attract the sympathy of the journalists, and the admiration of the domestic 
constituency, all of which edified him more.
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The Federal Government replied with Decree Eight, a document that appeared at first 
glance to implement the major points of the constitutional agreement of Aburi; if not the 
fiscal arrangements. Decree Eight, like Aburi, vested the legislative and executive powers 
in the Supreme Military Council, and decisions on vital matters could only be taken with 
the agreement of all the Military Governors. Within their own regions, the Governors 
were to have virtual autonomy.
It looked good, and was hailed as such by the media in Lagos and the West. The Eastern 
media cautiosly welcomed it as a climb down, and change of heart by Gowon, although it 
went no further than what had been agreed at Aburi four months earlier. That was until 
the small print was read again and more carefully. Then it could be seen that the 'extras' on 
the small print virtually nullified the main paragraphs.
One of the extra clauses was to the effect that the Regional Governors could not exercise 
their powers "so as to impede or prejudice the authority of the Federation, or endager the 
continuance of the Federal Government". Although it looked harmless, it was presumably 
up to the Federal Government, ie; Gowon, to decide precisely what would "impede or 
prejudice the authority..." Another section enabled the Federal Government to take over 
the authority of a Regional Government which was "endangering the continuance of the 
Federal Government", the criterion being again left in Lagos.
Most menacing of all to Eastern eyes was a paragraph, under which, a state of emergency 
could be declared in any region with the agreement of only three Military Governors.^
As the declaration of a state of emergency usually implies sending in troops, and as the 
other three Military Governors were either Northern or governed regions occupied by 
Northern troops, Colonel Ojukwu saw this as being specifically anti- Eastern. He rejected 
the decree in a broadcast on Eastern Nigeria media.
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The mounting unpopularity of the Gowon regime now grew elsewhere in the South. In the 
West there had been growing resentment over the failure to repatriate the Northern 
troops, a measure that Aburi had restated, and Chief Awolowo led the revolt. His 
following had traditionally been among the proletarian and radical elements in the West, 
and these were the people who resented most the occupation of the Northern soldiers. At 
a meeting of the Western ’leaders of thought' in Ibadan in late April, 1967, he resigned as 
the Western delegate to the impending Ad Hoc Conference, stating in his letter: "It is my 
considered view that whilst some of the demands of the East are excessive, within the 
context of a Nigerian Union, most of such demands are not only well founded, but are 
designed for smooth and healthy association among the various national units of 
Nigeria” 42
Chief Awolowo had just returned from a visit to Ojukwu in Enugu, to witness for himself 
the depth of feeling in the East. According to Ojukwu, in a press conference following the 
visit, Awolowo had asked if the East would pull out, and the reply had been that it would 
not until and unless it was absolutely offered no other alternative.
After seeing the situation for himself, Awolowo sympathised with the sufferings of the 
Eastern people, and asked that if the East was going to pull out, he be allowed twenty 
four hours forewarning, and he would do the same for the West. This, he was promised. 
Later, he got his forewarning, but by that time, he had been swayed round by other 
attractions, and failed to fulfil his intent. Frederick Forsyth maintains that from the point 
of view of the Yorubas, this was regrettable, for if Awolowo had stuck to his guns, the 
Federal government, unable to face two simultaneous disaffections, would have been 
forced to fulfil the Aburi agreements to the letter.^
As the deadlock continued, the media acted as snipers for their respective governments. 
One precaution Ojukwu did feel obliged to take, nevertheless, was to import some arms.
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The departure of the Enugu garrison with all its weaponry, and arrival back home of the 
Eastern troops without any, had left the East defenceless. Moreover, Ojukwu had come 
into possession of a document from an Ibo diplomat in Rome showing that a Northern 
army Major, Sule Apollo was in Italy buying large quantities of arm s.^
Gowon was emboldened by pronouncements from the Northern media, conveying their 
support for his actions, including the creation of more States in Nigeria (a major turn 
around for the North for propaganda reasons). Early in May 1967, Gowon imposed a 
partial blockade on the East. It extended to postal and postal order services, but also 
affected telephones, cables, telex machines, and other forms of communication, all of 
which were routed through Lagos. The effect was to leave the East cut off from the 
outside, the more so as Nigeria Airways flights were also banned.
In Enugu, Ojukwu remarked to Reuters: "I think we are now rolling downhill. It will take 
a great deal to halt the momentum. We are very close, very, very close".
There was one last peace move. A group calling itself the National Conciliation 
Committee, headed by the new Federal Chief Justice, Sir Adetokumbo Ademola, a 
Yoruba, and including Chief Awolowo, visited Ojukwu on 7th May. They listened to his 
views, accepted all his demands, and called on the Federal Government to implement 
them. These demands included little more than the implementation of the August 9th, 
1966 agreement to post the troops back to their regions of origin, and to call off the 
economic sanctions News broadcasts and commentaries from both the Nigerian and 
Biafran media at the time confirmed this.
On 20th May, 1967, Gowon accepted all the recommendations. He announced the lifting 
of the ban on Nigerian Airways flights, along with other sanctions. But, the Director of 
the Airways privately admitted that he had had no orders to resume flights. As for the 
troops, Colonel Katsina flew from Kaduna to Ibadan to inform the troops that they were
154
to be moved - but only to the town of Ilorin, about a stone's throw over the border 
between West and North, and lying on the main road to Lagos.
All this, in propaganda terms, was a catalogue of lies and deception, a process of 
disinformation, in order to keep the other side guessing, and destabilised.
Ojukwu, by the time, had dissolved the House of Assembly, and set up a Consultative 
Assembly with 335 members, of people from all ethnic groups in the East, and from all 
walks of life. They met on 26th May (with the clamour for sepration ringing in their ears), 
and gave him a unanimous mandate, at the end of a noisy session, to pull the East out of 
what was now, according to the Eastern media, "the defunct Federation of Nigeria", 'at an 
early practicable date', by declaring the Eastern Region:
"A FREE SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE BY THE NAME AND 
TITLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA".
Gowon activated his plans the next day. He declared a state of emergency, and 
simultaneously published a decree, abolishing the existing regions, and dividing Nigeria 
into twelve new States. It was clearly a propaganda ploy, meant to be provocative, 
directed at the heart of the Eastern demands; but it was also an appeal to the sensibilities 
of the minorities of the East. There had been no consultation, which was contrary to the 
constitution, even though despite the mandate granted him by the East, Ojukwu had not in 
fact, seceded. It contravened the spirit of Aburi. It contravened the provision that all the 
Regions would participate fully in any determination of the country's structural adjustment 
in the form of association. More important was the division of the East into three States - 
Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers States, thus satisfying the yearnings of the Calabar, Ogoja, and 
Rivers'(COR) State Movement, which comprised the non-Ibo politicians of the East who, 
for long, had agitated for a separate State, carved out of the Eastern Region.
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Also, Port Harcourt, the industrial city of the East, was removed by Gowon's 
arrangement, and made capital of Rivers State. The Rivers and Cross Rivers States were 
the oil producing areas of the region, and the country. The action was described by the 
media in the East as "an open challenge to secede". In the same broadcast on the Federal 
media, Gowon announced the reimposition of the blockade, the abrogation of Decree 
Eight, earlier mentioned, and accorded himself full powers " for the short period necessary 
to carry out the measures which are now urgently required".
Clearly, there was no way the Federal Government could administer the new States it had 
created within Eastern Nigeria, because the government of the soon to be declared 
Republic of Biaffa, had territorial and military control.
In the small hours of 30th May, 1967, diplomats were called to the State House, Enugu, 
soon to be renamed Biaffa Lodge, to hear Colonel Ojukwu read the Declaration of 
Independence:
"Fellow Countrymen and women, you the 
people of Eastern Nigeria:
Conscious of the Supreme authority of 
Almighty God over all Mankind; of 
your duty to yourselves and posterity;
Aware that you can no longer be 
protected in your lives and in your 
property by any government based 
outside Eastern Nigeria.
Believing that you, are bom free and 
have certain inalienable rights which 
can be best presented by yourselves;
Unwilling to be unfree partners in
any association of a political or economic
nature;
Rejecting the authority of any person
or persons other than the Military Government
of Eastern Nigeria to make
any imposition of whatever kind of
nature upon you;
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Determined to disolve all political and 
other ties between you and the former 
Federal Republic of Nigeria;
Prepared to enter into such association, 
treaty or alliance with any sovereign 
State within the former Federal Republic 
of Nigeria and elsewhere on such terms 
and conditions as best to subserve 
your common good;
Affirming your trust and confidence in 
me;
Having mandated me to proclaim on your 
behalf and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria 
be a Sovereign Independent Republic,
NOW THEREFORE I, LIEUTENANT COLONEL 
CHUKWUEMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU,
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN NIGERIA 
BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY, AND PURSUANT TO 
THE PRICIPLES RECITED ABOVE,
DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIM 
THAT THE TERRITORY AND REGION 
KNOWN AS AND CALLED EASTERN NIGERIA 
TOGETHER WITH HER CONTINENTAL SHELF 
AND TERRITORIAL WATERS 
SHALL HENCEFORTH BE 
AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE 
OF THE NAME AND TITLE OF 
"THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA."46
The die was thus cast.
What Radio Nigeria and Television in Lagos chose to describe as 'police action' started, 
to 'bring Eastern Nigeria back to the fold'. The slogan on Radio Nigeria and Television 
was 'to keep Nigeria one, is a task that must be done'.
Within a few months of the declaration o f independence, a remarkable array of forces had 
ranged themselves to crush the new country.^ Gowon launched the Federal army behind 
the slogan above. Phrases like 'One Nigeria', 'to preserve the territorial integrity of 
Nigeria', and 'crush the revolt' were constant features on the Nigerian media.
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The counter slogan on what was now 'Radio Biafra and Television', was 'the price of 
liberty is eternal vigilance'.
The media in Lagos announced that the army had been instructed to enter the Eastern 
Nigerian territory to regain the territory in a police action. They were also expected 'to 
capture Ojukwu dead or alive, and bring him back to Lagos'.
Seeing that war was imminent, both sides went forward with feverish preparations, the 
Biaffans to defend themselves, the Nigerians to bring about a quick finish to what they 
regarded as a "childishly easy task".
The first shells were fired over Biafra's northern border at dawn on 6th July, 1967.
Full scale war broke out.
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CHAPTER FOUR, PARTB.
4.6. The Operation of the Biafran Media.
The Radio was by far the most powerful instrument in the Biafran war.
By 1967 there were two television stations in Biafra - Channel 6 in Enugu and Channel 4 
in Aba. However, it was the Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation in Enugu which 
reached out to all parts of the region and beyond. There were also repeater stations in all 
the provincial headquarters of the Region. Apart from local newspapers in Aba, Calabar, 
Onitsha, with circulation only in the provinces, the main newspaper was owned and 
controlled by the Biafran government with a regional circulation. This was called the 
Biaffa Sun. (see appendix.) In addition there were the numerous government propaganda 
leaflets. It is necessary to emphasise that even though the people of Calabar, Ogoja, and 
Rivers Provinces were killed along with the Ibos in the North, they did not want to be part 
of Biaffa. That meant that the whole of the Eastern Region did not speak with one voice. 
Consequently propaganda was directed from Lagos at the people in the three dissenting 
areas to sabotage Biafra. Conversely there was a vast amount of propaganda from the 
Biafran media to keep them in the Biafran fold.
Since at this time, Biafra had military control of the area, the Biafran media prevailed. To 
further consolidate this hold, listening to Radio Nigeria and reading Nigerian newspapers 
was made illegal and treated as sabotage. It is not clear whether the Biafran government 
ever caught and punished anybody under this law, but there were indications that some 
people who were caught were mobbed to death by angry crowds or summarily shot by 
soldiers, though clearly not at the command or with the Knowledge of superior officers of 
the Biafran government.
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At the beginning of the war, Radio Nigeria Enugu, which was an offshoot of the Federal 
Radio Nigeria was taken over by the Biafran government. All the broadcast systems were 
brought under one umbrella for effective control. The Ministiy of Information was 
converted into The Propaganda Directorate headed by Dr. Ifegwu Eke, a university 
lecturer. The air and sea blockade mounted by the Federal Nigerian Government against 
Biaffa meant that it became difficult, indeed almost impossible, to import and export from 
the Biafran territory. Biafra then established the Voice of Biafra to reach out to the rest of 
the world, to come to her aid.
Propaganda dictated the pace of the war. Territories were gained and lost on radio. 
Newspapers could hardly be produced for lack of paper, and spare parts. The Radio 
subsisted on a repair culture. Sometimes Biafra existed only on radio. Even when the 
capital Enugu fell to the Nigerian soldiers, the station built underground in Umuahia in a 
bunker was still announcing the retention of Enugu. The stations were boosted. People 
were encouraged to produce more radio from scrap. People were encouraged to buy and 
carry radios. Bushes and forests became radio stations and palm and cotton wool trees 
their antennae.
4.7 The Biafran Media and The Biafran People.
The operation and activities of the Biafran media are a clear demonstration of the 
modalities of successful propaganda postulated by this thesis, namely
(1) Motivation
(2) Mobilisation
(3) Sustainability (Sustenance)
(3) Durability.
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It will be expedient therefore to examine these themes in turn;
4.7.1 Motivation.
Prior to the civil war, the Biafran media was used as an instrument to build up unity, 
confidence and morale of the Biafran people. Pictures of Easterners being massacred in 
Kano and different parts of the North were repeatedly shown on what was then the 
Eastern Nigeria Television, and in the region's newspapers. This angered all parts of the 
East, not just the Ibos. Most families of the East were affected either directly or indirectly 
by the massacres. People were returning to the East from the North by all available means 
- bicycles, trucks, planes, trains, some even lay on top of trains. The Eastern Television 
stations, Channels 6 & 4, and the newspapers were full of the images. Even the Western 
Nigeria television and newspapers at this stage carried the pictures. The radios ran 
interviews with the streams of people pouring into the East. The images of the exodus 
were roundly condemned by Easterners.
The resettlement of the refugees, or "returnees" (as they were called in the East), affected 
evrybody's life in the region. The radio was not left out of this. Together with Television 
and Print, it carried out several interviews with the "returnees", broadcasting them to all 
nooks and crannies of the region.
As has been seen, the media played a major role in caricaturing Gowon's inadequacies, 
whilst edifying Ojukwu's virtues at the peace conferences leading up to the declaration of 
Biafra.
4.7.2 Mobilisation.
In this case, there was a very fine line between motivation and mobilisation. The one 
flowed into the other.
It should be stressed that the most important things that the media did, either as Eastern 
Nigeria media or the Biafran media, were:
161
(1) The conveying of the Declaration of Secession and (Independence).
(2) The annoucement of the Ahiara Declaration
(3) The annoucement of the cessation of military activities, and surrender speech by 
General Philip Efiong, Biafran Deputy Head of State, and an Ibibio.
These were cardinal landmarks which stand out amongst the other activities of the 
secessionist State media.
The declaration of secession and of the Republic of Biafra, was both a motivator and 
mobiliser for the people of Eastern Nigeria. It was a momentous occasion for friends and 
enemies of Biafra, within and beyond the territory. It was exhilarating for some, and 
ominous for the others. It was onerous. People were expectant and reflective; they Knew 
the die was cast.
A hurriedly assembled "Biafran Army" was enveloped by a sense of awe - for what was to 
come. The 'Ahiara Declaration* which resulted, both from the failure of the 'Aburi Accord' 
and the Declaration of Independence, was regarded, as already stated, as a 'Charter' for 
Biafra and Biafrans. It was both a motivator and mobiliser, and from this point of view, 
can be compared, with 'Mein Kampf, and the Little Red Book', as well as more 
immediately, Nyerere's 'Arusha Declaration1 on which it was modelled. Ojukwu admired 
Nyerere, who in turn had great respect for Mao.
The paradox was that Nyerere was a socialist, whilst Ojukwu was a capitalist. The Arusha 
Declaration for its part was modelled on Mao's Little Red Book .The Biafran media 
repeated pronouncements and announcements of the Ahiara Declaration several times 
over, to motivate and mobilise. There were passages for all strata of society. It became a 
'bible', a way of life and conduct, for Biafran Servicemen, Civil Servants, Businessmen and 
Civilians. Passages were treated as wise sayings.
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4.7.3. Sustainability (Sustenance).
The Biafran media commissioned, drama, and sketches in praise of Biafra, and edification 
of Ojukwu. Nigeria on the other hand was portrayed in a predictably bad light, and 
Gowon was caricatured. Peter Edochie's story about Gowon's production of children, 
earlier told, was one example, the story of the coconut tree another, of the sort of either 
subtle or abrasive propaganda that went on. To reiterate, the story of the coconut tree 
went thus; three people went in search of coconut. They all gathered at the trunk of the 
coconut tree. The first, a Hausa-Fulani, sat down and said'Allah will provide', the second, 
a Yoruba looked up watching for the coconut to fall for him to pick, the third, an Ibo, 
climbed up and plucked the coconut.
The fiercest battles of the war were fought at Ikot Ekpene, Aba-Azumini-Ekpat Akwa, 
especially at Ogbor Hill; and at Port Harcourt, Abagana, and Umuahia-Uzuakoli. The 
Biafran commanders at these battle fronts were extolled by the media for their prowess, 
intelligence, and bravery. In this way, the war was sustained. The media created and 
enkindled confidence in the Biafran people. It gave them hope that they were being 
sufficiently defended, and protected from annihilation. Some of the commanders, like 
Colonel Archibong of the Ikot Ekpene front, Colonel Achuzia, Port Harcourt front, 
Colonel Ananaba, Adazi front, were extolled as possessing mystical powers, which could 
not be penetrated by enemy forces. It was claimed that Colonel Archibong was impervious 
to enemy bullets. According to Biafran propaganda, he was indestructible. This was 
analogous to claims made during the Ukpum Ete/Okon battles, demonstrating the 
continuity of propaganda.
Even when Colonel Archibong was finally killed, and given a military burial in Lagos by 
Gowon, the Biafran people did not believe it; just as they did not believe that Aguiyi 
Ironsi could be successfully assassinated. These sort of beliefs were not restricted to 
Biafra. The Northerners had believed that Ahmadu Bello was above human destruction.
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Songs like "Ojukwu Nyem Egbe", "Military Police", "Biafra Win The War", and several 
others, were constantly repeated on the Bifran media. Song writers, musicians, band 
leaders, like Miki Nzewi, Nwokolobia Agu, Ojukwu (no relation), and performing groups, 
wrote and performed numerous songs and sketches on the media, and at the war fronts, to 
sustain the war effort. Several drama sketches were written, and directed by prominent 
figures, amongst whom were John Ekwere, Cyprian Ekwensi, Ralph Opara, Okokon 
Ndem, Kalu Uka, Ezenta Eze, Mazi Ukonu Ukonu.
When Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe escaped to Nigeria, and announced that he was happy to 
return to his fatherland; the Biafran media announced that Zik had left his "motherland", 
for his "fatherland". This was the Biafran way of saying that Zik was running with the hare 
and hunting with the hounds; that he was a deserter, who could not be trusted not to 
abandon ship in heavy storm. Zik, incidentally wrote the Biafran National Anthem, before 
he escaped from Biafra.(see appendix). The National Anthem itself, like the Biafran 
currency, (see appendix) and Biafran stamps, were land marks in the sustenance of the 
war effort. They were reflections of Biafran images, aims and objectives, struggles, 
motivations, purposes, ambitions and successes. The Anthem, ensign, currency, stamps, 
coat of arms and crest, were all designed to encompass all of the Biafran peoples, their 
cultures, and their aims, and not only the Ibos'.
The announcement of the secession of hostilities, and military activities, and surrender 
speech was the last performance of the Biafran media. General Philip Efiong, an Ibibio, 
Deputy Biafran Head of State, undertook the awesome, but onerous task. Ojukwu had 
fled to exile the week before surrender. After the speech, all activities of the Biafran media 
were brought to a halt. The media ceased to exist.
Everything went dead.
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4.7.4. Durability.
As a test of the durability of Biafran propaganda, this thesis has fallen back on two studies
- (1) A study conducted in the course of research for this thesis on the Ukpum Ete/Okon
Clan discussed earlier; and (2) A study conducted by Luke Uka Uche in some urban areas
48of Nigeria, and rural Ibo communities.
These two studies, it should be noted, are relatively recent. Luke Uka Uche's study was 
done in 1987, while the one for this thesis was done in 1992. The Ukpum Ete/Okon 
community was discussed in chapter 1. They are a community in the South East of 
Nigeria. They were a part of Eastern Nigeria, then of Biafra; ’liberated' by Colonel 
Adekunle's Nigerian commandos in 1968, they became a part of the South Eastern State 
created by Gowon. Latterly, they have become a part of Akwa Ibom State, carved out of 
South Eastern State by General Ibrahim Babangida.
They, are therefore a strategically suitable group for study. They form part of the Ibibio 
language group. There were newstalks in Efik/Ibibio, who are the fourth largest language 
group in Nigeria; and were the second largest language group in Biaffa.
General Philip Efiong, as already stated, is an Ibibio. He was Deputy Head of State in 
Biaffa. Mr. N.U.Akpan, who was Secretary to the Government of Biaffa, is an Ibibio. The 
Director General of Biaffan Broadcasting Services, Chief John Dickson Ekwere, is an 
Ibibio. Ukpum Ete/Okon, therefore, possessing all the ingredients of being within the 
Biafran territory initially, captured in 1968 by Colonel Adekunle's Nigerian commandos, 
had the benefit of both propaganda thrusts - Nigeria's and Biafra's. Also, being within the 
COR State demand territory, Nigeria and Biafra wooed it. A lot of the newstalk were 
directed at such areas from the Biafran media. However, the study revealed that even 
though they were opposed to Biafra, and actually helped the Nigerian soldiers, they 
missed Radio Biafra after it ceased to exist. They still, even now, reflect on, repeat and 
chant, the 'one liner' songs and propaganda that emanated from Radio Biafra. The Biafran
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media, according to them, made compelling listening, and the propaganda therefrom was 
indelible.
Luke Uka Uche's study involved Aba, Abayi, Amaoji, and Ihie, in the heart of Ibo land in 
Eastern Nigeria - as a sample of rural village opinion. He chose Benin City in the Midwest 
of Nigeria, and Lagos at the centre, for a sample of Nigerian and urban opinion. The study 
revealed that Biafran propaganda was more convincing than Nigerian propaganda even in 
Federal communities like Lagos and Benin. The Ibo communities still chant the songs, 
repeat the stories, and keep the symbols of the war period.
Research for this thesis has also discovered that some buildings in Ibo land that were 
riddled with bullets have been left untouched as a memento for posterity. The Ibos cannot 
forget the motivating influence of the Biafran media.
According to Uka Uche, one Ibo leader interviewed observed: "Radio Biafra was a 
constant reminder of how Igbos were slaughtered up North. It reminded me that we had 
always been cheated..."
One of the propaganda 'one liners' that the Ibibio people still remember arose from a 
newstalk in Ibibio directed at them by Okon Atakpo from Radio Biafra . One of the lines 
was a deep rooted Ibibio idiom which had a double edged meaning: "Nsasak asok asak, 
ete atat adan", meaning "the robin is roasting, but the onlookers claim it is shedding oil".
4.8 The Sun Set.
The involement of the major powers in the Biafra/Nigeria conflict may have been as a 
result of oil, politics or Biafran and Nigerian propaganda, but it was the only occasion 
since the second world war that Britain, the U.S.A. and Russia were on one side. France 
however supported and aided Biafra.
Under the aegis of the O. A.U. the African countries tried several times and by various 
means and through several personalities to intervene. One such attempt was the 'Aburi
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Accord' which was instigated by President Julius Nyerere and the Ghanaian Head of State, 
(see ch. 5)
The international involvement meant that the United Nations urged the O. A.U. to 
mediate. Biafra tried unsuccessfully to be admitted into the United Nations. The other 
angle adopted by Biaffa in its propaganda war was religion. It accused the Mostly Muslim 
North' of seeking to annihilate the 'Christian East'. This attracted sympathy from the 
World Council of Churches and the Vatican, and large supplies from Caritas.(see ch. 5) 
Ironically, the instrument for propagating the Biafran cause was also used by one of its 
foremost soldiers to sabotage Biafra. Emmanuel Ifeajuna, one of the leaders of the 1966 
coup had joined Biafra along with Chukwuma Nzeogu. Ifeajuna had his own ambition.
He wanted to take back Lagos and become Head of State. He then played both ends 
against themselves. He made a secret pact with the Nigerian army to hand Biafra back to 
Nigeria, his main aim being to use the opportunity as a footstool to recapture Lagos. He 
then put out certain messages on Radio Biafra which at the time he claimed were coded 
messages to the Biafran forces at the war front. But, in fact he was sending veiled 
messages to the Nigerian forces to come and take Enugu. The message read "The apple is 
ripe and must be eaten. Go to the lake and catch the fish. Andrew Lilian will cooperate". 
He was found out, but too late, Enugu had fallen. He was shot. No doubt this started 
some back lash against the Onitsha people, homeland of Ifeajuna. The Biafran scene was 
tumultous. There were suspicions, accusations and distrust even amongst media people. 
There were struggles for power, and sycophancy and ethnic differences between Ibos and 
non-Ibos were rife.
Internal strife neither helped the propaganda network nor the Biafran war. Nevertheless 
there were a number of prominent non-Ibo broadcasters who were very efficient in 
Biafra. The perpetual news talks against Nigeria were given by Okokon Ndem, an Efik, 
Paddy Davies, an Ibibio, and Nwora Asika, an Ibo. John Ekwere, an Ibibio, was Director 
General for the co-ordinated Biafran broadcasting services. The O. A.U. forces stepped in.
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The Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra went silent and into hiding. Even when the Nigerian 
army regained the territory, they did not discover the stations.
4.9 Back To The Fold.
Just before the end, a fourth station was set up. Tests were being run.
It was called "The Fourth Dimension". This was to carry a very powerful transmitter, and 
to be beamed to Europe and the Americas. Whatever effect this would have had on the 
war is a matter for conjecture.
However, Radio Biaffa was taken back to Enugu and incorporated into Radio Nigeria, 
Enugu since it had a short wave transmitter. The Voice of Biaffa was secretly carted away 
to Calabar by the Engineer-in-charge, who came ffom Calabar, David Andrew Bassey, to 
be used at Calabar Television Stations at Enugu and Aba were incorporated into the 
Nigerian Television, and the Radio Stations were all taken over by the New State 
Governments or the Federal Government.
The process of reabsorbtion signified the magnanimity of the then Head of State, General 
Yakubu Gowon Despite all the insults on him personally, emanating ffom the Voice of 
Biaffa and Radio Biafra, during the war, he welcomed everybody back and rehabilitated 
them. It would be interesting to see where else such bitter wars have been fought, and 
there have not been any official recriminations at the end.
Some of the Biaffan broadcasters have since risen to positions of authority within the 
Nigerian fold.
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4.10. Epilogue.
Somehow, none of the active participants in Biafra's propaganda effort has written 
about their experiences. This thesis may turn out to be the first such account. It 
incorporates the views and reactions of prominent participants and colleagues, some of 
whom include; Cyprian Ekwensi, John Ekwere, Chinua Achebe, Kalu Uka, Sam 
Nwaneri, Sebastian Ofiirum, Eno Irukwu, OkokonNdem, Kevin Ejiofor, David 
Andrew-Bassey, Gloria Fiofori, Kalu Nsi, Ifegwu Eke.
Part of the reason for the lack of exposition of Biafran propaganda, is that at the end 
of the war, the word Biafra became a "dirty word" in Nigeria, even to the ex-Biafrans. 
The ex-Biafrans were more concerned with rehabilitation and reconstruction. And, the 
Nigerians were frightened, lest another propaganda war would start, and another civil 
war. The Federal Nigerian Government of General Yakubu Gowon was anxious to 
bury the hatchet and speed up rehabilitation and reconstruction. Some books have 
eventually emerged but mainly on the civil war itself, not on the media.
One observation from these reflections is worth comment; the African attitude towards 
reconciliations. Unlike other parts of the world - the Middle East, the Americas, Asia 
and Europe - where repercusions still reverberate over crimes that were committed at 
war decades ago, Africans, as demonstrated in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and 
South Africa, reconcile, accommodate, bury the hatchet, and forget.
Hopefully, this will happen in future in Mozambique, Angola, Liberia,etc. There are no 
widespread postwar recriminations. This does not happen elsewhere in the world. 
Perhaps, since the reconciliation example migrated from Nigeria to Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, and South Africa, the African mutation formula may, in due course be 
imitated and replicated around the world.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BIAFRA: THE EXTERNAL FACTOR.
Introduction
This chapter, which is in three parts, examines the international factor in Biaffan 
propaganda under the following headings:
Part A: Biaffa's external propaganda;
Part B: Biafra and Africa; Biaffa and Britain; and
Part C: Biaffa and the World.
With the establishment of the Voice of Biafra, which reached out to surrounding African 
countries, sympathy began to emerge from some African countries. The countries included 
parts of the Camerouns, despite the attempt by the Camerounian leader to stop it, Gabon, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Zaire.
Outside Africa, Israel, France, Portugal, South Africa and Haiti, were sympathetic. By 
accusing Nigeria of continued genocide and instituting pogroms, Biafra also attracted 
some non-governmental sympathy from the people of Great Britain and the United States. 
The voice of Biafra expressed the appreciation of the Biaffan people for the support.
The media - Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra - accused Nigeria of waging the war to steal 
the abundant mineral wealth of Biafra. They called it an 'oil war', because Biafra was the 
main source of crude oil in Nigeria. In 1967, in the early part of the war, Biaffan soldiers
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successfully captured and incorporated the Midwest, the other oil producing area. But, the 
Nigerian army took back the region.
The people of Biafra were asked through mounting propaganda to starve Nigeria of crude 
oil, fuel, and by-products. The sale or export of these products was punishable by death. 
Despite this, the black market flourished, and traders amassed vast amounts of Biafran 
money.
A broadcast from the Voice of Biafra in December 1967, accused the British Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, of supporting Nigeria, and ignoring the cross party consensus in 
the British Parliament against his policy. According to the Voice of Biaffa, he advised the 
Nigerian government to get the United States and the Soviet Union on her side quickly. 
The Biaffan government, however, claimed that even though Britain officially supported 
the Nigerian government, it indirectly and unofficially sympathised with Biafra. There 
appears to be no official source for this piece of information which seems to have 
emanated either from Biafran government sources, or the propaganda directorate. But, the 
'rumour' spread like wild fire in Biafra boosting morale. Whether this was propaganda or 
not, is difficult to determine, but Auberon Waugh maintained that Sir David Hunt, who 
was British High Commissioner in Nigeria at the time, tacitly worked in favour of the 
Nigerian government, and also convinced the British government to do the same. *
This chapter will examine these themes in greater depth, and analyse the effectiveness of 
Biafran propaganda in attracting or repelling sympathies from the different participating 
external constituencies it addressed.
It will be seen that while the British government appeared to 'encourage the activities of 
the Nigerian government, British journalists were active on both sides of the divide, for 
example, Colin Legum, then Africa and Commonwealth correspondent of the Observer. 
and Frederick Forsyth, then of the B.B.C. were involved with feeding the world with 
information, the former from Nigeria, the latter from Biafra. Others, like Angus
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McDermid and Auberon Waugh also became deeply involved at different times in the 
propaganda war.
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PART A
5.1. External Propaganda:
Mode, Method, Execution and Effect.
This part analyses the mode of transmission of Biafran propaganda to the outside world, 
and the method used to execute the spread. It examines the effect this had on the policies 
of the recipients.
5.1.1. Mode
The mode was entirely 'manipulative persuasion' by both Nigeria and Biaffa, but more so 
by Biaffa, whose propaganda was better organised and more efficient. The means of 
control of the external forces was non existent, and so it was difficult to gauge the mood, 
reception and reaction of the external constituency. Therefore the methods discussed in 
the next section had to be employed.
Dr. Ifegwu Eke, when interviewed for this thesis, explained that Biafra had also carefully 
studied the propaganda results and responses in the other models - China and Germany, 
etc. and learned both from their mistakes and successes, and decided what to adapt and 
tailor to suit it's own particular propaganda goals. From this, it is fair to argue that a 
process of migration and mutation had occured. The Biaffans had gestated the ideas thus 
imbibed, imitated and replicated them, with adaptations to suit their particular messages 
and recipient audiences. The external audiences responded, and reacted variously to the 
messages received. Their reactions and responses varied depending on their interpretations 
of Biafran mterial. Their respective motivations were to variously mobilise humanitarian 
help, and arms.
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No doubt, censorship as a mode of propaganda was also heavily applied. Each side only 
issued statements, and released messages and information favourable to it. Two typical 
examples demonstrate this clearly:
(1) During the upheaval in Western Nigeria, the Commonwealth Prime Minister's 
Conference was being held in Lagos. Yet, the Federal Government controlled, 
manipulated and stifled the information that reached the Heads of State and Government, 
even at such a close proximity; such as the the riots, the killings, the burning and looting 
that went on. The propagation of a 'police action', whilst waging all out war, is a further 
example.
(2) The best illustration of such a control by Biaffa was the continous announcement that 
Radio Biaffa and Voice of Biaffa were both still broadcasting ffom Enugu, long after 
Enugu had been sacked. In fact, Radio Biafra had moved three times, first to Owerri, then 
to Umuahia, then to a bunker, and finally to Obodo Ukwu near Orlu, where it survived in 
the forest till the war ended.
Voice of Biafra had also moved three or more times, finally situating in Eke Ututu near 
the Biafran airport at Uli, until the end of the war.
Throughout all this movement, the stations were housed in mobile portakabins - an act of 
considerable engineering ingenuity, considering the propaganda achievement over a period 
of three years.
5.1.2. Method.
In 1968, the first puzzling signs of famine began to emerge from Biafra - images of famine 
that were to reveal the true scale of the so called 'small bush war', and transform it into a 
major front page story in the West. The journalist responsible for the transformation was 
Frederick Forsyth.
181
He had been in Biafra during the early days - the exodus and the declaration of 
independence. He was recalled by the BBC, but returned to Biafra independently, because 
he was moved by what he saw in his earlier visit.
Biafra's early propaganda thrust were three fold - pogrom and genocide, religious war 
fare, and oil and economic war.(see ch.4). All three relatively impacted on the world 
stage, but, as has been seen, despite strong words, did not motivate any external 
mobilisation in aid of Biafra. But, famine - and the pictures of Kwashiorkor children, 
women and men achieved what religion, genocide and pogrom, and oil, did not.
Famine has struck countless communities throughout history, but the impact had always 
been local and gone largely unnoticed in the rest of the world. In this case, the isolation 
was swept aside because the media was made to take interest - an excellent case of 
manipulative persuasion.
The Biafran famine was caused directly by the civil war. It was a clear and unambigous 
case of politics provoking a famine.
Father Mike Doheny. an Irish Holy Ghost Father, who had lived as a missionary in 
Eastern Nigeria from 1945 to 1959, recalls:
’We'd never seen hunger, never.
There was no shortage of food.
People lived very simply,
there was a lot of disease
but no starvation as such,
and when we saw it for the first time,
when we saw Kwashiorkor,
it really shocked us to our foundations.
We weren't prepared for it
and we could'nt understand it for a long time'.4
Kwashiorkor, a protein-deficiency disease principally affecting children, had arisen 
because of the blockade of Biaffa on land sea and air by Nigeria. Previously, Eastern 
Nigeria had been self sufficient in fruits and carbohydrates, while importing salt from
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Niger, and meat from Northern Nigeria. It imported stock fish - dried cod - from 
Scandinavia.
With the economic and military blockade, everything stopped coming. Biafra accused 
Nigeria of seeking to starve Biafran citizens into submission, and of using starvation as a 
weapon of war. Biafra had no hard currency to exchange for goods and materials because 
it could no longer export. Insurance cover was denied to all shipping lines venturing 
beyond Lagos port - apart from the threat of being boarded and searched.
The area was described by Nigeria as a war zone, while claiming that it was only carrying 
out a police action 'to keep Nigeria one'.
Biafra launched two schemes called Back to Land', and 'Operation Feed the Nation'. It 
propagated the planting of all sorts of crops, an increase in the production of chicken and 
egg, extensive fish farming, salt production from sea water etc. But, as the war 
progressed, these measures became inadequate for the needs of both the military and 
civilian populations. Gradually, Biafra began to lose even the farming territories to the 
invading Nigerian army. As the rural areas fell, refugees flocked to the centre of Biafra, 
exacerbating the famine.
Thus, by May 1968, starvation was almost at its peak. Biafran propaganda on the issue of 
starvation also heightened, whilst Lagos was determined to play it down.
It censored every information emanating from Biafra. The two hundred Christian 
Missionary groups in Biafra were the first to react to this aspect of Biafra's message, and 
responded immediately. They were to play a key role in attracting the world's attention to 
the ever increasing volumes of Biafra's starving children especially, and women and men 
generally.
Earlier, it was seen that Eastern Nigeria unlike the North and West had totally accepted 
Christianity. This was to have its rewards. As a result of this acceptance, various 
denominations had built churches, hospitals and schools. As town after town fell, the 
missionaries who ran these institutions could not carry on with their normal daily
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activities. They therefore turned their energies into helping the refugees and the starving. 
They risked their lives in most cases, to take food into remote villages to reach those who 
had been cut off and inaccessible to the refugee centres. Some of them even became 
involved in buying or hiring ships and planes to bring in vital supplies via Lisbon and Sao 
Tome.
Father Doheny explains:
Suddenly we realised that 
we were all in the same boat 
with our people getting hammered.
The children were starving 
and I realised for the first time 
the meaning of Paul's phrase:
"You are my children
whom I have begotten in the Lord".
I had once taken that
as a pious kind of statement,
but now I realised that it was a fact.
I was feeling:
"Here are children I have baptised, 
and here they are starving.
They are mine, may be in a very true sense.
Even though it's not a natural child, 
it's a spiritual child, a reality".
And that's what drove us.
And here were all these missionaries
finding the same thing,
their children were starving,
and so to help them they had to come together.
And they came together 
not by talking but by doing.
They started Joint Church Aid - JCA,
which combined all their resources at Sao Tome.
They hired planes and pilots 
to fly them in overnight to Biafra'.^
Unlike the journalists who flocked into Biafra when news of the famine broke, the 
missionaries had lived in the area for a long time. They knew their whereabouts.^ They
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also knew the advantage and power of the media - and they used it. The missionary 
infrastructure was good and strong, and their local knowledge was useful to the media. 
The media knew this and utilised it. The relationship became, unconsciously, a quid pro 
quo. Therefore, what started as propaganda, repeated often enough, materialised in fact, 
into a truism. Father Mike Doheny's brother, Father Kevin Doheny was as prominent 
amongst the missionaries as his brother. He had resided and worked in Eastern Nigeria 
since 1954. He was particularly outspoken and journalists often sought him out precisely
n
because he refused to mince his words. He was quoted in the Daily Sketch of 22nd June
o
1968 as saying: 'I came here to these people and will stay here until I am killed'. He 
brought many stories of the bombing of undefended villages and the like to the attention 
of Frederick Forsyth and the journalists. Father Kevin Doheny recalls one occasion in
1969 when Mike Nicholson of ITN came out to Biafra:
Because of anti-British feeling,
he wasn't allowed to take any photographs
or any films.
I asked the Ministry of Information 
if he could stay with me, 
and they said yes.
He stayed with me in a hoouse in Umuahia.
We were there when
the Iliyushin jets came right over our heads, 
strafing the church and the Priest's house.
Mike had his camera just at the right time
in the right place,
because the Catholic Church was
overlooking the town
so he got marvellous film
of the whole of the bombing episode'.^
Father Mike Doheny had been in the habit of shooting films since the 1960s purely as a 
hobby, but the war brought a new dimension to his favourite past time. Television became 
an outlet. Demand for films from Biafra had grown. The dangers and expense of sending a 
crew to the front were enormous, so the stations developed an appetite for anything that
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came out - any footage at all, they even abandoned their normal reluctance to use super-8 
film. ^  As it happened, Father Mike Doheny was at the scene when Owerri was 
recaptured from Nigeria by Biafra in April 1969. He recalls:
'I had taken shots of Owerri
and the unfinished Cathedral
and the Bishop’s house with bullet holes
and strafing marks on the walls.
By this time
I'd got to know a lot of these media guys; 
you’d meet them out there and they’d say:
"Give us a buzz when you're next in London".
They'd want to hear the latest news.
So this time when I got to London, 
one of them asked if I had any film.
He had a look at it
and asked if he could use i t .
I said yes, on condition that I was in no way 
identified as the person who made it.
It was a very delicate diplomatic situation 
at that time.
That night, it appeared on News At Ten
which was OK,
as they didn't identify me.
But the following night
RTE (Irish Television) showed it,
saying who I was,
without so much as a 'by your leave'. * *
5.1.3. Execution.
Two wars were fought in Nigeria. The first was the military, which eventually the Federal 
19side won. The second was conducted in the media, and there is no boubt that the
1 ^Biafrans won that one hands down. The Easterners had dominated the Nigerian media 
and they were fully conscious of the need for publicity to attract outside support.
Angus McDermid cites a British diplomat, who had once been a professional public 
relations practitioner, as saying rather grudgingly, that in his opinion the Biafrans had 
mounted 'the most successful public relations campaign of all time'. ^  They hired a
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Geneva- based PR Manager, Markpress, which also held the Chrysler account, to promote 
their cause. Markpress bombarded British MPs, newspaper editors, radio and television 
correspondents, businessmen and academics with over 700 press releases and other 
material during the war. ^  The Catholic Church also played an important world wide role 
in the propaganda war.
Since most Easterners were Catholic, it was natural for the Church to sympathise with 
them, and idividuals like Fr Mike, Fr W.J.Dowling, Fr Michael Golden, Fr O'Marley, Fr 
Owen Reid spared no effort to publicise the Biafran cause as widely as possible. In the 
case of Fr W.J. Dowling, who had once been Parish Priest in Essene, Opobo, Pricipal of 
Holy Family College, Abak, St Patrick's College Calabar, and Regina Coeli College 
Essene, devoted his life to the Biafran cause. Like Fr Mike, he had baptised so many 
children, and seen so many of them through school, that he could not stand idly by and 
watch them die. When the Nigerian soldiers entered the South East, he was captured, sent 
to Lagos, deported, and banned from Nigeria. He has ofcourse since returned as Parish 
Priest in Abakaliki near Enugu. Fr. Michael Golden was sent to Northern Nigeria, where 
he contracted polio, and became paralysed from the waist down. He was flown back to 
Dublin, but still manages even now, despite his disability, to pay regular visits to Nigeria. 
Fr. O'Marley went to Rome to work in the Research Department of the Vatican, while 
Owen Reid returned to Northern Ireland.
In France, the combination of Catholicism and President De Gaulle's desire to weaken 
Nigeria, meant that the Biafrans got every support short of 'de jure' recognition.
In America, Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Sub-committee on 
Refugees tried to tilt official policy towards Biafra. (see part 3 of this ch.)
In Ireland, Holland and Germany, there was also significant support for Biafra.
The missionaries often talked of the conflict in terms of a 'Holy War' between Christianity 
and Islam. This was an over-simplification, which ignored the Christian belt in the largely 
Muslim North of Nigeria, and the fact that the predominantly Christian West supported
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the Federal side. But it is true that strong support for Federal Nigeria came from the oil- 
rich Arab countries, while Egyptian pilots flew Russian-built Ilyushin jets for the 
Nigrerians after Britain declined to do so, thus serving to enhance the notion of a Holy 
War.16
When it came to television, the Biafrans were far more adept than the Nigerians. As Colin 
Legum of the Observer explains:
'The Biafrans stole a march 
by flying in everybody who wanted to come 
and taking them up and showing them everything.
Thus much of the filming on television, 
which is what upset the Federals, 
was on the Biafran side, 
showing the devastation caused, 
first by the air bombing 
and then later by the famine.
So in that sense the reporting became one-sided 
because the Federals refused to let the cameras in,17
or placed great obstacles m the way'1
In time the Nigerians handled the media abysmally. They were defensive, secretive and 
very formal. They were reluctant to supply even the most basic information to the 20 or so 
foriegn journalists normally based in Lagos and they made it almost impossible for them to 
get to the front. No army casualty lists were ever supplied.
Angus McDermid's recollection is that 'you had to go round squeezing out news'. The 
Federal side had nothing to rival Markpress. He goes on:
'The journalists relied heavily on 
what were laughingly called 
"diplomatic sources".
We did the rounds of the embassies.
We tried to get stuff out of the Ministry of Defence, 
but there were very few regular press conferences, 
and the idea of daily press handouts was laughable.
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Scraps of Information came from the generals 
who went out with the army 
and would give you a briefing 
when they got back.
The government itself was very reluctant 
to say anything.
You might get an individual soldier 
telling you something.
It was extremely difficult and unsatisfactory;
in fact it was an affront
to our sense of professionalism'. ^
For McDermid, it was of all reporting jobs the most difficult to get anything absolute:
'I used to amuse myself in the long nights 
by thinking about a situation 
and making a coefficient of reliability.
Something that I gave ten points to,
I had seen happen myself.
Then gradually I worked down to the things like
"who told me about this;
what would his reason be for telling me?
Have two people seen this?"
and so on until you got down to about three,
w hich was the rumour stage.
It was a most weird task to report the war, 
and Markpress were no help; 
they were sending out 
disastrously incorrect stuff. ^
Forsyth agrees with this assessment of Markpress bulletins. He 'very quickly came to 
regard them as being as foolish and as exaggerated and propagandist as the Federal 
bulletins'. But he was given far greater freedom than McDermid. According to Paul 
Harrison and Robin Palmer, in News Out of Africa, when Forsyth returned as a freelance 
to Biafra, Ojukwu gave him accommodation, the loan of a Volkswagen Beetle and petrol 
vouchers, access to the one telex and freedom to travel where he liked, saying: 'If you 
want to get your head blown off, get your head blown off, but don't blame me!'
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The problems of lack of information on the Federal side and deliberate misinformation on 
both sides were further compounded by the fact that it was virtually impossible for 
journalists to cover both sides of the war. Once a journalist had gone to Biafra, he/she was 
automatically barred from Nigeria. Winston Churchill, then a special correspodent for The 
Times, did go to both sides, to Nigeria first and then to Biafra - but he would not have 
been allowed back into Nigeria again.
Eventually the Federals did give a small contract to a London PR firm, Galitzine Chant 
Russell, but that did not change things very much because they continued to be very 
secretive and their army continued to behave 'pretty badly', according to Colin Legum.
The Nigerians constantly complained that they were getting a bad Western press, and the 
issue soured Nigerian-British relations long after the end of the war, but they remained 
chronically incapable of remedying the situation. In fact the Western press was very much 
divided on the issue.
It is interesting to note that Forsyth, who was pro-Biafran, and Legum, who was pro- 
Federal, both considered themselves to be in a minority. Because Legum had written so 
movingly about the atrocities committed against the Easterners in the North in 1966, he 
was regarded as pro-Biafran. In fact, he supported the Federal side, believing secession to 
be 'a nonsense which wouldn't work'.
5.1.4
The Effect.
For Biafra, the great media breakthrough came in the summer of 1968, almost by 
accident. Forsyth recalls that as with the missionaries, it took time for the full implications 
of the famine to hit the journalists. The first photographs, taken by the Daily Express's 
David Cairns were dismissed by his editor as mere Oxfam posters of no news value or 
interest whatever to the British people. In June 1968 a party of five journalists went out to 
Biafra at the invitation of Markpress. It included Michael Leapman of the Sun as
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Commonwealth Correspondent, this paper having replaced the Daily Herald in 1964. He 
went to Biafra with a photographer, Ronald Burton.
As far as Leapman was concerned, it was a war assignment. But, he recalls a visit to a 
hospital in Biafra with Alan Hart of the ITN, at the invitation of Fr Kevin:
’It was the pictures 
that really made that first story, 
some marvellous pictures 
of kids in great distress.
And talking to the Doctor, who said:
"This one here is going to die tomorrow".
It was very moving stuff.
I'd never done much
of the heart-throbbing, sob-story stuff before;
I'd been mainly in diplomatic reporting.
I wrote down what he said 
and reported it back.
And the Sun ran it as a series
over about three days and sent me back
about a week later!
It was at that time
that I think the Biafrans realised that
if they wanted to get the sympathy of the world,
they could actually exploit this.
And they did.
They then took people around.
But it wasn't their initial intention.
They did that when they realised 
what the reponse was to that story, 
compared to the very limited response 
to the other stories 
that had been written ! '^
Leapman's first story appeared on the morning of 12th June, while Hart's ITN coverage 
went out that evening. Leapman's article was entitled 'The Land of No Hope' - a phrase 
which The Sun was to make great play with. The front page carried a picture of a child 
dying of hunger in a nurse's arms.
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On page two there was an article headed Why British arms count' about arms supplies to 
Nigeria, and a picture of Biafran soldiers with a case of British made ammunition captured 
from the Nigerians.
Page three carried a picture of a child in Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Umuahia, with a 
caption Boy suffering from malnutrition hides under a cot during an air raid'.
This was later used in an appeal run by The Times, headed, 'We can't sit and wait for a 
million people to die'.
Leapman's main report said that several thousand children had already died; that hundreds 
of thousands would starve to death that summer, and by August more than a million might 
be dead. The problem was exacerbated by the massive influx of refugees into an ever- 
diminishing area and by the Ngerian blockade. The hospital was receiving 2,500 
malnutrition cases every week. Biafra needed 200 tons of protein daily, but was getting 
only 20 tons weekly. This report coincided with an emergency Commons debate on arms 
supplies to Nigeria, and copies of the Sun were sent to every MP. The next day a Sun 
editorial called for a massive international rescue operation and for more vigour by the 
British government.
A similar story appeared in the Sun's rival, the Daily Sketch on 17th June. Its front page 
carried a picture of a starving child and proclaimed 'Scandal of Biafra: the Sketch says the 
children need milk - Britain sends bullets'. The Sketch had decided to send out half a ton 
of full cream dried milk, enough to keep 200 children alive for just two weeks. It appealed 
for more. On 22nd June Brian Dixon, who had followed in Leapman's footsteps, filed a 
report in the Sketch under a heading TVlilk - not murder'. He described Biafra as 'today's 
Belsen', and said he had seen 200 children dying that day, that those he had spoken to 
would probably not be alive by the time his report was read, and that nearly 3 million 
children were thought to be near death:
'The grey hair on their heads
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is the sign that there is no hope.
The sign that they have a few days to live.
They sit like decrepit old men.
Their bones are covered with only 
tightly stretched skin,
their eyes bulge and they look around them 
as if they know they are doomed'.^*
The impact of the ITN and newspaper reports was instant. Forsyth remarks:
'Quite suddenly, bingo, we'd touched a nerve.
Nobody in this country at that time 
had ever seen children looking like that.
The last time the Brits had seen anything like that 
must have been the Belsen pictures.
Even in Vietnam they didn't starve.
Those first few pictures did it.
There was suddenly a tidal wave 
of applications from Fleet Street 
to the little office the Biafrans maintained 
in London for space on a plane, for access.
And then it all started.
What they wrote
shook the conscience of the world...
Only after those pictures appeared 
did the Fleet Street editors 
override the advice they were getting 
from the Commonwealth Office.
Only at that point did they say:
''Bugger you, we are going to investigate 
And the guys they sent down 
weren't African experts, 
they were hard-nosed reporters, 
who went out with no prior conceptions 
or emotional baggage.
They were just down there to report a story.
And report it they did. With cameras.
Then came the television 
and then came the foreigners.
The war itself would never have 
set the Thames on fire, 
but the pictures of starving children 
put Biaffa on to the front page 
of every British newspaper
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and from there to newspapers all over the world.
People who couldn't fathom
the political complexities of the war
could easily grasp the wrong
in a picture of a child dying of starvation'.^
After this, Biafra became a beehive of world journalists. The world was brimming over 
with the Biafran story.
Charity organisations across the globe fell over themselves to get into the act of relief 
shipments to Biafra, all to the chagrin of Nigeria.
Predictably therefore, public opinion and government policies around the world reacted 
variously to the massive media coverage, as discussed in the remaining parts of this 
chapter.
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PART 2
5.2. Biafra and Africa.
It is necessary to state at the start that, there was a big difference between the propaganda 
messages sent out from Biafra to Africa, and those sent to the rest of the world. This is 
because where Africa was concerned, at least initially, Biafra had a problem convincing 
the other countries, especially within the O. A.U, that if successful, its secssion would not 
create a domino effect across the continent.
It was therefore more difficult to get African sympathy for Biafra. Conversly, the African 
countries' fear of a secessionist domino effect was the very same sentiment that Nigeria 
played on to counteract the Biafran argument. In a speech welcoming the O. A.U 
Consultative Committee on Nigeria in 1967, General Gowon stated 
'The O. A.U has rightly seen our problems as a purely domestic affair, and in accordance 
with the O.A.U resolutions, your mission is not here to mediate.
The O.A.U, as it was formed in 1963, represented a compromise between two groups. 
Professor Emmanuel Wallerstein, has defined these as the progressive core which saw 
unity as a movement, 'a key rallying point' with the aim of transforming Africa, and a 
periphery which regarded unity as 'an alliance among the gorvening groups to share in the 
immediately available portion of the pie allocated to their countries in the existing world 
m arket'.^
This division corresponded roughly to the radical 'Casablanca' and moderate 'Monrovia' 
groups, named after the venues of two conferences that had been held in 1961.
The main difference between the two was their attitude towards events in the Congo; the 
Casablanca States supporting the Lumumbist elements and the Monrovia group 
attempting 'to consolidate the defeat of the Lumumbist elements in the Congo by creating
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a Pan-African structure that would build very firmly on the principle of non interference in 
the internal affairs of sovereign states.
Non interference had thus been consecrated in the O.A.U Charter as a principle on the 
insistence of those who feared subversion and were deeply concerned about internal 
security. In return, a commitment to help liberation movements in Southern Africa and in 
other African territories still under foreign domination was also incorporated into the 
Charter.
When President Tshombe of the Congo began systematically to recruit South African and 
other white mercenaries to deal with the Lumumbist revolutionaries, backed by strong 
material assistance from the United States and other Western powers, the O. A.U called an 
extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers. This established an ad hoc ten member 
commission charged with restoring normal relations between the Congo and some of its 
neighbours, and with helping and encouraging the efforts of the Congolese government 'in 
the restoration of national reconciliation'.^
In effect, this meant that the OAU had asserted that national reconciliation within a 
member state was its legitimate concern - an important principle three years later when the 
organisation had to deal with the Nigerian crisis.
This African debate on the Congo was to be highly relevant to the issues involved in the 
Biaffan secession It was inevitable that Biaffa should be compared with Katanga, and 
Ojukwu with Tshombe Nigerian emissaries at international meetings, particularly at the 
OAU and the United Nations invariably made this point, forgetting perhaps that Nigeria - 
one of the key protagonists of the Monrovia group - had not been among those which had 
supported Lumumba, or protested at the Stanleyville rescue operation. President Mobutu 
of Zaire was not at first among those who took the view that Katanga was comparable to 
Biaffa, since the secession of Katanga had been brought about by foreign financial
7 7
interests, while the secession of Biaffa was the result of internal forces against Nigeria.
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The same view was held from the start by President Nyerere of Tanzania, In 1969, he 
expanded it in an analysis of the Nigerian crisis. Outlining the similarities between the two 
cases, he acknowledged that Katanga was part of a United Congo - similarly Biaffa was 
part of a United Nigeria.
Both decided to secede, and in both cases the centre objected and war broke out. Katanga 
had vast copper resources; the former colonial power was very interested in this vast 
amount of wealth, and these economic interests were threatened by Lumumba at the 
centre. Similarly Biaffa had vital oil resources. The former colonial power was vitally 
interested in this vast amount of oil, and these interests were threatened in the conflict - 
but in this case the threat came ffom the secessionists. In the case of the Congo, Belgium 
joined the side supported by the copper companies - Katanga. In the case of Nigeria,
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Britain was on the same side as the oil companes - the centre.
Nyerere further argued:
'Let those who love 
the superficial similarities of secession 
have the courage and honesty to accept 
this unpleasant fact also.
In Katanga, Belgium
and the copper companies were on one side; 
in Nigeria, Britain
and the oil companies are on one side.
This is the one constant 
and crucial factor in both cases 
around which everything else 
can be variable
In both cases, the former colonial power 
and the vested economic interests 
are on one side.
Tshombe was a stooge
of the copper interests:
they filled his coffers
with their vast financial resources.
Ojukwu is not a stooge of these interests.
They refuse to pay him a penny 
ffom the wealth they derive
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from Biafran oil...
Only great simplicity -
or extreme naievity
could lend anyone to accept that
Britain is defending the unity of Nigeria,
or African unity in general.
She is defending
her own economic interests...
Who is Biafra's Tshombe?
Who in Biafra represents 
the copper companies?
Africa appealed to the United Nations
to support Patrice Lumumba;
why are we not appealing
to the United Nations
to support General Gowon,
who on this analogy
would be Nigeria’s Lumumba?
Perhaps the true answer is 
that it is not necessary; 
he already has strong support.
But why is it not necessary?
Because the Ibos are simply
fighting for their own survival
and therefore have no strong supporter.
That is their strength and weakness: 
it is the major difference between 
Katanga and Biafra.
In the one case,
foreign economic interest was on the side
of the secessionists,
and that made them very strong;
in the other case
foreign economic interest
is on the side of the Federalists,
and makes them too very strong.
They can even quote the O.A.U Charter 
on non-interference in the internal affairs 
of a member State'. 29
This statement is of particular importance as Julius Nyerere was later to spearhead the
campaign for recognition of Biafra by African States, an unprecedented act, in
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contradiction of the O.A.U. Charter. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia held a similar 
view as Nyerere. He too was to later recognise Biafra, along with Ivory Coast and Gabon. 
Even though Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah was regarded as the protagonist of the 
radical - Casablanca group, by 1967 Nyerere's Tanzania, had emerged as one of the 
radical front runners. He had an ally in Kenneth Kaunda who shared his views on 
international affairs.
Nevertheless, the other 'radicals' 30 were firmly opposed to Biafra's secession. Most of 
those in this category were Muslim States;in thier case the Biafran religious propaganda 
had a negative - indeed an opposite - effect on them.
Thus President Boumediene attacked countries and relief agencies aiding Biafra in a tirade 
which described them as imperialist stooges in a conspiracy against Nigeria 'whose unity 
we are all proud of. Similar views were expressed by Guinea, Egypt, Mali, Somalia and 
the Sudan - all countries which voted with the 'progressives' on African issues.
Their difference with Nyerere on the Nigerian question became particularly marked in that 
they found themselves in the same group as Malawi and the Malagasy Republic, two of 
the most conservative African countries, which were as fully behind Lagos as the North
o I
African radicals.
In 1968, the President of the Malagasy Republic condemned Tanzanian recognition of 
Biafra as 'not an honest act vis-a-vis a brother state in the O.A.U...what would the 
Tanzanian leaders do if a part of their country seceded?' He warned against 'imperialist 
traps' and said; 'There is oil in Biafra and this smells of o il '.^  For Dr. Banda, 'non­
intervention in Nigeria's domestic affairs meant that he would support anything Gowon 
chose to do in Nigeria on the understanding that Gowon would refrain from interfering in 
what Dr. Banda considered to be Malawi's internal affairs. The fact that Presidents 
Nyerere and Kaunda whom he had long accused of fostering subversion in Malawi, had 
recognised Biafra may also have influenced him. South Africa reacted to Tanzania's
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recognition by predicting that this action would split the O. A.U, and suggesting that 
Chinese Communist influence would invade West Africa.
There was ofcourse an element of double standards by Algeria who on the one hand 
supported the Eritrean Liberation Movement, whilst decrying Biaffan secession. For 
instance, the Algerian government kept Biaffan representatives out of Algeria during the 
1968 summit of the O.A.U, while allowing the Eritrean Liberation Movement, which had 
opened offices in Algiers a few months earlier, to lobby among the African delegations 
attending the summit. The reasons were purely religious.
Thus, the reception of and reaction to Biaffan and Nigerian propaganda, by Affican 
governments were varied and complex, as will be seen later in this chapter.
There certainly is a link between Islam and politics on the African continent, and in some 
cases with government and governance.^
The Islamic, and, feudal structures of Northern Nigeria had emerged relatively unscathed 
from the effects of colonialism. Eastern Nigeria, the area that became Biafra, was not 
penetrated, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, by Islam. The all conquering Fulanis, who 
spread Islam to West Africa, were obstructed in the South by the dense rain forest and 
Tsetse fly.
Western Nigeria was partly converted because of the proximity to the North, and partly 
because of Yoruba trade with Arabic Kingdoms north of the Sahara.
The East remained firmly and predominantly Christian, preventing Islam from ’dipping the 
Koran in the sea', as Biafra claimed in its euphemistic propaganda during the war.
Within hours of declaring independence, Radio Biafra announced that Ghana, Togo, 
Gambia, Ethiopia and Israel had recognised Biafra, with more recognitions being 
expected. This was denied by the countries concerned. The inclusion or anticipation of 
recognition by Israel merely acted in a negative propaganda fashion, in that it stiffened the 
opposition of the Islamic Affican countries to Biaffan independence. There was caution
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and concern in the various African countries. Mostly all the African countries wanted 
mediation and reconciliation to occur.
Nevertheless, mediation offers were principally initiated from West African countries. For 
instance, Dahomey, one of Nigeria’s closest neighbours, fearing an eruption of the war, 
sent a mission headed by its Foreign Minister, Dr. Zinsou, which was turned back at the
or
border by the Nigerian government. The Gowon Government was nervous about any 
form of mediation which looked like an interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria.
This was because Ojukwu had used the Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra to call on the 
African countries to mediate.
Any mediation attempt therefore appeared to Gowon to be an attempt to respond to and 
side with Ojukwu. The Federal government was opposed to this in principle because 
intervention by Heads of State might have been regarded as a form of recognition for 
Biafra: it implied that Gowon and Ojukwu were being approached as equals, and 
Ojukwu’s refusal to accept the authority of Lagos was ofcourse the basic issue. The main 
comfort for Lagos at this stage came from outside Africa - significantly - from the ruler of 
Kuwait, who sent a message of goodwill, and solidarity to Gowon, stating that he 
regarded the Nigerian crisis as a purely internal m a t t e r . T h e  Nigerian government then 
reinforced it's propaganda message that it was merely carrying out a police action in the 
East to restore law and order, and secure Nigerian unity. It claimed that it was not a 
religious war at all as propagated by Biafra, even though Lagos enjoyed the total support 
of the Islamic countries.
On 29th June, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Nigeria's Foreign Minister left Lagos with a message 
from Gowon to President Mobutu of Zaire. Simultaneously, Radio Nigeria, drew a 
parallel between Biafra and Katanga, ignoring Nyerere's earlier argument to the contrary. 
Mobutu had already offerd to mediate: he had also pointed out that contrary to what 
'some politicians' had claimed, Biaffa's secession could not be compared to that of 
Katanga.
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The war broke out while Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were meeting 
to prevent it, and all they could do was to issue a communique which appealed for an 
immediate end to fighting. But it was too late. Nyerere commented that only South Africa 
and Rhodesia could rejoice over Nigeria's war, and repeated his call for a ceasefire. He 
also criticised Britain's 'shameless involvement', while other African countries called for 
'African action' to stop the w a r .^
'African action' meant intervention by the O. A.U and the employment of the mediation 
offices of the O.A.U. The summit meeting of the O.A.U was scheduled that year to be 
held in Zaire. The chorus of African action found favour with Biafra. The Biaffan media 
incorporated this in its propaganda thrust, and Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra carried 
the statement that 'The problem must be solved by Africans, if the O. A.U is to justify its 
existence.
In anticipation of the summit, media and diplomatic activities became frantic on both 
sides. The Nigerian media claimed that Biafra acquired arms from Czechoslovakia which 
were paid for in U.S. dollars. It blamed the C.I.A. for not preventing it. It announced that 
Communist Chinese guerrillas were fighting alongside the Biafrans against Nigeria. All 
this was an attempt to consolidate the support of the West for Nigeria, which it already 
enjoyed. Russia, for that matter, also supported Nigeria. Radio Nigeria further warned 
Ghanain media against supporting Biafra, threatening that disintegration was contagious, 
waving 'the sword of an Ashanti' revolt over Ghana's head. The Biaffan propaganda 
machine countered, accusing Nigeria of recruiting ex-SS mercemaries in Bonn, and 
repeatedly warning Affican countries of the 'new Anglo-Soviet imperialist threat to 
Africa'. Close to the conference, the Nigerian media raised vehement objections to the
O. A.U. discussing the war without approval from Lagos. It maintained that Cameroun, 
Congo-Brazaville, the Central Affican Republic, Niger and Gabon had expressed
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'enthusiastic support' for the Nigerian stand. It, claimed that these countries had also 
promised not to raise the issue at the summit.^
When it became clear that there was heavy African pressure, particularly from Ghana, 
Liberia and Zaire itself, for a discussion of the Nigerian crisis, the Nigerian government 
indicated that in the event of a negotiated settlement, it would not accept Ojukwu as 
spokesman for Biafra. The media in Lagos demanded that the Biaffans could either 
surrender 'and seek honourable peace under a new leadership or they could fight "to total 
destruction" under Ojukwu'. The crisis was not in the official agenda of the summit, but 
it was discussed. On the 14th of September, the conference set up a mediation 
committee,^® with Emperor Haile Selasie as chairman. Avoiding the use of the word 
'mediate', the conference resolved '...to send a consultative mission of six Heads of State 
to the Head o f the Federal government of Nigeria to assure him of the Assembly's desire 
for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria'.^
The mission was also, according to the official communique, to 'explore the possibilities of 
placing the services of the Assembly at the disposal of the Federal government'.
The communique expressed concern at the 'tragic and serious situation in Nigeria'. The 
Assembly thus achieved a dual purpose of respect for the internal affairs of a member state
whilst reiterating its 1964 precedent when it appointed an ad hoc commission to help the
49Congolese government in the restoration of national reconciliation. Apart from Haile 
Selasie, other members of the mission were Presidents Mobutu of Zaire, Hamani Diori of 
Niger, Ahidjo of Cameroun, Tubman of Liberia and General Ankrah of Ghana. Since 
Nigeria was acclaimed to be the economic and military regional super power, the 
countries immediately bordering her were severely affected economically by the war.
These included the Cameroun, Niger, Dahomey, Chad and Sau Tome - particularly 
Fernando Po.
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The ’frontline States' - the countries bordering South Africa and Rhodesia, resisting white 
rule and domination - were also affected. This was because Nigeria contributed large 
funds to the liberation struggle. The total liberation of Africa from colonialism and foreign 
domination was the core of Nigeria's foreign policy.
In the Cameroun, the situation was more complicated. President Ahidjo, a Northern Fulani 
who was actually bom in Northern Nigeria clearly sympathised with Lagos. However, he 
bore Nigeria a political grudge: the Northern Cameroun - a trust territory had been joined 
to Nigeria, after a United Nations plebiscite in 1962, but Cameroun had refused to accept 
the decision, holding an annual day of mourning to commemorate the sad event. Besides, 
West Cameroun, which had once been administered together with Eastern Nigeria but 
which had chosen to join East Cameroun on independence, subsequently found she was 
not very happy in this predominantly Francophone union and the nostalgia for the pre- 
independence day generated a wave of sympathy with Biafra accross the border. It was a 
sentiment which Ahidjo as a wise politician could not ignore
Popular opinion in most West African counteries particularly Ghana, and Liberia was 
sympathetic to Biafra. Their leaders however were restrained by the non-interference 
clause in the O. A.U. Charter. Emperor Haile Selasie and the Zairen President seemed to 
find themselves in this same situation.^
Biafra hailed the O. A.U. mediation committee, describing it as 'a move to mediate in the 
war'. Ojukwu stated on the Biaffan media that the O.A.U. had recognised 'the 
international nature of the conflict', by setting up the committee.
This antagonised the Nigerian government which sought to prevent the visit of the 
committee to L agos.^  The Biaffan media accused Nigeria of applying delay tactics to 
obstruct the committee. The Nigerian media denied this. In the interim, they announced 
that Biafra had lost Enugu, its capital, prompting an announcement in London by the 
Nigerian High Commissioner that the war was 'fast coming to an en d '.^
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The Biafran media vigorously denied these claims, and Biafra stiffened its military 
resistance. The committee finally met in Lagos on the 22nd of November. President 
Tubman of Liberia, and Mobutu of Zaire were absent.
Gowon's welcome address to the committee stated: 'Your Mission is not here to 
mediate'.^ He repeated the same statement to the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, 
when he visited Lagos in March 1969.^ In both instances, Gowon raised the spectre of 
contagious infection of seperatism in Africa, if Biafra were allowed to succeed. To the 
relief of Nigeria and the wrath of Biafra, the Committee agreed with Gowon. The war of 
arms and words thus continued for three years, belying the so called 'police action '^ that 
Nigeria had claimed it was carrying out.
The African countries got weary and impatient - the supporters of Lagos with Biafra, and 
the supporters of Biafra with Nigeria. In April 1968, President Nyerere of Tanzania 
recognised Biafra.
In explanation, he stated:
"Unity by conquest is impossible... 
even if military might could force 
the acceptance of a particular authority, 
the purpose of unity 
would have been destroyed.
The general consent 
of all the people involved 
is the only basis 
on which unity in Africa 
can be maintained or extended.
The Biafrans might be wrong 
in their belief
that they had been rejected by
a Nigeria whose government had been unable
or unwilling to protect them
from persecutions and pogroms;
if so , they would have to be persuaded
that they were wrong,
but they will not be convinced
by being shot.
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Nobody had talked more about the need
for African unity
than the leaders of Tanzania,
but it seemed to us that by refusing
to recognise the existence of Biafra
we were tacitly supporting a war
against the people of Eastern Nigeria -
and a war conducted in the name of unity.
We could not continue doing this 
soany longer"
The Nigerian media labelled Nyerere a puppet - a charge that did not stick. The Biaffan 
media acclaimed him an African statesman, maintaining that Tanzania had nothing to gain 
except undiluted principle. Susequently, in barely five weeks - between April and May of 
that year, three more recognitions of Biafra followed. These were by Zambia, Gabon and 
Ivory Coast.
While the war of arms and words was raging, there were several attempts by at mediation, 
intervention and settlement, by both individuals and institutions.. One of these following 
immmediately on the four rapid recognitions of Biafra was by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat in London. It initiated the setting up of peace negotiations, with Kampala as 
the venue. The process went through preliminary and substantive stages, but failed 
because of the intransigence of both sides to the conflict.
On the 15th of July, after the failure of the Kampala peace talks, the O. A.U. Consultative 
Committee was invited to reassemble in Niamey. Five of the six members o f the 
committee attended. Mobutu again was absent. Chief Obafemi Awolowo led the Nigerian 
delegation, but General Gowon joined the meeting the folloing day, 16th July 1968, and 
declared himself only as an 'observer'. He warned, in his self declared observer status 
speech, that if the 'rebels persist in their contemptous attitude to the conference table, the 
Federal government will have no choice but to take over the remainig rebel-held areas...In 
military terms, the rebellion is virtually supressed already'.^ Ojukwu was invited to 
attend.
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The meeting proposed a ten-mile-wide demilitarised zone patrolled by neutral 
international troops to allow relief supplies to pass to Biaffan refugees. Gowon is said to 
have rejected this, and his comments and attitude seemed to confer that he would not 
have been able to guarantee the actions of his soldiers at the fronts. Niamey radio 
broadcast the main points of the resolution and the rejection. It also announced that 
Ghana and the Camerouns offered their services for the transportation of relief materials; 
and offered shipping facilities. Gowon left for Lagos within two days.
The Biaffan delegation headed by Ojukwu arrived on the 19th. He flew in on Houphet 
Boigny's private jet. The delegation included Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, former Governor 
General and President of Nigeria, Dr. Michael Okpara, former Premier of Eastern Nigeria, 
Sir Louis Mbanefo, former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and Chief Justice of Biaffa, and Dr. 
Eni Njoku, former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos.
At the end of the meeting between Ojukwu and the committee a communique was issued. 
There appeared to be two versions. According to Niamey radio,:
The O. A.U. Consultative Committe on Nigeria announces with great satisfaction the 
folloing decisions: (1) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu 
have agreed to meet immediately in Niamey under the chairmanship of President Hamani 
Diori in order to begin preliminary talks as a speedy resumption of Nigerian peace 
negotiations; (2) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have 
agreed to resume as soon as possible peace negotiations in Addis Ababa under the 
auspices of the O.A.U. Consultative Committee on Nigeria'. ^
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The version broadcast by the Nigerian media was different from that of Niamey radio. 
Radio Nigeria announced that the Committee had called on both parties to resume peace 
talks as soon as possible, '...with the objective of preserving Nigeria's territorial integrity 
and guaranteeing the security of all its inhabitants'. It further claimed that the committee 
indicated that 'it will be in contact with the Federal Military Government, and Ojukwu or 
his representatives may at any time contact any member of the committee'.
The Lagos broadcast included two other items that were absent in the Niamey radio 
broadcast. These concerned relief, appealing to both sides to undertake various measures 
to alleviate suffering among war victims. ^
The next round of peace talks opened at Addis Ababa on the 15th of August. The 
Consultative Committee failed to turn up. Gowon did not appear. The O.A.U. Secretariat 
was left to cope unsuccessfully. The Biafran delegation which was without Ojukwu stayed 
on for a while,on his instructions, Ojukwu had been earlier blamed earlier for breaking off 
the Kampala peace talks, because they did not go the Biafran way. He therefore told the 
Biafran delegation to 'stay there even if it takes a thousand years'
Subsequently, Diallo Telli, then Scecretary General of the O.A.U, said in an interview 
with 1.6 Figaro' ''We must ask ourselves if we should not reconsider the principle of unity 
at any price, which has been for Africans the main stay of our policy'. ' His annual report 
to the O.A.U. that year, 1969 also called for a redefinition of the idea of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of member states. After this, every subsequent attempt at mediation 
by the O. A.U. failed. The only condition Lagos accepted from the O.A.U. was the 
allowing of the O. A.U.troops to observe the surrender by Biafra. Even this was done out 
of pressure from the United Nations Secretariat.^
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5.3. Biafra and Britain.
The initial lack of African support for Biafra was one of the arguments employed by the 
British Government to justify it's active support for the Nigerian Government. The British 
Government argued that an international embargo against Nigeria would be received with 
'deep hostility by most African States'.
Mr. Michael Stewart, the British Foreign Secretary, applied the domino theory to the 
African situation - arguing that secession in one part of Africa would generate the 
disintegration of the African Continent into tribal States. The Johnson and Nixon 
administrations employed the same arguments in America,1^  because American policy 
towards Africa was heavily weighted towards the British view. They believed that Britain, 
as the former colonial power, knew the area better. On the other hand, Biafra claimed that 
the British Government had encouraged Nigeria to blockade Biafra by land, sea and air - 
thus depriving the Biafran people of the means of self defence, with the aim of starving the 
Biafran people into submission and surrender. British policy in Lagos had always been 
solidly in favour of anything which looked like being able to hold the Nigerian Federation 
together.
Nigeria was Britain's proudest colonial achievement, the home of thousands of British 
subjects, easily the most populous country in Africa, and potentially the most prosperous. 
Britain already had some five hundred million pounds invested in the Federation, and the 
field for afuture exploitation - especially the oil deposits in the East and the Midwest - was 
almost limitless. Oil was a particularly sensitive commodity because both Nigeria and 
Biafra used the oil arguments in their propaganda war. Biafra accused Nigeria of wanting 
to capture Biafra because of oil reserves. Nigeria accused Biafra of appropriating 
unwilling minority areas, eg; Calabar and Rivers Provinces into Biafra because of their oil 
deposits.
Nothing which threatened radically to alter the unity of Nigeria was acceptable to Britain. 
Auberon Waugh maintained that it was British influence which prevented General Gowon
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from honouring the 'Aburi A ccord'.^ This was hotly denied in Whitehall, but according 
to Waugh, there is evidence to suggest that it was Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, the then 
High Commissioner in Lagos who dissuaded General Gowon from announcing the break­
up of the Federation in his broadcast of 1st August 1966. The evidence is credited to 
Professor Eni Njoku, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos in an 
interview with Susan Cronje. It is stated that Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce related the 
incident to Professor Njoku and Sir Louis Mbanefo, former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and 
later Chief Justice of Biafra. As seen above, the two were also later members of Biafran 
peace delegations. The conversation is said to have taken place in Sir Louis Mbanefo's 
residence in Enugu when the British High Commissioner paid a farewell visit before 
leaving Nigeria early in 1967.^
The assumption by the British Government initially was that this was a storm in a tea cup 
which would soon blow over.
It was the repudiation of the Aburi Accord which made war inevitable.^ This action of 
the Gowon regime cornered Ojukwu, leaving him with very few choices, and the Biafran 
people with their backs to the wall. There was a pervasive sense of insecurity in Biafra. 
However, the British government clung to its 'storm in a tea cup' theory, seeing the crisis 
as the type of tribal warfare that plagued Africa, and would blow over as in other ex­
colonial African countries: it pointed to similar pressures in other countries and urged 
(quite rightly in many cases) that tribal fragmentation of this nature did nothing but harm 
to the economic prospects of the people involved; it also pointed to the tribal diversity of 
Nigeria itself, and argued, that disintegration along tribal lines would not be conducive to 
the general good, and should therefore be discouraged; finally, it argued that if ever one 
such tribal pressure were to prevail, in what were admittedly exceptional circumstances, 
then it inescapably followed that every single other such tribal pressure would be similarly 
successful.^
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It is worth noting that at the inception of the war, all the information at the disposal of the 
British Cabinet - if not the Foreign and Commomnwealth office - suggested that the war 
would be over in a matter of weeks; at which point it seemed that there was no need for
the British government to do anything but express public regret, for domestic
f%  7consumption, that such a 'police action, 7 as claimed by Nigerian propaganda, should 
have been necessary.
On the basis of available information, to have withheld arms supplies and to have 
repudiated existing arms contracts would certainly be interpreted as hostile to the 
recognised government in Lagos, and would also have been singularly pointless, since it 
could only have prolonged the hostilities while Nigeria sought arms from other sources. 
Indeed, so effective had been the British High Commission in persuading Whitehall that 
the war would be over in a matter of weeks, that the cabinet allowed itself the moral 
luxury of refusing to sell General Gowon any military aircraft, on the grounds that that 
would not be needed and would only add to the mess.
As a result, Chief Anthony Enahoro, the Federal Commissioner for Labour and 
Information, was sent to Moscow where he successfully negotiated an agreement to 
receive both Mig fighters and Ilyushin bombers, and the arms race began in earnest. This 
episode also provided the British Foreign office with a further justification for the 
Commonwealth Office's policy - namely the spectre of Russian presence in West Africa. It 
was this 'Russian threat' argument which later converted Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Chief 
opposition spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the government's 
policy.
Exactly how the British Cabinet came to be so misinformed is a matter of permisible 
speculation. Until the third month of the war, there was a British Deputy High 
Commissioner in Enugu, the Biafran Capital. He was in a position to inform the British 
government on the extent of Biafra's preparadness for the war and also on the extent of 
her will to resist. All the evidence suggests that the Deputy High Commissioner, Mr.
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James Parker, did, in fact, fulfil his duty in this respect until the time of his departure after 
the fall o f Enugu. Unfortunately, from Biaffa's point of view, all Parker's intelligence had 
to go through the British High Commissioner in Lagos. The new High Commissioner, Sir 
David Hunt ( who succeeded Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce in November 1966) turned out 
to be a very good friend of Nigeria, and a man whose assessment of the military situation 
was strickingly different from Parker's. Presumably, the papers will be available in 1999, 
under the thirty year rule, and then it will be known in what form Parker's information 
reached London, unless placed under a special embargo. What is absolutely certain is that 
it was Sir David Hunt's assessment which prevailed.
It is clear that, like Churchill, Eden, and Reith, during the second world war, who used 
censorhip effectively to stifle Hitler's propaganda thrust into Britain, Wilson and Gowon 
believed that censorship was the most effective propaganda weapon to use against the 
Biafrans. Conversely, like Hitler and Goebbels , Ojukwu believed in massive propaganda 
bombardment of the enemy constituencies.
However, it is fair to say, even at the risk of repetition that at the time that Biafra seceded
on 30th May 1967, official British actions were muted and ambivalent. In the House of
Commons, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Herbert Bowden, said
only that there was some association between the British representative in Enugu and the
authorities there, 'but at this stage there can be no recognition of the Eastern Region by
ourselves, nor has any other country recognised it'.^* Lord Watson, Parliamentary
Secretary, Board of Trade, is quoted as stating in June 1967: W e have been watching
carefully - indeed anxiously - what has been happening in Nigeria, and we have done so
for many reasons...We have a vast trade with Nigeria...There are ofcourse, the relatively
newly discovered oil deposits which are being exploited now with such enormous 
79success...' ^
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The British Government's ambivalence and preoccupation was understandable. Apart from 
the traditional fears of being cut off fron its sources of oil, the closure of the Suez Canal 
threatened to affect Britain's desperate attempts to achieve a balance of payments surplus. 
Mr. Harold Wilson subsequently recalled that 'in the spring of 1967 we were almost within 
sight of balancing our overseas trade and payments when the Middle East war and the 
closure of the Suez Canal inflicted great damage on us - a major factor in forcing
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devaluation upon us later in the year'. On the 6th of June 1967, Egypt blocked the Suez 
Canal, and the following day, George Brown, then Foreign Secretary, said that urgent 
steps were being taken to readjust the pattern of oil supplies to Britain. By the end of 
June, Britain began to feel the oil shortage.
The loss resulting from the Middle East situation as a whole was about £ 10 million a 
month from July to September, and double that level for the rest of the y ea r.^
With these points in view, it is not surprising therefore that oil featured prominently in the 
propaganda war between Biafra and Nigeria. It is possible that if Parker's reports had 
reached London in the form they were sent, Britain may have sided with Biafra, and the 
course and outcome of the war would have been completely different. This is only a 
matter of conjecture. It will also remain a matter of conjecture which factors weighed 
more with the decision makers in the British cabinet - oil reserves and wealth; the British 
economy; the unity of Nigeria; or the contagious, infectious disintergration of Africa. 
Suffice it to say that Biafra maintained in its propaganda that Britain erred on the side of 
oil reserves, and selfishness. If that is true, then the unity of Nigeria and Africa were 
secondary in the circumstances that Britain found itself economically after the closure of 
the Suez Canal by Egypt.
It has to be said, that public support for secession is very rare, and was particularly non 
existent during the cold war. In fact, up to 1971, after the Biafran war, secession might 
have been regarded as futile. The fact that Biafra attracted public sympathy at all, was the 
success of its propaganda.
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The Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London in January 1969, was the first 
since the meeting presided over by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in Lagos. It seemed to 
many Africans to have belonged to a previous age. In any event, the Conference kept the 
Nigerian crisis carefully in the background.
Sierra Leone's Prime Minister Siaka Stevens, tried to persuade the Commonwealth 
countries to launch a new peace initiative through Emperor Haile Selassie or the Liberian 
Prime Minister William Tubman, but Nigeria's Head of Delegation, Chief Awolowo, 
headed this off, stressing the OAU's exclusive right to act as mediator. Officially, the 
Federal position remained rock-hard. Awolowo maintained 'bluntly, one side or the other 
has to give in. You could say we're both fighting for the soul of Nigeria'. However, he did 
see Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, Biafra's two Commonwealth backers, privately, and 
explained the Federal Government's uncompromising attitude in more detail and in less 
abrasive language.
At the end of March 1969, Harold Wilson, Britain's Prime Minister, arrived in Lagos. He 
had offered to come the preceding Christmas to try to arrange a temporary truce, but the 
Federal government had made plain their opposition.
This time, the mediating motive, officially denied by both Lagos and Whitehall, was 
ascribed to a fact finding trip.
It was the watershed of British policy towards the Nigerian civil war. It became clear then, 
if there were ever any doubts, that officially, Britain was not only firmly behind Nigeria 
but intended to maintain this support. The presence of a British Prime Minister in Lagos, 
and the fact that he visited Federal occupied parts of Biafra, where he made speeches 
declaring Britain's support for 'One Nigeria', constituted the final imprimatur of the policy 
of the British government.^
Even though it criticised the visit, the Biaffan propaganda Directorate was rather cautious 
about the way it handled critcisms of the British. Biafra had always maintained that the 
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was acting against the will of the British people, members
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of his party, and of parliament. There was still hope in Biafra that they could win Britain
over, as the war progressed. All they had to do was to 'hang in there', until Nigerian
77credibility waned, and the outside world asked more questions. Rather, Biafra directed 
it's propaganda at Gowon, calling him a puppet. They claimed that he could not take 
decisioins on his own, that was why he had to invite 'his Lord and master' to come and
70
show him what to do.
With some justification, Biafra maintained, as it had done all along, that the British public 
was behind her, because the World Council of Churches and other charity organisations 
were raising aid, collecting clothes, food, milk, etc for Biafra. Voices were raised against 
the reports of genocide that were appearing on British television. As a result of the part 
played by organisations like Save the Children, in helping Biaffan children, and Caritas, in 
flying provisions into Biafra, these organisations along with the Red Cross were banned 
from Nigeria. Save the Children has still not reopened its offices in Nigeria.
Chief (Dr.) K.O.Mbadiwe, Ambassador plenipotentiary, Joseph Wayas, and many other 
Biafrans were despatched to Britain via Gabon and the Camerouns to raise 'public 
awareness', and to raise funds for Biafra.
To illustrate the nature of the public debate in Britain, it may be helpful at this point to 
reproduce a sample of quotations from public speeches:
1. 'The Ibos quite unknowingly 
appeared to take the position of 
the Irish in the former United Kingdom; 
they had never formed part of the Roman Empire 
and never come under the Law.
The result was that they would never conform.
The Ibo had never come up against the Fulani
and their administrative genius...
they lapped up education...
they filled important
professional and technical posts
all over the North...'
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- Sir Rex Niven, 01
former colonial official in Northern Nigeria.
2. We are neutral to both sides, 
but there is clearly a 
recognised government in Nigeria'.
- Lord Shepherd, 25th January, 1968.8^
3. Neutrality would mean supporting a rebellion'.
- George Thompson, 21st May 1968.8-*
4. Neutrality was not a possible option 
for Her Majesty's government'.
- George Thompson, 27th August 1968.8^
5. 'I do not believe in neutrality'.
- Lord Shepherd, 27th August 1968.8^
6. Britain was probably the only country 
in the world that could not,
in fact or in honour, be neutral about this'.
- Michael Stewart, 30th June 1969.8^
7. What we have pressed for 
is a ceasefire on the basis of 
recognition of the Federal system in Nigeria, 
with adequate safeguards for the very fine people 
who live in the Biafran area'.
- Harold Wilson, October 1968.8^
8. W e at least used our influence 
with the Nigerian government 
together with others 
to persuade them to invite observers 
into the areas concerned 
to provide some...guarantee that 
there was no genocide...
This was totally successful and the
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reports showed that there was no genocide'. 
- Harold Wilson, April 1971.88
9. 'The Nigerian Airforce
does not have the capacity of 
interdicting the rebel airfield complex at Uli'.
- Colonel Scott,
on
British Defence Adviser, December 1967.
10. 'So that I can take pleasure in the prospect 
of greater industrialisation in Nigeria;
not merely because we are pleased by 
the prosperity of our friends but also because 
I look forward to an industialised Nigeria 
as an increasingly better customer 
for those sophisticated and expensive goods 
by whose export Britain now lives.
Long live a modem, enterprising, prosperous 
and industialised Nigeria'.
- Sir David Hunt, British High Commissioner 
in Nigeria, November 1967.
Such was the range of arguments, and the varying degrees of neutrality exhibited by the 
authorities in Britain towards the Nigerian conflict.
Nevertheless, in November 1969, a Biaffan government statement which aroused much 
speculation declared 'Biafra's only interest in wanting Sovereignty is that it provides 
security for it's 14 million people. It then went on to describe 'the ever recurring incidence 
of massacres suffered by the people of the former Eastern Region living outside their own 
areas in 1945, 1955 and 1966'.^ It continued: 'The only logical remedy, as Biafrans see 
it, is their seperate existence. However, since our attachment to sovereignty is functional 
and not sentimental, Biafra will be prepared to accept, at the suggestion of no matter 
whom, any alternative arrangement that can guarantee a non-recurrence of the massacres 
of the last twenty five years'.
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This was, hailed in London and elsewhere as a sign of a more flexible Biaffan attitude,
until a further statement issued a couple of days later announced that Biaffa's basic
09attitude remained unchanged. The Biaffans were then accused of inconsistency.
Earlier, in June 1968, when the British government was under heavy pressure over its 
arms supply to Lagos, it spelled out certain conditions under which it would, consider 'and 
more than reconsider' it's policy towards Nigeria.
In the words of Mr. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary:
'if we make the supposition
that it were the intention
of the Federal government
not merely to preserve the unity of Nigeria
but, to proceed without mercy
either with the slaughter
or the starvation of the people
or if we were to make
the supposition that it were the intention
of the Federal government
to take advantage of a
military situation in order to throw aside
with contempt any terms
of reasonable resettlement,
then the arguments which justified
the policy we have so far pursued
would fall, and we would have to
reconsider, and more than reconsider,go
the action we have so far taken'.
A few days after these words were spoken, it became obvious not only that Biaffan 
civilians were starving, but that General Gowon had given the order for 'the final push' 
into the Biaffan heartland.^
The critics of Mr. Harold Wilson's policy considered that Gowon's 'final push' fulfilled the 
second of the conditions enunciated above by Mr. Michael Stewart, and angry MPs 
demanded a vote.
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According to the procedure this could only be taken if the final speaker, Mr. Whitlock, 
ended the speech before the set time limit. But despite repeated appeals and points of 
order from backbenchers of all parties he refused to do this. The end of his speech was 
drowned in cries of'shame', and 'sit down', joined by shouts of'murderer' and 'liar' from 
the public gallery until a few of the spectators were ejected.
Thus by applying a process of fillibustering the British government under Harold Wilson 
actually succeded in obliterating any demands for areview of it's policy, which they had no 
intention of changing in any case. In the final explosion and pandemonium Mr. Wilson and 
his colleagues hurriedly moved out of the chamber, followed by a torrent of abuse. ^
The Labour Party Conference in Blackpool was approaching, and in preparation for the 
event, 'Peace News', the Pacifist Weekly, circulated a pro-forma statement which was 
signed by many prominent Labour Members of both Houses of Parliament. In part the 
declaration read:
'On the Nigerian - Biafran issue
the government has withheld
the truth and concealed vital information.
It has pursued it's course willy-nilly, 
outside the "democratic process".
There has been every effort - successful at that - 
to curb and stifle legislative debate, 
and popular indignation 
has been brazenly disregarded.
We are now confronted not
only with an entrenched problem of foreign policy
- how to halt the suffering
of the peoples of Nigeria and Biafra -
but also with what is perhaps
the most serious domestic
problem of our times:
What kind of democracy are we going to 
have in this country?'
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The signatories included such leading members of the 'Tribune Group as Stan Ome, 
Stan Newens, Frank Allaun and Eric Heffer, and Labour Peers like Lord Gifford and Lord 
Soper. The statement was presented to Mr. Michael Stewart on three seperate occasions 
by delegations led by Frank Allaun. At last on 24th December 1968, well after the 
Blackpool conference, Mr. Maurice Foley, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
replied to it. In a letter to Frank Allaun he stated:
'Our position is certainly not an inflexible one.
While we have always taken the view that
the future welfare of Nigeria depends
to a substantial degree on the country's
ability to maintain it's unity,
the nature of a settlement
has to be decided by the people themselves.
It is flexibility on the part of belligerents 
that is required to end this war'.
The only possible compromise - a loose association between Nigeria and Biafra entailing 
close cooperation between equal partners on a voluntary basis - was unacceptable to 
Nigeria and did not receive British official support. Biafra would have had to concede it's 
formal sovereignty; Nigeria would have had to relinguish it's claim to political authority 
over Biafra. Ojukwu had offered an internationally supervised referendum in 'disputed 
areas' - those inhabited by the minority groups in the East and, perhaps, the Ibo parts of 
the Mid-West. This was refused by the Federal government. If'flexibility' meant anything, 
it meant a compromise on those lines. ^
The news of the final push and the consequent uproar and furore was so awkward for the 
British government that it tried to deny that the campaign was in full swing.
But since the evidence that it was taking place was irrefutable, the Foreign Office renewed 
it's efforts to persuade Lagos to invite 'impartial'^ international observers who could 
certify the good behaviour of Federal troops and, above all, produce 'evidence' that
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Biaffa's charges of genocide were false. Gowon subsequently spoke of the great 
reluctance with which he had invited the foreign observers. ^
The Nigerian government announcement about the establishment of an International 
Observer Team came two days after the stormy August 1968 debate in the British 
Parliament.
A Federal Nigerian government spokesman said that the United Nations, the Organisation 
of Afrcan Unity, Britain, Canada, Sweden and Poland had been invited to send one 
member each. The Nigerian government subsequently relented sufficiently to allow each 
o f these observers one or two deputies, but it refused to enlarge the team, despite pressure 
from the governments which had sent representatives. ^  A spokesman for the 
Commonwealth Office said that the British government was willing in principle to take 
part in the scheme, provided that the other parties agreed to it. He stressed that 'this 
should not be taken to mean that the British government is aware that an offensive is 
taking place, or is, in fact, imminent'. ^  Nobody else was in any doubt that it was well 
under way. The Times of the same day carried a long report by its own correspondent, 
datelined 'near Aba, Nigeria, August 29th' under the prominent headline NIGERIAN 
TROOPS CLOSE IN ON IBO HEARTLAND'. ^  While declaring itself ready to send a 
representative, the British government stated that there was no intention to seek Biafran 
reactions to the invitation of observers.
The continued Biafran resistance, despite the fact that Gowon had forecast victory inside 
four weeks was put down in London to large quantities of French arms which were said to 
be supplied nightly to the Biafran troops; these shipments had 'prolonged the misery and 
the agony', according to Mr. Harold Wilson. The British government rejected 
suggestions that British bullets' might have similar effects.
At the end of September, Lord Shepherd was despatched to Lagos on an undisclosed, 
unidentified mission, because even though the Foreign Office maintained that he was there
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to discuss peace and relief, Lagos seemed surprised at his visit. They seemed not to have 
expected him. After that Mr. Maurice Foley arrived in Lagos on a trip that achieved very 
little, if anything.
In defence of Gowon against Biafra's accusations of perpertrating genocide on the Biafran 
people, Lord Hunt, who had been sent to Lagos in 1968 to solve the relief problem, came 
back 'convinced from my personal meeting with him General Gowon is a man of high 
ideals, of deep sincerity and real humanity.
Perhaps the most appropriate way to round off this section is to recall the words of 
Professor H.G.Hanbury:
'If the government had waited
to consider the merits of the quarrel
before taking sides, with the stronger party,
other powers would doubtless have done the same,
though Britain has, through it's policies,
been reduced to second- class status
among nations, yet surely,
in a matter concerning the Commonwealth,
her lead would have been followed.
But it chose to place expediency before right,
it can only be the realisation
that it has long ceased to represent
the people whom it presumes to rule,
that preserves Biafrans,
with their innate sence of justice,
from unreservedly condemning
the entire Bitish Nation.
Four nations there are, 
which have reversed their priorities, 
and placed right above expediency, 
in recognising Biafra 
as a Sovereign State.
These are Tanzania, Gabon,
Ivory Coast and Zambia,
who have set a splendid example of fair dealing
to the rest of the world.
Though the "federal government", 
in senseless resentment and spite,
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at once broke off relations with them, 
it must be sensible
of the spirit of indignation and conpassion 
which will, it is hoped 
pervade the rest of Africa, and the world, 
before it is too late.
Mr. Wilson should read the moving statement
by M.Houphouet Boigny,
probably the most revered figure
in Africa today,
who pointed out that the war
which Nigeria launched on
Biafra has, in ten months,
accounted for more deaths than
has the Vietnam war in three years.
It's perusal might, even
at the eleventh hour, induce him:
(1) to follow the excellent example of 
Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Netherlands, 
and abandon his evil policy 
of supplying Lagos with arms;
(ii) to make it clear
to the "federal government"
that, in the event of their victory,
which may God forbid,
he will not hasten to clasp their hands,
red with the blood
of women and little children, but that any form
of overseas aid will be withheld,
until the rights and dignity of such
Ibos as are left alive
will be inviolably safeguarded'.*^
It is important to stress that Biafran propaganda was not carried out only on the media. 
Biafra invested heavily in foreign emissaries to spread the news, convince the people, raise 
funds, and lobby members of foreign National Assemblies. It engaged numerous friends, 
intellectuals, and sympathisers in foreign countries, to help disseminate it's message, and 
propagagate it's case. In this way, it circumvented the censorship and embargo placed on 
it. This was another demonstration of Biafra's aptitude at counter propaganda.
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Implantation of information, censorship, counter propaganda, all demonstrate elements of 
migration and mutation, imigration and replication.
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PART C 
5.4. BIAFRA AND THE WORLD.
5.4.1 Haiti.
The best way to kick off this section, is with the last, and only non-African diplomatic
recognition that Biafra received. It was the least expected and the most bizzare.
On 22nd March 1969, the Republic of Haiti recognised Biafra, and even senior Biaffan
government officials in Umuahia could not take it seriously, dissolving into laughter when
Ojukwu read out the cable from 'Papa Doc' Duvalier, who signed himself'President for 
107Life'. The circumstances surrounding this move are obscure, but it seems to have
sprung from a fit of pique against the British - Graham Greene's highly critical novel about
Haiti, 'The Comedians' had just been made into a film - and the fact that nobody
apparently had solicited 'Papa Doc's' opinion or assistance in world affairs before.
The recognition was considered as a quirk by some Biafra watchers and commentators.
One of the reasons suggested for the recognition was that one of Papa Doc's old school
108friends, Dr. Ikejiani, happened to be an Ibo, and one of Ojukwu's emissaries. The 
significance of the recognition nevertheless was that it was the first outside the African 
continent; it was neither overtly or covertly solicited, and it acted to swell the number of 
recognitions for Biafra.
5.4.2. South Africa.
Towards the end of 1967. Nigeria accused South Africa of helping Biafra. The accusation 
followed a court hearing in Cape Town, where it was alleged, that an outlawed African 
Nationalist movement had it's headquarters in Lagos. ^
The Nigerian Federal government in its denial of this claim, countered that it 'was an 
obvious attempt by the South African government to justify its active support for the
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rebels in Nigeria'. Both sides accused each other - Nigeria and Biafra - from time to time, 
of having South Africans among their respective mercenaries, and in both cases the 
accusations were justified. In 1967, while Lagos was claiming active South African 
support for Biafra, the Nigerians themselvews employed South Africans, Britons and 
Egyptians as pilots to bomb and strafe Biafran targets. One of the reporters covering 
the war from Lagos, Norman Kirkman, claims that: 'A Nigerian Air Force DC-3 with 
2501bs bombs taxied slowly past me to the runway. A South African at the controls 
grinned and gave me a thumbs-up sign as he began another bombing mission. The 
appearance of South Africans among the mercenaries has caused some surprise in view of 
apartheid. But they were recruited on a strictly commercial basis to train Nigerians. They 
have been flying because air operations were necessary before training was complete'. ^  
There were similar reports from other correspondents.
While there was no concrete or substantial evidence of South African involvement on 
either side, Biafra's Portuguese connections aroused speculations of South African 
support for Biafra. Nigeria's disintegration would have been a welcome bonus for the 
whites in Pretoria; already the bloody conflict in itself was employed to support South 
Africa's contention that Black Africa was unstable, and not sufficiently mature to govern 
itself. By helping Biafra to continue the resistance, Pretoria might well have wished to 
buttress it's argument and perpertuate the conflict.
5.4.3 France.
M. Joel Le Theule, the French Secretary of State for Information made the first official
pronouncements about Biafra on 31st July 1968. He said: 'The Biafrans had demonstrated
their will to assert themselves as a people, and the war had to be settled by appropiate
113international procedures on the basis of the right of peoples to self determination'. As 
was to be expected, this was received with absolute exhilaration by Biafra.
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Peace talks in Addis Ababa were about to start, under the auspices of the OAU. Nigeria 
ascribed Biafran ’obstinacy* at the peace talks to encouragement from France.
Before the official statement of July 1968, Biafra had made no attempts to deny Nigerian 
and British accusations that France backed Biafra. Ivory Coast Radio had indicated the 
number of times that President Houphet Boigny had to meet with President De Gaulle 
before announcing his recognition of Biafra. Gabon, according to Nigerian propaganda, 
was also said to have been encouraged by France to recognise Biafra.
Nigerian propaganda was quite sure that France was bringing pressure to bear on the 
Francophone African countries - particularly the West African ones to support Biafra.
On his way to France before the recognition of Biafra, Houphet Boigny had stopped off in 
Tunisia. After a meeting Habib Bourguiba, the two Heads of State issued a communique 
condemning the 'reckless, unnecessary pogrom and genocide that was taking place in 
Nigeria'. They called for a ceasefire. ^
As earlier stated, the British Prime Minister, had also ascribed Biafran intransigence and 
obstinacy to the large number of Frecnh arms in Biafra. On 9th September, 1968, the day 
the Addis Ababa conference broke down, President De Gaulle declared in a press 
conference that he was not sure:
'that the concept of Federation'
which replaces in certain places
that of colonisation,
is always a very good one,
or very practical, especially in Africa...
even before the present tragedy of Biafra
took place, one could ask oneself
if Nigeria would live in view of the upheavals
it was going through...
In this affair, France has assisted
and is assisting Biafra
to the limit of her possibilities.
She has not taken the step... 
of recognition of the Biafran Republic, 
because she thinks that the development
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of Africa is above all a matter 
for Africans.
Already, there are, some African States of 
the West and of the East 
which have recognised Biafra.
Others will also perhaps recognise it.
This means that for France the decision 
which has not been taken cannot be 
excluded in the future.
Moreover, one can imagine the Federation... 
transforming itself into some sort of Union 
which could reconcile the right of Biafra 
to decide it's own fate and the links 
which would remain between it and 
the whole of Nigeria'. * ^
This was a rather ominous statement and Biafra's hopes were raised high after it. 
According to the Voice of Biafra, starvation, had reached it's peak, but Gowon's 'final 
push' was in full swing.
Even though Biafra was short of supplies and equipment, the aims of the 'final push' were 
not achieved; the annihilation of Biafra in one final fell swoop failed at this time. Gowon 
attributed the failure to a let down by Nigeria's arms suppliers, whilst on the other hand, 
'French arms were pouring into Biafra'. ^  Ojukwu, countering this, maintained in an 
address to the Biafran Consultative Assembly on 26th September 1968, that 'the increased 
international acceptance of Biafra's right to self determination, and it's improved supply 
position, had boosted Biafra's capability and resolve'. Press reports in Britain talked of 
massive airlifts of arms from France to Biafra via Libreville in Gabon.
The reports were denied by the French Foreign Office in Paris, maintaining only that relief 
materials were being airlifted to Biafra through Libreville. The statement from the French 
Foreign Office pointed out that the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Michel Debre had 
proclaimed an embargo on arms to both sides earlier in the year, and that this remained the 
official position. ^  This did not satisfy the British Press. A headline in the Observer read: 
BIAFRA SHOCK: FRANCE STEPS UP AID TO THE REBELS.118
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France would have been happy to see the dislocation of Nigeria. It was envious of 
Nigeria’s Anglophone credentials, because of its potential wealth, size, population and 
strength vis- a- vis the Francophone African countries.
During the civil war, Nigeria had accused France of being interested in the oil deposits in 
the areas in conflict.
However, De Gaulle had stopped short of full recognition of Biafra. Of this, Ojukwu 
remarked to Phillipe Decraene of Le Monde:
'The attitude of the French Government 
towards us is encouraging.
But our enemies have been so impressed 
by the moral aid given to us by France 
that they have savagely stepped up 
their military operations against Biafra.
What we need now is for this moral aid 
to be matched by military 
and diplomatic measures.
My feeling is that France is now in 
a position to grant us recognition.
A move of this sort
would have a dramatic effect on Nigeria, 
it would force Gowon at long last 
to sit at the conference table...
Where it would have a really decisive effect 
is on the French-speaking African countries
But, De Gaulle did not go the extra mile and recognise Biafra. Two diametrically opposed
reasons have been offered for this, both authoritative.
Both agree that President Houphet Boigny's intercession had helped to bring the French 
Government out into the open in supporting Biafra's aspirations. But, acording to Fracois 
Debre, the French Foreign Minister under De Gaulle, Houphet Boigny himself advised
12 i
against full recognition, saying that the matter was an African affair. This view was 
supported by other sources in the French Foreign Office. Susan George, a journalist and 
writer on Biafra, states that she discovered this in an interview with Pricess Elizabeth Du 
Croy, a leading figure in the French - Biafra lobby, who said after the war, that she had
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been told about Houphet Boigny's advise by 'highly placed figures' - like the Quay 
d'Orsay.*^
On the other hand, Ralph Uwechue, the Biafran Representative in Paris, who was
involved in all the relevant diplomatic exchanges until he left the Biafran Service at the
end of 1968, maintained that Houphet Boigny tried to persuade De Gaulle to extend
1recognition, but failed. In his owm book, Uwechue explains that 'French officials made 
no secret of their intention to keep clear of the struggle, which they regarded essentially as 
an African affair'. ^ 4
Whatever the truth is, France kept Biafra suspended in a diplomatic limbo . After Biafra's 
surrender in January 1970, a Biafran official complained of France: 'I wish they had never
1 O f
opened their mouth. They did not really help us much, and it only annoyed the British'.
5.4.4 United States of America.
The initial reaction from the United States was that the civil war in Nigeria was an 'African 
Affair'. Washington was more inclined to tow the same line as its ally, Britain, which was 
also the former metropolitan colonial power.
This combination of Britain, America and later the Soviet Union tilted the scales heavily 
agaist Biafra, in favour of Nigeria. It is not clear that America was intially aware of this, 
nor whether it intended it to happen. Nevertheless, it looked to the OAU to solve the 
problem, despite the fact that the organisation had proved itself inadequate to do so. It 
was clear, or should have been that every attempt by the OAU to mediate had been 
rebuffed by Nigeria.
However, despite this apparent apathy, Auberon Waugh and Susan Cronje maintained that 
the most blatant and significant pre-war intervention occured at the end of July 1966, after 
the second coup, when the US Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Elbert G.Mathews, and the 
British High Commissioner, Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, persuaded Lt,Col. Yakubu 
Gowon at the last minute to strike out of his speech the actual words announcing the
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dissolution of the Federation. Had the various parts of Nigeria been allowed to drift apart
- a natural development after the political nightmare of the previous two years - a looser
association might have been formed, which would probably have prevented any large scale 
19 ftmilitary conflict.
Dr. Eni Njoku, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos is said to have told 
Susan Cronje that Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce related the incident to himself and Sir 
Louis Mbanefo, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and later former Chief Justice of 
Biafra. The conversation is said to have taken place in Sir Louis' residence in Enugu when 
the British High Commissioner paid a fairwell visit before leaving Nigeria early in
I  0 * 7
1967. i ^ /The restatement of this point, which was made ealier, is important because of its 
importance.
Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, the American Ambassador, intervened again after the Aburi 
meeting - which w ould have given the regions a certain amount of autonomy - by assuring 
Gowon of American support in his refusal to implement the essential conditons of the 
agreement. The Eastern Region, on the other hand, was told in no uncertain terms that the 
United States w ould not stand behind it, if it refused to cooperate with the policies which 
came out of Lagos, and which were in direct contradiction with what had been agreed at 
Aburi.128
The apparent initial apathy appears to have been a smoke screen therefore to camouflage
America's real intentions. As in the case of Britain, the reports from the American Consul
in Enugu, were at v ariance with those of the Ambassador in Lagos. The difference
199between them was regarded in the State Department as a 'personality conflict'.
An American Senator, Eugene McCarthy maintained that in preventing the dissolution of
the Federation, and in giving the policies of Lagos full support while opposing those in
1Enugu, the United States and Britain actively interfered in Nigerian affairs. He 
disputed the claim by the United States that diplomatic recognition of Biafra would 
constitute intervention into purely African affairs.
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Senator McCarthy stated: 'Non-recognition is also intervention. There are faults of 
ommission as well as commission. The United States has already intervened repeatedly in 
the area: first by propping up General Gowon when he assumed power; later by backing 
him when Nigeria abrogated the Aburi agreement; and also by exerting pressure on a 
number of African nations not to recognise Biafra'.
A similar account of American interference in Nigeria during 1966-67 was given in a
171Republican Party publication, the Ripon Forum. 1 The Ripon Society Incorporated is a 
Republican Research and Policy Organisation. The editor states: 'In publishing this 
magazine, the Ripon Society seeks to provide a forum for fresh ideas, well researched 
proposals and for a free spirit of criticism, innovation, and idependent thinking within the 
Republican Party'. ^
The official American account maintained a discreet silence concerning the second coup, 
and events in Lagos during July 1966. Mr. Joseph Palmer, Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs until May 1969, in a statement made before the sub-committee on Africa of the 
Senate Committee of Foreign Relations on September 11th 1 9 6 8 ,^  suggested that the 
cause of the July coup was revenge because the new government, 'led by General Ironsi, 
(an Ibo), was not strong enough to punish the leaders of the original coup, despite strong 
demands to that effect from the North'. He conceded: 'After the second coup, in the 
period before secession, the US government urged both sides to negotiate their 
differences. When negotiations broke down we counseled against secession through our 
Consul in Enugu, and Ambassador Mathews flew to that city to try to dissuade Colonel 
Ojukwu from this course'. Susan Cronje stated that she was at State House in Enugu at 
the beginning of April 1967 when a stormy interview took place. Both men emerged from 
the conference room looking angry, but at that stage Lt. Col. Ojukwu was by no means 
set on secession. In fact he had just appealed for African mediation in the hope of avoiding 
the disintegration of the Federation. The argument with Mr. Mathews arose out of an
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American attempt to persuade the Biafran government to accept the authority of Gowon,
IOC
which it did not recognise.
On his return to Lagos, Mathews issued a more specific and terse statement. In a letter he
sent to the Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce a few days after the outbreak of
war early in July 1967, he stated:
The facts are simple.
My government recognises 
the Federal Military Government 
as the government of Nigeria.
We have repeatedly made known
our complete support
for the political integrity of Nigeria.
Many times we have expressed our hopes 
that Nigeria would continue to remain 
a united country.
This is not only an official view, 
but one that is also felt 
by American businessmen 
engaged in the rapidly growing trade 
between our two countries...
Despite the uncertainties of the 
past eighteen months, 
there have been notable expressions of 
continued confidence in Nigeria's future 
by investors from the United States.
The expansion of your own organisation 
and the formation of counterparts like it 
in the United States 
indicate the continuing importance 
of our mutual economic activities 
Following the military coup of January 1966, 
and through all subsequent difficulties, 
the United States has consistently 
expressed it's hopes that Nigerians 
would resolve their differences 
and maintain the cohesion 
of the country.
Both alone, and together with other governments, 
the United States has urged Nigerian leaders 
to seek a solution that would insure
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a stable future.
Repeatedly, we have stated that Nigeria, 
as an independent country, 
should solve it's own problems.
We regard these as internal matters 
for the Nigerian people themselves.
As a consequence of this policy 
we have not during the current crises 
supplied arms anywhere in Nigeria.
It is our deepest desire
that the present hostilities
may be brought to a steady end
and that Nigeria would resume
uninterruptedly her dynamic development1.
Nevertheless, the decision not to supply arms to Nigeria was received in stony silence by 
Lagos. On the other side, the Biafran media remained sceptical of American intentions.
It believed that the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk had stated that Nigeria was 'the 
primary responsibility of Great Britain'. ^  The West Africa Magazine also held the same 
view. The Voice of Biafra claimed that Joseph Palmer, who was a former Ambassador to 
Nigeria, had engineered the policy of America allowing Britain to be the arms supplier to 
Nigeria. According to the Biafran media, he was committed to 'One Nigeria', as the 
showcase of Western democracy in Africa, just as was Britain. All indications are that 
there was closer cooperation on policy between America and Britain than was apparent. 
When, for instance, Britain announced that airlifting of food for Biafra was inadequate,
1 TO
and wanted Biafra to accept a land corridor, America concurred.
But, for some Americans this attitude was inadequate. Senator Eugene McCarthy called
on President Johnson in July 1968 to ask the United Nations for a mandatory airlift of
food to Biafra, and to persuade Britain to stop arms shipments to Nigeria. He said that
America should be prepared to back a division of Nigeria according to self-determination,
and he accused the Johnson administration of passivity and inaction. His rival for the
Democratic Party nomination, Vice President Hubert Humphreys called for the Red Cross
13Qto 'take prompt and risk taking initiatives'^
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The matter of Biafran starvation became a subject of American internal politics. On 9th 
September 1968, Presidential candidate Mr. Richard M. Nixon issued the following 
statement:
The terrible tragedy of the people of Biafra 
has now assumed catastrophic dimensions.
Starvation is daily claiming the lives of 
an estimated six thousand Ibo tribesmen, 
most of them children.
If adequate food is not delivered 
to the people in the immediate future, 
hundreds of thousands of human beings 
will die of hunger.
Until now efforts to relieve the Biafran people 
have been thwarted by the desire 
of the central government of Nigeria 
to pursue total and unconditional victory 
and by the fear of the Ibo people that 
surrender means wholesale atrocities 
and genocide.
But genocide is what is taking place right now - 
and starvation is the grim reaper.
This is not the time to stand on ceremony
or to "go through channels",
or to observe the diplomatic niceties.
The destruction of an entire people
is an immoral objective,
even in the most moral of wars.
It can never be justified; 
it can never be condoned.
Voluntary organisations such as the Red Cross, 
the World Council of Churches and Caritas 
have rushed thousands of tons of foods 
to the vicinity of the stricken region.
Much of the food remains nearby 
while these children starve to death.
The time has long passed 
for the wringing of hands 
about what is going on.
Whilst America is not the world’s policeman, 
let us at least act as the world's conscience 
in this matter of life and death for millions.
The President of the United States
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is a man charged with responsibilities 
and concern all over the world, 
but I urge President Johnson 
to give to this crisis
all the time and attention and imagination 
and energy he can muster.
Every friend of humanity should be asked
to step forward to call an end
to this slaughter of innocents in West Africa.
America is not without
enormous material wealth and power and ability.
There is no better cause
in which we might invest that power
than in staying alive
the lives of innocent men and women
and children who otherwise are doomed' ^
Richard Nixon was elected President in November 1968, and proceeded to setup an 
emergency task force on Biafra under the Secretary of State, Mr. Nicholas de 
B.Katzenbach at the end of the month of his election.
The new move was seen both as an effort to give the Biafran crisis a higher priority in 
government policy-making, and to force a sweeping review of US policies.
A key source in Washington was quoted as saying: 'The time is fast approaching when the 
United States can no longer stand by and hope for a purely African solution to this 
problem'. ^
But in a statement in December, ^  Mr. Katzenbach said that 'a solution to the conflict 
must be pre-eminently Nigerian and African'. In the same breath he said that the British 
'who have traditionally trained and supplied Nigeria with arms have continued to do so:...
I do not really see how they could have made any other choice. Their position is clearly 
different from others who have been interlopers or Johnies-come-lately in the Nigerian 
arms picture.If they had stopped their sales they would, in fact, be helping to support the 
disemberment of a fellow Commonwealth country with which they have had a special 
relationship since it's independence'.
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This was after the OAU's fifth attempt to deal with the conflict had failed. At about the 
same time, Mr. Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian Foreign Minister, criticised the OAU for 
having washed its hands of the affair: 'the only advise the African States had given was for 
Biafra to lay down its arms'. ^
It would appear therefore that despite Nixon's pre-election strong words, and the 
immediate subsequent setting up of the task force, America was at a cross roads on policy 
on Biafra. It was split between loyalty to Britain, revulsion at the atrocities in Biafra, and 
bringing pressure to bear on African States and the OAU to find a peaceful solution. 
Again, therefore, just as in the case of France, America did not formulate a definite and 
credible policy until the war ended. However, it can be argued that Biafra's use of 
starvation as a propaganda weapon immensely affected United States's foreign policy and 
public opinion towards the conflict.
5.4.5. The Soviet Union.
Sam Ikoku, a leading Nigerian socialist politician stated: 'The Federal Government's 
decision to purchase arms from the USSR and obtain military aid from the UAR knocked 
the bottom out of the Anglo-American diplomacy over arms supplies...
The Soviet attitude towards the plight of Eastern Nigeria before secession was a mixture 
of sympathy and understanding as testified by Russian journalists visiting Nigeria.
Amongst these was Yevgeny Korshunov, who, while in Nigeria in 1967 met Herbert 
Unegbu, editor of the West African Pilot, and Paul Nwokedi, President of the Nigeria- 
Soviet Friendship Society. The two briefed him on the pogroms on Easterners in 1966 in 
Northern Nigeria and the subsequent exodus of Easterners from the North.
Korshunov was 'disturbed by the passion and resolution expressed' by, people he knew to 
be 'supporters of African unity in the face of imperialist intrigues'. But he was impressed 
by the way the refugees were being integrated.
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He wrote:
Today the whole of Eastern Nigeria has turned into a building site... they are cutting 
down the jungle and cultivating new land...they are receiving from the government on 
easy terms hundreds of thousands of chick incubators and are raising poultry... frankly, 
one's heart rejoices when one sees this bubbling life...'
In admiration of Ojukwu, he recalled how, previously, the government had blocked the 
spread of socialist ideas in the East. He described How 'Ojukwu has publicly declared 
at a meeting of trade union workers that, for Africa, he saw just one path for 
development - the socialist one...'
Ojukwu, he said, did not tire of repeating that 'in the present circumstances there is but 
one way towards the preservation of the unity of Nigeria - the creation of a 
confederation instead of the existing federation. He continues in this search with great 
stubbomess, and with all the force at his command. He tries to secure the support of 
the West and Mid-West against the North. And without result'.
Korshunov concluded that there was chauvinism in the East, but that 'not all the 
Easterners whom I happened to meet were completely gripped by the wave of 
nationalism. Some tried to look to the future, asking themselves whether the East 
would not lose more than it would gain by "defecting". Those who thought like this 
took the view that "Nigeria is one country, and that the successful solution of the 
problem lies not in a greater or lesser autonomy for her regions, but in a uniting of all 
progressive forces on a basis of wholly national interests in the struggle for a better life 
for the working masses in all regions and all nationalities in Nigeria'.
This article, which appeared soon after Biafra's declaration of independence was in 
concurrence with Radio Moscow which in November 1966 announced: 'It must be 
clear that an end to tribal hostility will not solve the Nigerian crisis, as the Western 
Press has been suggesting, but only the coming together of progressive 
nationalists'. ^
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Pravda simultaneously declared that 'only the firmness of the military government in 
rising above tribal interests and the consolidation of all truly democratic forces can 
help Nigeria'. ^
The first overtly official statement on the war, came by way of a letter from the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Alexei Kosygin, in 1967, to General Gowon on the war. It was released 
in Lagos on 17th October, and in Moscow on 1st November 1967. It read:
'The Soviet people fully understand the desire 
of the Nigerian Federal government 
to preserve the unity and territorial integrity 
of the Nigerian State and to prevent the country 
from being disembered.
The Soviet Union has tried to help African States 
in every way in their noble desire to strengthen 
their political and economic independence'. ^
Despite this ambivalence, Biafra had made early overtures to the Soviet Union by 
sending George Krubo, as Biafra's emissary to Moscow. According to the Voice of 
Boafra, he was well received on arrival. ^  Apart from being Biafra's representative in 
the Soviet Union, he was also to negotiate the sale of arms by Moscow to Biafra. The 
tragedy was that for reasons that are not immediately clear, George Krubo defected to 
the Nigerian cause while in Russia, and chose to negotiate the purchase of arms for 
Nigeria instead.
Predictably, therefore, even though the Soviet authorities could not really explain how 
they came to support Nigeria, and be on the same side as the great enemies - Britain 
and America, to the Biafrans, it was obvious. For them, it was easy to guess how and 
why - to their chagrin.
They felt betrayed. * ^  *
239
5.5. Conclusion.
The watershed for Biafran propaganda was the discovery that starvation was a 
powerful, and exploitable propaganda weapon. Having used genocide, pogrom, 
religious and ethnic extermination, economic and political domination and subjugation, 
with limited successes, starvation struck a chord with the world’s conscience. Biafra 
without weapons could not win a military war. It had one telex link to the outside 
world, and made this available to foreign journalists who sympathised with it's cause.
It employed the services of a Geneva based public relations organisation, Markpress, 
and literarily 'invaded the West' with it's propaganda, drawing on the world's sympathy 
to attract unprecedented massive aid, and some might say, sustenance. Even though 
starvation and kwashiorkor were real, it was the conversion and manipulation of these 
images for a propaganda purpose, that demonstrated Biafra's dexterity at manipulative 
persuasion. The international publics were motivated by the images and messages that 
came out of Biafra.
Britain, which regarded Nigeria as the show piece of African colonies, did not want 
the disintegration of the country. The British government believed that the war would 
blow over in a few weeks. It did not. It lasted three years and, according to Auberon 
Waugh, cost one million Eastern Nigerian lives. Whilst Vietnam was America's 
television war of the 1960s, Biafra was Europe's. Until Biafra, civil wars in Africa 
were largely unreported in the West.
The recognition of Biafra by five countries was unprecedented at least on the African 
continent. The use of hunger and starvation as a propaganda weapon was a 'first'. 
Nigerias attempt to censor information emanating from Biafra failed woefully. Nigeria 
may have won the military war, but it never matched Biafran propaganda.
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CHAPTER SIX. 
CONCLUSION.
Certainly, in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, two wars were fought - the bush war, and 
the propaganda war. There is little doubt that whilst Nigeria won the former, Biafra won 
the latter. In order to examine this view, it was essential to discuss the following 
prevailing questions:
1. What is propaganda.
2.Who makes propaganda.
3. What is the objective of propaganda.
4. What is the Biafra experience.
1. Propaganda was defined as the manipulation of information to achieve certain 
objectives. Even though there are studies being undertaken into various aspects of 
propaganda, eg. propaganda in foreign policy, and in advertising, the particular concern 
here was with propaganda in war, and in civil war especially. In relating this theme to the 
discussion, three models have been studied. These have been - Germany under Hitler and 
Goebbels; China under MaoTse Tung; and Biafra, the main case study. The word 
'propaganda' does not appear to have come into military usage till the latter part of the 
19th century or the early part of the 20th century. The 'act' nevertheless existed. It was 
variously described as psychological warfare, or psyche war-(in the case of the American 
war of independence). A juxtaposition of Sun Tzu in China in 550 BC. with Hitler's 
utterances in Mein Kampf. and Ojukwus speeches and broadcasts, demonstrate an 
apparent continuum from the ancient to the modem - ie. from psychological warfare to 
propaganda, (see chs. 2-5.) The word 'propaganda' seems to have ecclesiastical origins, 
deriving from the Roman Catholic Church. It was used to describe the activity of 
propagating the faith. It is argued that in terms of this definition, there is very little
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difference between propaganda in world, international, or civil wars, except in the 
constituencies addressed, and the facilities available. The language, message, culture and 
design are adapted in each case to suit the prevailing set of circumstances.
2. In war situations, and in civil wars especially, the question of 'who makes propaganda' 
is always difficult. this is because, no one side to a conflict ever admits to being engaged 
in propaganda activities. The reason for this is that each side to conflict accuses the other 
of lying, and of leading its constituencies astray. Propaganda activities therefore tend to be 
treated as lies and deceit. This was amply demonstrated in the second world war, (ch.3.), 
when Eden and Churchill maintained that they did not want to engage in propaganda 
activities, because that meant telling lies to the British people. However, they and the 
BBC applied strict censorship to what was broadcast. This brings up the question of 
'censorship' in the realms of propaganda. The Encyclopaedia Britannica (ch.2.) clearly puts 
censorship within the definition of propaganda. Furthermore, going by the earlier 
definition of propaganda as being the 'manipulation of information', then, it is fair to argue 
that censorship is within the definition, and therefore an aspect of propaganda. It follows 
therefore that whatever the arguments, accusations and denials, both side to a conflict 
make propaganda.
3. The objective of propaganda, according to Sun Tzu, (ch.2), and Hitler, (ch.3), is to 
disable the enemy psychologically before the first bullets are fired in battle. The aim is to 
create an inferiority complex in the enemy, to make him turn and run. It is also necessary, 
through this process, to caricature the leader or protagonist of the enemy, and cause a loss 
of confidence within the rank and file of the enemy publics - military and civilian. 
Conversely, a process of edification of the leader of the propagandist is pursued. The 
examples of Mao Tse tung, Hitler, and Ojukwu are demonstrations of this (ch.2,3,4.) The 
objective demands total, unquestioning and unalloyed loyalty from its targeted audiences.
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However, this depends on whether the propagandist is applying what David Wedgewood- 
Benn describes as; coercive persuasion, or manipulative persuasion’, (ch3). Coercive 
persuasion, as in the case of the Soviet Union, involves total control of propaganda 
facilities, while manipulative persuasion does not. Nevertheless, in a war situation, the two 
are usually applied, dependent on whether the propagandist is adressing the domestic or 
the external audience. It is easier to use coercive persuasion on the domestic audience as 
in the case of Mao Tse Tung, Hitler and Ojukwu,(ch.3&4), while manipulative persuasion 
is applied to external targets. An effective propaganda precedes, intensifies during, and 
outlasts the war. The intention is to motivate, mobilise and sustain the varied 
constituencies. The important things are the credibility of the messenger, and the 
belieavability of the message. Therefore, there is a tendency to 'brainwash', particularly the 
domestic audience. Total submission becomes essential. Goebbels believed that 
propaganda was not meant for the intellectual, but for those who could not question the 
essence of the massages with which they were bombarded . (ch.3). The audience is not 
expected to have time to think and question. If they did, then the objective had failed.
4. In the case of Biafra, a process of migration and mutation,(ch.3), seems to have 
occurred; ie the authorities adapted certain aspects of the German and Chinese examples, 
and tailored them to their particular circumstances. Despite this, the peculiarly African 
nature of the conflict affected the resolution of the conflict, as will be seen in the 
discussion under the following headings:
1 RECONCILIATION.
2 THE EFFECT.
3 THE LESSONS.
These segments are so interactive, that in some cases, they may overlap, in a rather 
complementary form to and with each other.
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6.1. Reconciliation.
"In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God"... 1 
"And God said, let there be light: and there was light...
And God called the light Day, and the Darkness He called Night. And the evening and the 
morning were the first day.
And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide into 
waters from the waters...
And God called the firmament Heaven..."^
Such sentences demonstrate the power of the word. At a party for newly qualified 
Doctors at St. Thomas' Hospital London, one of the graduates, a self confessed religious 
sceptic remarked that the Bible was a propaganda document, and that the immaculate 
conception was a 'con' Another graduant countered that if that were true, then the 
propaganda and the ’con' were immensely powerful and durable. The Bible itself is replete 
with the word - spoken, written, uttered, and in so many other forms and symbols that it is 
unique. The acceptance and belief in them is an act of faith. This unquestioning faith is 
what the Catholics describe as 'The Mistery Of Religion. The followers of this faith, 
acceptance and belief, are the faithful. Modem Christians or followers of any religion are 
sometimes accused of being brainwashed. Propaganda, and the targets of propaganda - 
the followers create an analogy to the faithful - are sometimes accused of being 
brainwashed. The Bible itself exploited the symbolic power of words, to convert, to 
admonish, to restrain, to keep within the fold of believers; eg; as in the 'The Lord's Prayer', 
'The Beatitudes', the casting of the devil into the herd of swines, 'The Ten 
Commandments', 'The Baptism', the turning of wine into water, the parables and other 
numerous miracles, etc. The only thing modem Christians have inherited from the fathers 
of Christianity are the words and symbols. It is total, unquestioning and absolute loyalty 
that keeps them attached to their faith. It is easier, perhaps to be an agnostic, or an atheist, 
than to believe in the unknown, unseen, and some might say, a void. The scriptures,
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creeds, prayers and images are all different forms and symbols of the of the word, and the 
'mistery of religion', according to the Roman Catholic Church, is in the total acceptance of 
the faith without investigation and questioning; it is an act of absolute faith. The Pope to 
the Roman Catholics is infallible. The followers of the Church have accepted this from 
time immemorial. As a result, his utterances are tantamount to decrees. The moment 
followers begin to question the papal decrees, they are questioning the structure and 
culture of the Church. Afterall, propaganda is a catholic church derivative, demonstrating 
the analogy in the demand for absolute faith and loyalty, whether the propaganda is 
temporal or spiritual. Those who question and investigate are potential sceptics who may 
'fall by the way side'. That is why in Biafra, support had to be unquestioningly strong, 
even for the followers to imagine or envisage the success of the secession, against the 
odds. That is why, when the end came, some Easterners, particularly Ibos were 
completely devastated. There was uncertainty about what was going to be everybody's 
fate. Emeka Obinwa and Willy R. Murray-Bruce, both Biafran airforce pilots decided at 
the eleventh hour that they had to marry immediately, 'and produce children to leave 
something behind'.’* Many broadcasters did the same.^ As a result, a lot of the surviving 
young women came out of the war pregnant. Many of the marriages have survived, some 
have not. The children - 'products of the war', may or may not ever be told the reasons for 
their being brought into the world. However, the end of the war came like a flash of 
tropical lightning, momentarily illuminating a half - remembered landscape, and 
reimposing itself on the consciousness of a world which had already pigeonholed the 
conflict, along with Vietnam and the Middle East, as insoluble. It took everyone by 
surprise, including the victorious Nigerian armies as they raced across great tracts of 
Biafran territory long denied them. The initial reaction was one of disbelief; the cry of 
'victory' had been heard too often in the past to retain much credibility. Then, outside 
Nigeria there was an emotional outburst of unprecedented proportions as the whole world 
- or so it seemed - expressed the direct fears for the fate of the Biafrans, and frantically
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tried to rush relief and other supplies in, only to have the door slammed firmly in it's face 
by an angry and xenophobic Federal Nigerian Government. The first news that something 
serious was happening appeared in the Paris evening papers on Saturday, 10th January 
1970. French relief workers, evacuated from Biafra to Gabon, carried tales of a Federal 
breakthrough in the Southern sector: Owerri and even Uli appeared to be threatened. In 
answer to journalist's questions, Markpress and Biafran officials abroad could only say 
that they were having 'communication problems with Biafra', but that they had however 
been in touch by telex with Biafra earlier, and confirmed that Uli - the airport was still 
safe. The next morning, in the London Sunday Times] Richard Hall, the last foreign 
journalist to leave Biafra, opened his dramatic account with the terse sentence, 'Biafra is 
dying'. Four days later, after two and a half years of anguished but heroic existence, the 
Republic of Biafra, 'Land of the Rising Sun', was dead.*’
After the Biafran media, principally the radio stations at this time, had performed their last 
duties of transmitting the secession of violence, it also went dead.^ But despite the fact 
that oral form of propaganda had silenced itself, the other symbols remained - the posters, 
the images, domestic and external would not be easily erased. Nevertheless, Owerri which 
was the heartland of Biafra and it's last stronghold witnessed a mass retreat of Biafran 
soldiers. Many of them were still armed, some were not. Quite a number of them had 
buried their arms on hearing of the cessation of violence on the radio, and simply fled. The 
media governed their lives and actions till the last moment. They ran, they walked, they 
jogged tiredly and helplessly, looking for relatives, friends, family, homes, whatever they 
could find, whatever remained of people, of houses. Some, described as 'artillery', who 
were the heavy gunners during the war were still shell shocked, and virtually visually 
stupefied, and unaware of either themselves or their environment. Mingled amongst them, 
and sometimes following closely behind, were armed Nigerian soldiers, not in combat 
readiness, but with their guns slung over their shoulders. With the Nigerian soldiers were 
others in bluish uniforms who the Easterners learned were peace and surrender monitoring
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troops from the OAU - the only ones the Nigerian government was at last willing to 
tolerate and accommodate. The Federal government had always maintained that it would 
allow a monitoring team only to oversee Biafra's surrender. These were the memories and 
images that would not go away. The others that have not gone away are the bullet ridden 
houses, some of which have been preserved as they are, for posterity, the numerous war- 
maimed-tumed-beggars, the bunkers of the Radio Biafra, the songs, the poems, the 
currency, the stamps, the insignia and coat of arms, the National Anthem of Biafra.
Radio Nigeria, the Nigerian Television, and Nigerian print media re-took the initiative. 
Pronouncements were made about the team to travel to the Biafran heartland, led by 
General Olufemi Obasanjo, to pick up General Effiong and his officials to Lagos for the 
surrender ceremony. Time and dates were announced. Everything went like clockwork. It 
is important to note that none of the Biafran stations were ever captured by the Nigerian 
soldiers, nor was Uli, the Biafran airport, ever captured. Gowon painstakingly ensured 
that the press, domestic and international, was heavily represented at the surrender 
ceremony in Lagos. It was extensively covered. The greatest, and the most enduring sight 
was seeing Gowon, Effiong, and members of both teams, all embracing each other - in a
n
truly African tradition - thus setting up an unprecedented reconciliation process.
6.2. The Effect.
On 28th April 1968, William Norris wrote in the Sunday Times:
'I have seen things in Biafra this week which no man should have to see Sights 
to scorch the mind and sicken the conscience. I have seen children roasted 
alive, young girls torn in two by shrapnel, pregnant women eviscerated, and 
old men blown to fragments. I have seen these things, and I have seen their 
cause: high flying Russian Illyusian jets operated by Federal Nigeria, dropping 
their bombs on civilian centres throughout Biafra'.
A commentator on the Biafran war, Arthur Nwankwo wrote in a book published in 1969,
in the thick of the war:
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The extended family, that resilient traditional umbrella in whose 
comfortable and protecting shade the Biafran always finds a welcome 
place in times of need is useless today. The umbrella itself has been 
tom to pieces by the invading Nigerian forces. Makeshift refugee 
camps are set up in every available space (which is rare).
After my first visit to a camp I couldn’t sleep for two days... It was 
terrible enough to live from hand to mouth, not sure of the next meal; 
to think of such things as electric lights, gas, stoves, fans, air 
conditioners, milk, ice cream, cake, beer, tinned food, soft drinks and 
anything that savoured of twentieth century civilisation (except, of 
course, guns, bombs and modem instruments of destmction) is to think 
of luxuries of far remote times'.
He continues:
My first visit to the refugee camp was not planned. I ran across an old 
school mate whom I hadn't seen for years. He was an administrative 
officer -in-charge of one of the camps. He invited me for a weekend 
and I went. The camp was in what used to be an elementary school 
compound. (Education is also a thing of the past world in embattled 
Biafra). My friend graduated from a Nigerian University and shared a 
room with a co-worker also a graduate of the same University. The 
first thing my host did was to take me round the camp. It was a 
nightmarish affair. The refugees clustered in groups (family groups, 
probably) and gazed listlessly at us as we passed. Of course they 
were human skeletons. There were hundreds of children, with swollen 
tummies and legs, large skully heads, withered chests, pleated and 
sallow skins, yellowish hairs, flattened buttocks and sunken pale eyes'.^
The reason for reproducing this in full is to elicit the full effect of the war, despite the
positive propaganda on both sides of the divide. It gives credence to the adage that 'when
the elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers'. There were two wars - the military, and the
propaganda. As already stated, Nigeria won the one, and Biafra the other, but both were
fought intensely. But, it is necessary to stop and think of the effect both their wars had on
the civilian population of Nigeria and Biafra. Arthur Nwankwo was an Ibo, from Biafra,
who was studying in the United States. After several attempts to reach home during the
war, he finally succeeded, travelling through Lisbon, South Africa, and on to Biafra, in a
manner that has never been sufficiently explained. However, if his writing, reproduced
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above, is juxtaposed with that of William Norris, also reproduced above, there is no doubt 
about the physical effect of the war on the Biafran population. The two writings are self 
explanatory. They paint a picture and summarise a tiny portion of an essay on the total 
mental and physical suffering of the Biafran population. Yet, Biafran propaganda had kept 
them going. It kept them believing in Biafra. If, at the time in 1969, any of those people in 
the refugee camps were tempted to flee to Nigeria, they would have spumed the idea.
They were conditioned by a process of both coercive and manipulative persuasion to think 
that way. They were scared of the unknown. What they knew was what they had and saw 
in front of them. The alternative, they were made to believe, was worse than death. And 
indeed they did believe it.
Air raids, for instance had the effect (after so many of them) of bringing out propaganda 
songs from the affected areas. These songs were either orchestrated, planted, taught, 
and/or started off by members of *60??'. This was an elite group trained in the manner of 
the British 'SAS'. They never wore uniforms. Their task to was defend Biafra with their 
lives, if necessary. They mingled with the domestic crowds, and rooted out 'suspected 
saboteurs'. They crossed enemy lines and carried out kamikaze type assignments. Within 
the Biafran population, 'BOFF was given different interpretations. Some people thought it 
meant Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters, others believed it was Biafran Offensive 
Forces. Every indication is that the former is more accurate. As 'BOFF' was more or less 
elusive, secretive, and elitist, it was difficult to discover what it meant, what it was, and 
what it did. One typical song that most of the population were taught, including children - 
and which would echo round the camps immediately after air raids went thus:
'We are Biaffans 
Fighting for survival,
By the name of Jesus 
We shall conquer.
They may bomb us 
Killing all our children,
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But by the name of Jesus 
We shall conquer'.
It was one of many. The other regular one in that sort of circumstance was; 'Anyi ge nwe 
mmeli', meaning, 'we shall overcome'. This was also sung soon after heavy shelling by the 
Nigerian forces. The Biafran media also made a point of incorporating these songs, 
poems and wise sayings into their different broadcasts, programmes, and write-ups. The 
effect of each air raid intensified the belief of the people that their survival lay in resisting 
to the bitter end. Biafra had learned, as Goebbels had taught in Germany, to turn disasters 
into drama, poetry, and music - thus affecting people's psychological leanings, beliefs, and 
loyalties. The strength of this loyalty lay in maintaining the propaganda momentum, 
without giving the mass populace time and space to think or question the rationale or 
effect of the 'brainwashing'. The policy section of the propaganda directorate worked 
round the clock, studying other examples in particular circumstances, producing reactions 
and response, advising, commissioning songs, drama, dance, and all sorts of diversions 
and entertainment. Punch lines and one liners were constantly produced to catch the ear or 
eye, and therefore the sentiments of the populace, Biafran musicians like Nwokolobia 
Agu, Miki Nzewi, and Sam Ojukwu were kept very busy writing, composing, producing 
and entertaining. Dramatists like John Ekwere, Okokon Ndem, Ralph Opara, Ezenta Eze, 
and Paddy Davies were kept very busy writing, producing and acting. So were the poets, 
the numerous University dons who had flocked back to Biafra from different parts of the 
country. There was an abundance of artistic input. On the other hand, the Nigerian 
populace was perplexed at the resilience of Biaffans. They lived more in fear of Biaffa's 
success. When during the initial stages of the war, the Biaffans bombed Lagos, the 
teaming capital of Nigeria emptied within minutes, with people in flowing robes scuttling 
in all sorts of transport back to their villages. Biaffa, however could not keep this up 
because of the inadequacy of its air force. Ironically therefore, Nigerians were more 
frightened, than they need have been. Biafra and Biafran success, sometimes virtually
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existed only on radio. So, despite the fact that the bulk of Nigeria was relatively 
untouched by the physical and military war, they were grossly affected psychologically by 
the propaganda war. Conversely, to quote Arthur Nwankwo again;
'The psychological effect of this war on the total Biafran population has been 
most profound, though this is hardly recognised. The knowledge that one 
stands a very good chance of being dead the next minute is a rather exacting 
strain. One moment you are chatting with a neighbour, a friend or a brother.
The next moment a bomber swoops into the town, there is an explosion and he 
is dead. It could have been you. And there is no knowing that it won't be your 
turn next. When a bomber arrives, my younger brother always says, "say your 
last prayer, which may not be your last". He does it jovially; but how profound 
it is!'10
Propaganda or not, the fact is that this avidly describes the true situation in Biafra. This is 
clearly an element of positive propaganda, demonstrating that the underdog need not lie.
3.The Lessons.
In the course of this research, certain important questions have arisen, which fall 
into the context of this section. These included:
(1.) How was it that the Biafran war, received greater publicity and world attention than 
other civil wars, that were raging at the time, and had gone on for longer periods than the 
Biafran war?
(2.) What were the lessons for Africa?
3.) What were the lessons for Nigeria?
The answers to these questions provide the backdrop for this section: (1). The answer to 
the first question is all embracing. It involves the attitude of States and International 
Institutions at a particular time in history. It involves their reactions to secession and 
disintegration,, to rebellion and threats to the modem State. The effect of propaganda on 
these is implicit. Propaganda helped to shape public opinion in the respective external 
constituencies that had to deal or react to the warring parties, therefore affecting the 
course of their foreign policies towards them. If the examples of Britain, America, France,
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and the Soviet Union, ^  are re-examined, it may be discovered that even though Britain, 
for instance, had stood firm behind Nigeria at the official and governmental level, public 
opinion was behind Biafra. This is not only because Biafran propaganda said so, but also 
because of the uproar that arose out of the debates in Parliament on the crisis. It is also 
borne out of the multifarious humanitarian activities that emanated from Britain in support 
of Biafra. As time went on, the Biafran attitude was almost exactly like that of the 
Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s - keep holding on, and keep repeating your propaganda 
often enough, and the tide turns in your favour. Most Biaffans still believe even now that 
the weight of public opinion would have swayed the British Government attitude towards 
Biafra, if the war had not ended when it did. This will never be proven.
10As argued earlier, the case of America was slightly different. The Biafran media 
believed that the American public had been convinced of Biaffa's right to self 
determination. ^  The attitude of Biafran propaganda operators was a bit fuzzy at first. 
Generally, they maintained an attitude of not antagonising the external publics, even when 
they felt that they were being hard done by. Rather, they made a point of caricaturing 
Gowon and his leadership before the world. It was more or less a matter of positive 
propaganda in putting across the Biafran cause, and negative propaganda in attempting to 
destroy the reasons put forward by Nigeria for attacking Biafra. The watershed for Britain 
and America however came with the pictures of starving Biafran children, women and 
men on media around the world. ^  Richard Nixon's pre-election statements condemning 
the genocide, discussed in chapter 5, put Lyndon Johnson's government in difficulty. 
Hitherto, America was minded to go along with British policy towards Nigeria, as Britain 
was the former colonial master. The election of Nixon as President, and his instant 
reaction of setting up the emergency task force for Biafra met with a lot of praise and 
jubilation on the Biafran media. Nigeria, not surprisingly thought this was an unnecessary
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interference in Nigeria's internal affairs. Biafra even ventured to think that America might 
recognise Biafra.
It is impossible to say whether any propaganda affected the Soviet Union in it's attitude to 
the crisis. It is fair to argue, as demonstrated earlier, ^  that the Soviets were mainly 
interested in arms sales. It would appear that if Colonel Krubo, whom the Biaffans sent as 
Ambassador to Moscow had not defected to the Nigerian side, the Soviets would have 
backed Biafra. This is a matter of conjecture. Also, it is worth noting that utterances from 
the Soviet authorities and media were not supportive of rebellion, disintegration, 
secession, or separation. They were mindful at the time of their own tribal and ethnic 
problems. The unique lesson and consequence of all this was that the Biafran war became 
the first time since the second world war that America, initially, Britain, and the Soviet 
Union were more or less on the same side. The case of France seems a little more 
complicated. It was the only major country that supported Biafra, all be it covertly at first. 
Earlier arguments have demonstrated that France was affected by the potential of Nigeria 
on the African continent - it being an Anglophone colossus. It has also been shown that it 
was swayed by the attitude towards Biafra of the Francophone African countries, 
particularly the Ivory Coast and Gabon. It may be fair to argue therefore that 
complementarity, Biafran propaganda, 'via' the same route of Francophone African 
countries, affected French actions and decisions. Since Ivory Coast in particular was 
persuaded to recognise Biafra, and held a sway of respected opinion with the Gaullist 
Government, it seems likely that the French were also persuaded by this means.
Apart from contributing a member of the observer team to Nigeria, and U. Thant 
attending the OAU meetings, on the Nigerian civil war as an observer, the UN was very 
much on the periphery of the conflict. The Secretariat did however, eventually, ask the 
OAU to try to settle the conflict.
This was at a time in history when non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member 
State was sacrosanct. Nigeria sent a delegation to the General Assembly to make sure that
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this was upheld. Biafra attempted to join, and was never allowed to see day light. Any 
attempts, in any case would have been blocked by Britain. It was only after Nixon's 
assumption of office, that he threatened to raise the matter of genocide at the security 
council. ^  Biafra hailed this. Nigeria reacted angrily. All this meant that Biafran problems 
were acted out on the world stage, and on the world media. This brought the matter to the 
fore of world opinion, but somehow in the act, overshadowing the other preceding and 
existing domestic conflicts around the world. It was a clear lesson of the success of a well 
organised propaganda. It can also be said that since about eighty percent of the world 
media is controlled by the English speaking media, the coverage in Britain and America 
given to the conflict, had an immense bearing on this aspect of the propaganda outcome 
o f events.
2. The success of organised propaganda transmitted to the reaction of African countries 
and the OAU. The OAU in its Charter maintains the sanctity of States. It upholds very 
strictly the non-interference principle in the domestic affairs of member States. It has 
reason to.
The very nature of the African Continent is that of a continent consisting of States with 
multifarious ethnic backgrounds, religions, language, and dialectical diversities, with all 
the attendant problems. Therefore, member States were careful not to 'upset the apple 
cart'.
All this created a problem for Biafran propaganda. If it played the ethnic card, the States
would shy away more from supporting it for fear of awakening internal problems at home
- fear of the domino effect. If it played the religious card, then it stood the chance of
17alienating Muslim States, particularly those of North Africa, as has been seen. So, 
Biafra tried them all, before it struck on the note of hunger, and starving children, women, 
and the elderly. The card of pogrom, and genocide was always there as the safety net 
when there was a lull, for Biafra to dip into. This thrust into the starvation, pogrom, and 
genocide propaganda emboldened the so called 'radical' States 18 like Tanzania, Zambia,
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Gabon, and the Ivory Coast, to press ahead and recognise Biafra, to the chagrin of 
Nigeria. Again, this was a first - an unprecedented step - the recognition of a secessionist 
entity. Comparisons of the Biafran situation with the Katanga situation were made by the 
Muslim North African States, which were dismissed by Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, 
and Kaunda of Zambia. This further demonstrated the power of Biafran propaganda. It 
showed that with properly organised propaganda, most things were possible in war. 
Nigeria was content to sit back and play the non-interference card - a rather negative 
propaganda ploy, in short, propaganda of omission.
3. In the Nigerian context, the lessons were numerous. Whether the Nigerian people have 
learned from them or not is another matter. Two cardinal points deserve mention. These 
are; the problem of ethnicity and tribalism; and the matter of the effective use of the media 
to achieve optimum results. Biafra created many 'firsts', amongst which were:
( 1) the first secessionist territory to be recognised internationally, during a civil war. ^  
Certainly, on the African continent, this fact is undisputable. Elsewhere, research has not 
revealed any evidence to the contrary. Buchheit, for instance, describes Biafra as a 
'precedent' in the study of secession in international law. But does not answer this 
particular point either way.
(2) the first entity to institutionalise propaganda in a civil war situation, by creating the 
Directorate of Propaganda: and the second in the world to set it up at all since Hitler's 
Germany in the second world w a r.^
(3) the first ever situation where starvation became the all conquering propaganda
21weapon. 1
(4) the first crisis since the second world war that initially at least, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and Britain supported the same side.
All these were not only lessons for Nigeria, Africa, but also for the world. These and 
other matters already discussed all happened because of effective manipulation of 
information. It was a question of the messenger discovering what was most suited to its
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target audience, and directing the message appropriately. It was the utmost effective use
of both coercive and manipulative persuasion. Biafran intellectuals who made up the
Propaganda Directorate had studied carefully the propaganda tactics of Hitler, Goebbels,
and Mao Tse tu n g .^  They had also studied the effect of'psyche war', the exploits of the
91French 'Enlightenment', modified, modernised, and converted them to suit their own
situations - their needs and commitments. It is therefore right to argue that here, a process
94of migration and mutation, imitation and replication had ensued.
95Nigeria was slow to catch up, and never really did catch up. Ojukwu stated this in an
interview in 1993. He was however more interested in talking about Nigeria at present, as
he was one of the Presidential aspirants at the time. He nevertheless indicated that present
events in Nigeria have vindicated 'the stand we have always maintained', that it is suicidal
for any one group in Nigeria to dream of subjugating the others. He said the East had its
share of conflict, and was not prepared to assist any one else to resolve their problems. He
said: 'it is now our turn to sit and watch by the side lines. He maintained that those asking
for civil war in Nigeria now, are doing so because they have had no experience of civil
wars, and so don't understand the repercussions. He paid glowing tribute to all those who
were involved with Biafran propaganda, 'for giving their all to keep us going'. But,
according to him, all that is in the past. 'We did what we were called upon to do, and
now, we must move on, look forward'. He warned Nigerians against calling for civil war,
and maintained that he was better placed than any Nigerian to understand that. He blamed
the press in Lagos for always wanting to fan up trouble.
The symbols are still there - the songs, the poems, the scars.
The Biafra experience, coming at the time that it did, was a clear, and undoubted
demonstration to Nigeria, Africa, the World, that ethnicity remained an immanent
96potentially explosive, and exploitative propaganda weapon, and still remains the 
greatest threat to the modem state. General Gowon stated this in April 1993, in a 
discussion. He said that his main aim has always been to keep Nigeria united without
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mentioning any particular ethnic groups, he maintained that the reason for dividing up the 
country was to satisfy the yearnings of the minorities and eliminate conflict. But, 
according to him, this does not appear to have 'cured the cancer'. Almost in the same vein 
as Ojukwu, he warned against 'those who want to mislead the Nigerian youth of today to 
start trouble'.
He said: don't be misled, don't be deceived. And, as if in echo, he repeated exactly what 
Ojukjwu had said a few months earlier, that Nigeria was mightier than any one man. He 
remained very hopeful where Nigeria was concerned. He said 'it would be to your credit 
for your supervisors to know you have interviewed me'. He stated: my motto has always 
been - to keep Nigeria one, is a task that must be done'.
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THE BIAFRAN NATIONAL ANTHEM
Land o f ike Rising Sim
Land of the rising sun, we love and cherish,
Beloved homeland of our brave heroes;
We must defend our lives or we shall perish,
We shall protect our hearths from all our foes;
But if the price is death for all we hold dear,
Then let us die without a shred of fear.
Kail to Biafra, consecrated nation,
Oh fatherland, this be our solemn pledge:
Defending thee shall be a dedication,
Spilling our blood we’ll count a privilege;
The waving standard which emboldens the free 
Snail always be our Sag of liberty.
We snail emerge triumphant from this ordeal,
And through the crucible unscathed we’ll pass;
When we are poiscu the wounds of battle to heal, 
We shall remember those who died in mass;
Then shall our trumpets peal the glorious song 
Of victory we scored o’er might and wrong.
Oh God, protect us from me hidden pitfall,
Guide ail our movements lest we go astray;
Give us the strength to heed the humanist call:
‘To give and not to count the cost*, each day;
Bless those who rule to serve with resoluteness,
To make this clime a land of righteousness.
N n a m d i AZZKIW2
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ABURI ACCORD
1. In order to follow clearly the immediate political development preceding the civil 
war, it is necessary to understand the salient points agreed to at the Aburi meeting 
by the Nigerian Military leaders. The meeting lasted for two days -4th and 5th 
January 1967. Here, with courtesy, the summary of conclusions reached on the 
various subjects considered at the meeting is reproduced.
O p en in g:
2. The Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council, Lt-General J.A. Ankrah 
declaring the meeting open, welcomed the visitors to Ghana and expressed delight 
that Ghana had been agreed upon by the Nigerian Military leaders as the venue for 
this crucial meeting. He considered the whole matter to be the domestic affairs of 
Nigeria and as such, he refrained from dwelling on any specific points. The 
General, however, expressed the belief that the Nigerian problems were not such 
that cannot be easily resolved through patience, understanding and mutual respect. 
Throughout history, he said, there has been no failure of military statesmen and the 
eyes of the whole world were on the Nigerian Army. He advised that soldiers arc 
purely statesmen and not politicians and the Nigerian Military leaders owe it as a 
responsibility to the 56 million people of Nigeria to successfully carry through 
their task of nation-buiiding. Concluding, the General urged the Nigerian leaders to 
bury their differences, forget the past and discuss their matter frankly but patiently.
3. Lt-Coi. Gowon invited the Nigerian leaders to say a "joint thank you" to their 
host, and all said thank you in unison in response to Lt-General Ankrah’s address.
At this point the General vacated the Conference table.
Im portation of Arms & Resolution Renouncing the Use of Force:
4. Lt-Col. Ojukwu spoke next. He said that the Agenda was acceptable to him subject 
to the comments he had made on some of the items. Lt-Col. Ojukwu said that no 
useful purpose would be served by using the meeting as a cover for arms build-up 
and accused the Federal Military Government of having engaged in large scale arms 
deals by sending Major Apolo to negotiate for arms abroad. He alleged that the 
Federal Military Government recently paid £ lm  for some arms bought from Italy 
and now stored up in Kaduna. Lt-Col. Ojukwu was reminded by the Military 
Governor, North and other members that the East was included in an arms build-up 
and that the plane carrying arms which recently crashed on the Carmeroons border 
was destined for Enugu. Lt-Col. Ojukwu denied both allegations. Concluding his 
remarks on arms build-up, Lt-Col. Ojukwu proposed that if the meeting was to 
make any progress, all the members must at the outset adopt a resolution to 
renounce the use of force in the settlement of the Nigerin dispute.
5. Lt-Col. Gowon explained that as a former Chief of Staff, Army he was aware of the 
deficiency in the country’s arms and ammunition which needed replacement. Since 
the Defence Industries Corporation could not produce these, the only choice was to 
order from overseas and order was accordingly placed to the tunc of £3/4m. He said 
to the best of his knowledge, the actual amount that had been paid out was only 
£80,000 for which he signed a cheque on behalf of the General Officer 
Commanding The £80m about which so much noise has been made was nothing but 
a typographical error in the Customs in recording the payment of £80,000. As to 
why these arms were sent up to the North, Lt-Col. Gowon referred to lack of 
storage facilites in Lagos and reminded his Military Colleagues of the number of 
times arms and ammunition had been dumped in the sea. This was why, he said, it 
became necessary to use the better storage facilities in Kaduna. The arms and
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ammunition had not been distributed because they arrived only two weeks 
previously and have not yet been taken on charge. After exhaustive discussion to 
which all members contributed and during which Lt-Col. Ejoor pointed out that it 
would be necessary to determine what arms and ammunition had arrived and what 
each unit of the Army had before any further distribution would take place, the 
Supreme Military Council unanimously adopted a Declaration proposed by Lt-Col. 
Ojukwu, that all members:
(a) renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis;
(b) Reaffirm their faith in discussions and negotiation as the only peaceful way of 
resolving the Nigerian crisis; and
(c) agree to exchange information on the quantity of arms and ammunition 
available in each unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated 
stores, and to share out such arms equitably to the various Commands;
(d) agree that there should be no more importation of arms and ammunition until 
normalcy was restored.
R eorganisation of the Army:
6. The Supreme Military Council, having acknowledged the fact that the series of 
disturbances since January 15, 1966, have caused disunity in the Army resulting in 
lack of discipline and loss of public confidence, turned their attention to the 
question of how best the Army should be re-organised in order to restore that 
discipline and confidence. There was a lengthy discussion of the subject and when 
the arguments became involved members retired into secret session. On their return 
they announced that agreement had been reached by them on the re-organisation, 
administration and control of the army on the following lines:-
(a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be 
known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal 
Military Government.
(b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from 
the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.
(c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the 
charge of Area Commanders.
(d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive 
posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme 
Military Council.
(e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will have 
control over Area Commands for internal security.
(f) Creation of a Lagos Garison including Ikeja Barracks.
7. In connection with the re-organisation of the Army, the Council discussed the 
distribution of Military Personnel with particular reference to the present 
recruitment drive. The view was held that general recruitment throughout the 
country in the present situation would cause great imbalance in the distribution of 
soldiers. After a lengthy discussion of the subject, the Council agreed to set up a 
Military Committee, on which each Region will be represented, to prepare 
statistics which will show:
(a) Present strength of the Nigerian Army;
(b) Deficiency in each sector of each unit;
(c) The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;
(d) Additional requirement for the country and each Area Command.
The Committee is to meet and report to Council within two weeks from the date of 
receipt of instructions.
8. The Council agreed that pending completion of the exercise in paragraph 7 further 
recruitment of soldiers should cease.
9. In respect of the organisation of the Nigerian Army, implementation of the 
agreement reached on August 9, 1966, it was agreed after a lengthy discussion,
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that ii was necessary for the agreement reached on August 9th by the delegates of 
the Regional Governments to be fully implemented. In particular, it was accepted 
in principle that army personnel of Northern origin would return to the North from 
the West. It was therefore fell that a crash programme of recruitment and training, 
the details of which would be further examined after the Committee to look into the 
strength and distribution of army personnel had reported, would be necessary to 
constitute indigenous army personnel in the West to a majority there quickly.
Non-Recognition by the East of Lt-Col. Gowon 
As Supreme Commander:
10. The question of the non-recognition by the East of Lt-Col. Gowon as Supreme 
Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government was also exhaustively 
discussed. Lt-Col. Ojukwu based his objection on the fact, inter alia, that no one 
can properly assume the position of Supreme Commander uniil the whereabout of 
the former Supreme Commander, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, was known. He 
therefore asked that the country be informed of the whereabout of the Major- 
General and added that in his view, it was impossible, in the present circumstances, 
for any one person to assume any effective central command of the Nigerian Army. 
Lt-Col. Ejoor enunciated four principles to guide the meeting in formulating an 
answer to the question of who should be Supreme Commander. These were the:
(a) Problem of effective leadership;
(b) Crisis of confidence in the Army;
(c) Disruption in the present chain of Command;
(d) Inability of any soldier to serve effectively in any unit anywhere in the
Lt-Col. Gowon replied that he was quite prepared to make an announcement on the 
matter and regretted that a formal announcement had been delayed for so long but 
the delay was originally intended to allow lime for tempers to cool down. He 
reminded his colleagues that they already had the information in confidence. After 
further discussion and following the insistence by Lt-Col. Ojukwu that Lt-Col. 
Gowon should inform members o f what happened to the former Supreme 
Commander, members retired into secret session and subsequently returned to 
continue with the meeting after having reached agreement among themselves.
11. At this point, the meeting adjourned until Thursday Sth January.
The Powers of the Federal M ilitary Government,
V is-A -V is the R egional G overnm ents:
12. When the meeting resumed on Sth January, it proceeded to consider the form of 
Government best suited to Nigeria in view of what the country has experienced in 
the past year (1966). Members agreed that the legislative and executive authority 
of the Federal Military Government should remair. in the Supreme Military Council 
to which any decision affecting the whole country shall be referred for 
determination provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the 
matter requiring determination must be referred to Military Governors for their 
comment and concurrence. Specifically, the Council agreed that appointments to 
senior ranks in the Police, Diplomatic and Consular Services as well as 
appointments to superscale posts in the Federal Civil Service and the equivalent 
posts in Statutory Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military 
Council. The Regional members felt that all the Decrees or positions of Decrees 
passed since 15th January. 1966 and which detracted from the previous powers and 
positions of Regional Governments should be repealed if mutual confidence is to 
be restored.
After this issue had been discussed at some length the Council took the following 
decisions:-
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The Council decided that:
(i) On the reorganisation of the Army:
(a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman 
to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the , 
Federal Military Government. *
(b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation 
from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff. (
(c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under 
the charge of Area Commanders.
(d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top 
executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the 
Supreme Military Council.
(e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will 
have control over Area Commands for internal security.
(0 Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks.
(ii) On appointment to certain posts:
The following appointment must be approved by the Supreme Military 
Council:-
(a) Diplomatic and Consular posts.
(b) Senior Posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.
(c) Super-scale Federal Civil service and Federal Corporation posts.
(iii) On the functioning of the Supreme Military Council: Any decision affecting 
the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military council. Where 
a meeting is not possible such a matter must be referred to Military Governors 
for comment and concurrence.
(iv) That all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on the 14th 
of January and list out all the Decrees and provisions of Decrees- concerned so 
that they may be repealed no; later than 21st January if possible.
(v) That for at least the next six months, there should be purely a Military 
Government, having nothing to do whatever with politicians.
Soldiers Involved In Disturbances on 
15th January, 1966 und Thereafter:
13. Members expressed views about the future of those who have been detained in 
connection with all the disturbances since 15th January, 1966 and agreed that the 
fate of soldiers in detention should be determined not later than end of January,
1967.
Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference:
14. The Council next considered the question of the resumption of the Ad Hoc 
Constitutional Committee and the acceptance of that Committee's recommendations of 
September, 1966. After some exchange of views, it was agreed that the Ad Hoc 
Committee should resume silting as soon as practical to begin from where they left off, 
and drat the question of accepting the unanimous recommendations of September, 1966 
be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Milita^r Council.
The Problems of Displaced Persons:
15. The Council considered exhaustively the problems of displaced persons, with 
particular reference to their rehabilitation, employment and property. The view was 
expressed and generally accepted that the Federal Government ought to take the 
lead in establishing a National Body which will be responsible for raising and 
making appeal for funds. Lt-Col. Ojukwu made the point, which was accepted by 
Lt-Cwi. Kalsina, that in the present situation, the interminingling of Easterners and
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Northerners was not feasible. After each Military Governor had discussed these 
problems as they affected his area, the Council agreed.
(a) On rehabilitation, the Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting 
within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each Region should 
send three representatives to the meeting.
(b) On employment and recovery of porpcrty, that civil servants and Corporation 
staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should 
continue to be paid their full salaries until 31st March, 1967 provided they 
have not got alternative employment, and that the Military Governors of the 
East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) 
to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by 
displaced persons. Lt-Col. Ejoor disclosed that the employment situation in 
his Region was so actule that he had no alternative but to ask non-Mid- 
Westemers working in the private sector in his Region to quit and make room 
for Mid-Westerners repatriated from elsewhere. Lt-Col. Ojukwu staled that he 
fully appreciated the problem faced by both the Military Governor, West, and 
the Military Governor, Mid-West, in this matter and that if in the last resort, 
cither of them had to send the Easterners concerned back to the East, he would 
understand, much as the action would further complicate the resettlement 
problem in the East. He .assured the Council that his order that non-Easterriers 
should leave the Eastern Region would be kept under constant review with a 
view to its being lifted as soon as practicable.
16. On the question of future meetings of the Supreme Military Council, members 
agreed that future meetings will be neid in Nigeria at a venue to be mutually agreed.
17. On the question of Government information media, the Council agreed that all 
Government information media should be restrained from making inflammatory 
statements and causing embarrassment to various Governments in the Federation.
18. There were other matters not on the Agenda which were also considered among 
which were the form of Government for Nigeria (reported in paragraph 12 above) 
and the disruption of the country’s economy by the lack of movement of rail and 
road transport which the Regional Governors agreed to look into.
19. The meeting began and ended in a most cordial atmosphere and members 
unanimously issued a second and final Communique.
20. In his closing remarks the Chi arm an of the Ghana National Liberation Council 
expressed his pleasure at the successful outcome of the meeting and commenced the 
decisions taken to the Nigerian leaders for their implementation. Lt-Col. Gowon on 
behalf of his colleagues thanked the Ghanaian leader for the excellent part he had 
played in helping to resolve the issues. The successful outcome of the meeting was 
then toasted with champagne and the Nigerians took leave of the Ghanaians.
21. The proceedings of the meeting were reported verbatim for each Regional 
Government and the Federal Government by their respective official reporters and 
tape-recorded versions were distributed to etch Government.
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G ow on Accused
Of Treason
The Eastern Nigeria Government said 
yesterday that the so-called creation of more 
states by the chief rebel in Lagos, Lt. Col* 
Yakubu Gowon and the declaration of a state 
of emergency in the country cannot apply to 
the East.
The Government state­
ment went on: “A stunned 
country and her friends 
have heard with amaze* 
nient the ominous and disa­
strous announcement of 
Gowon proclaiming him­
self the dictator of Nige­
ria, io what amounts to 
one-man coup d’etat.
By this act, Gowon has 
made May 27, 1967.
the darkest date in the 
history of freedom and res­
pect for human feelings in 
this couuti*).
Gowon. has unc-ivnioni- 
ously dismissed the Supre­
me M ilitary Council, con­
temptuously brushed as'cJe 
the most senior mijitaiy  
officer available in the 
country h\ proclaiming-
himself the Commander. 
in-Chiel of the Armed 
1 o n e s  and Head oi a I c- 
cieral Government that is 
now to consist of himsell 
a lo n e .
t i e  Mas I 'am Siieu '  I i o n i
Dishonesty
Tt is manifestly clear 
that Gowon does not even 
know the politi<;afc-geogra- 
plty of hastenLf.d^eri;-: 
and therefore . Tamioj ex­
pect an\one to" lake *.him 
seriously .
"Besiues, Gowon knows 
that lie cannot enforce any 
oi his decrees in the hast.
“The whole exercise is 
therefore dishonest, co­
wardly and farcical be­
cause it servrs as a cloak 
I or a permanent subjuga­
tion oi the W est.by . the 
North; for it is'clear'that 
ih« declaration of the so- 
C(iHed state of emergency 
is directed principally 
aj;ainst the occupied areas 
of tin- South, nanii'i.'. 
i-agos and Western Nige­
ria.
-W e in the hast knew 
o u r  Ntajid. T h e  p e o p l e  o fi I,*. IT««# - ..............* - - 4 •
Akpo P 
Protest
Akpo
• a la
c o m m u n i t y  in  
D i v i s i o n .  A « k a
An indigenous com­
pany for the manufacture 
of nail and wire was 
opened recently at Port 
Marcourt. Picture s h o v  -
Administrators 
Declare Assets
The tex t of the code of 
conduct subscribed to by 
the newly appointed Biafra 
Provincial Administrators 
appointed on Monday by 
the Military Governor, 
Lt. Col. Odumegwu 
Ojukwu has been publish­
ed.
Under the code of con­
duct approved by the M ili­
tary Governor, the Admi­
nistrators declared all their 
assets showing their landed 
property with the value at 
the time of their assump­
tion of ollice, amount of 
money they have in the 
bank, investments in any 
undertaking and value and 
income from any other 
sources.
The Administrators also 
solemnly swore on oath and 
bound themselves not to 
accept, gifts, decorations, 
gratuities, pensions, salary 
or title from any foreign 
government nor w ill 
they accept gifts, loans 
or other perquisites from 
anv person or source 
with a view  to influencing 
their decisions or actions 
in regard to their public 
duties.
The Administrators a ls ohounH ~ *
Refugee V\ 
Told To F
A ll refugee civil ser­
vants and corporation 
staff, whether already re­
settled or not, have been  
requested by the Biafra 
Republic Rehabilitation. 
Commission to register 
their names with the com­
mission as refugees.
In a statement in Enugu 
yesterday, the commission 
disclosed that of the 30,000 
refugee civil servants and 
corporation staff already
rese 
regi< 
thirt 
have 
conn 
Th 
fore 
servs 
staff 
not t 
with  
refug 
rent whicl
C0 NGRATUU
The Board, ^ ^ a o p m en
*
of the BIAFRA 
CORPORATIOh 
Lt. Col. Chukw 
Miiita.ry Goverm 
of BTAFRA am 
Congratulations c 
great, progressive and industi 
Federation of Nigeria into t 
of peace and abundance unde
Long live the Republic c
v*A
tc
O d i
Den
>ver
ssfu
i VACANC
# Vacancies exist in a progre 
|  young men and girls with the 
& and office work. Annlv in owi
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LT. COL. ODUMEGWU OJUKWU 
ftfctkms the historic declaration
Eastern Nigeria became the independent 
and sovereign State of Biafra early this morn­
ing following a proclamation by Lt. Col. 
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military 
Governor of the new nation-
The Governor's declaration, announcing the pulling 
out of what used to be called the Eastern Region from 
.the Nigerian Federation, was made eorlv ibis morning 
a* a coiourfu' ceirmuuy at S t a v e X n u g u -  >• , 
With the Military Governor were his Advises*; Sir 
Francis Ibiam, senior military personnel, the Chief 
Justice, Sir Louis Mbanefo. the Catholic and Anglican  
Bishops of Enu&u, members of the diplomatic corps and 
high Government officials.
The declaration was later cheered by thousands of 
people who ran out into the streets shouting ‘‘Hail th* 
REPUBLIC of BIAFRA."
The declaration reads:
Fellow countrymen and women. You, the people of
1.astern Nigeria:
* CONSCIOUS of the supreme authority of Alm ightv  
Cr>d over all mankind, of your duty‘to yourselves 
and postentv:
* AWARE that you can no longer be protected in 
your lives and in your property by any govern­
ment based outside Eastern Nigeria;
* BELIEVING that vou are born free and have cer­
ium inalienable rights which can best be preserved 
bv yourselves:
* UNWILLING to be unfree partners in anv asso-
^ o r  r r ? - ,a political or economic nature;
. tne authority of any person or per­
sons other than the Military Government of East-
u:Ti ^ ;gerla t0 make any imposition of whatever Kinj or naiure upon you;
* rDp^  kE? MINED  to  ° issolve a11 political and other 
Vf N ig e r i? 11 y° U the forraer Federal Republic
*  A°v,enter int0 s“ch association, treatv
form e?Federal
* a.nd “ n.Edence in ME:
Odumegwu Ojukwu, Mijitar 
N ig cm . by virtue of the anth 
principles, recited above, do 
that the territory and region I 
crn Nigeria together with h 
territorial waters shall hone? 
sovereign state of the name an 
of BIAFRA '.
AND I DO DECLARE TH, 
<0 aJ1 political ties betwee 
—  _ public of Nigeria are hoi 
(»i) all subsisting contractu: 
by the Government of 
Nigeria or by any perso 
or governm ent acting or 
son. authority, organisat 
on its behalf, with any 
ganisation operating, or 
thing, within the Uepub 
forth be deemed to be e: 
tary Governor of ihe Ref 
behalf of eh?> Gov»mme 
» < p«l»>br .>f ,j t ,„
suojcct to this Declarer: 
parties according to the
(iii) all subsisting internatk 
tions made on behalf of 
Government of the Fee 
shall be honoured and rt
(iv) Eastern Nigeria’s due 3 
teinadonal debts and ot 
the Government of th*; 
ria on behalf of the Fed: 
honoured and respected
(v) steps w ill be taken to 
question of Eastern X 
assets of the Federation 
properties of the citize 
the Federation of Niger
(vi) the rights, privileges, t 
sonnel of the Public Ser
and the Pol ice now serv: 
the Republic of Biafra 
(v;i) we hall keep the dcor'i 
and would welcome, anv 
‘n the former Federate 
other parts of Africa de 
us for the purposes of n 
organisation and for the 
mic ties;
(vii.i) we shall protect the 1 
foreigners residing in B; 
hand of friendship to if 
our sovereignty, and sh; 
in our internal affairs; ' 
U i) we shall faithfully adhe 
Organisation o f African 
N ations Organisation.I \  I 1+ 1 r« ,
ENUGU, Tuesday, May 30, 1967
Every Sunday
Three Pence
1
UMEGWU OJUKWU
; historic declaration
ia became the independent 
e of Biafra early this morn- 
proclamation by Lt. Col. 
umegwu Ojukwu, Military 
ew nation*
claration. announcing the pulling 
e called the Eastern Region from 
>11. was made enrly this jnprning 
■ v at Slave'.Hou6t, irhugu. >• .
Odumegwu Ojukwu, M ilitary Governor lo f Eastern 
Nigeria, by virtue of the authority, and pursuant t<*-the 
principles, recited above, do hereby solemnly proclaim 
that the territory and region known as and called East­
ern Nigeria together with her continental shelf and 
territorial waters shall henceforth be an Independent 
sovereign state of fche name and title of “The REPUBLIC 
of BIAFRA’’.
AND I DO DECLARE THAT —
(i) all political ties between Us and the Federal'Re- 
public of Nigeria are hereby totally dissojyel: 
all subsisting contractual obligations entered into 
by the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria or by any person, authority, orgahiiation 
or government acting on its behalf, w ithjm j per­
son. authority, organisation or govem m eft acting 
on its behalf, with any person, authorly or or­
ganisation operating, or relating to anv ifatter of 
thing, within the Republic of Biafra, shffl hence­
forth be deemed to be entered into with pie Mili­
tary Governor of the Republic of Biafia f(f and on 
behalf of the Government and people cf * Vf •; piibfiir-.rf BIVi's.' the*
AN EDITORIAL
W E SALUTE BIAFRA
(«i) A NEW NATION came into being today. By the grace of God and the  
will of the progressive people of these  
parts, it is the Republic of Biafra. A 
free, independent and sovereign State, 
it covers the whole of the area until 
yesterday known as Eastern Nigeria.
C o n ceiv ed  tin  freedom and  in sp ired  b v \  
♦ He o f a. pec p ie  to
precedented pogrom have shown neither 
remorse nor regret, and hove in fact 
conducted them selves most arrogantly 
and contemptuously, leaving no one in 
any doubt that given another opport­
unity they would gladly repeat the per­
formance.
, T h p re  w a s  n o  J o v b l i  ; ib slr
;ihe  iJinr o f  I’k  en em y  The .
4 BIAFRA SUN Tuesdt
BIRTH OF REPUB
OF BIAFRAFollowing- is text of the Proclama­tion made by the Governor, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu declaring the for­mer Eastern Nigeria the REPUBLIC of BIAFRA:
It is right and just that we of this genera­
tion of Eastern Nigeria, should record for the 
benefit of posterity, some of the reasons for 
the momentous decision we have taken at this 
crucial tim e in the history of our people.
The M ilitary Government of Eastern N i­
geria has, in a series of publications, traced the 
evils and injustices of the Nigerian political 
association through the decades, stating also 
the case and standpoint of Eastern Nigeria in  
the recent crisis.
Throughout the period of 
Nigeria’s precarious exist­
ence as a single political 
entity Eastern Nigerians 
have always believed in 
fundamental human rights 
and principles as they are 
accepted and enjoyed in 
civilized communities Im­
pelled by their belief in 
these rights and principles 
and in their common citi­
zenship with other N ige­
rians after Amalgamation,
Eastern Nigerians employ­
ed their ideas and skills, 
their resourcefulness and 
dynamism in the develop­
ment of areas of Nigeria 
outside the East.
Eastern Nigerians open­
ed up avenues of trade and 
industry throughout the 
country: overlooked the
neglect of their homeland 
i n  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  n a t i o n -
East’s Stand
which it purported to gua­
rantee for the citizens. 
Thus were sown, by design 
or by default, the sees of 
factionalism and hate, of 
struggle for power at the 
centre, and of the worst 
types of political chicanery 
and abuse of power.
One of two situations 
was bound to result from 
that arrangem ent: eitner 
perpetual nomination of 
the rest of the country by 
the North, not by consent, 
but by force anti fraud, or 
a dissolution of the federat­
ing bond. National inde­
pendence was followed by 
successive crises each lead­
ing to n e a r  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n
in its own way. Complete 
disorder followed. Yet, the 
Federal Government do­
minated by the North 
fiddled.
With the issue and even 
refused to recognise what 
the whole world had known 
namely, that Nigeria was 
on the brink of disaster.
Only the Armed Forces 
remained politically un­
committed and non-parti­
san. Some of their officers 
and men revolted against 
the injustices which were 
perpetrated before their 
very eyes and attempted 
to overthrow the Federal 
Government and Regional 
Government.
In desperation, the M i­
nisters of the Federal G o­
vernment handed over po- 
w-er to the Armed Forces 
under the supreme Com­
mand of Major-General 
J. T U. Aguiyi-Ironsi.
The Military administra­
tion under Major-General 
Aguiyi-Ironsi made the 
first real attempt to unite 
the country and its peo­
ples. The Northerners saw 
in his elForts the possibili­
ty of losing their control 
of the alFuirs of the coun- 
So w hile its leaders
ed by Northerners. They 
were killed in the North, 
in Western Nigeria, in 
Lagos; some Eastern soldi­
ers in detention at Benin 
were forcibly removed 
from prison by Northern 
soldiers and murdered.
At the time of the inci­
dent, millions of Eastern 
Nigerians resided outside 
the Eastland persons from 
other parts of the country 
lived in this Region. While 
Eastern Nigerians who as­
sembled at (Northern air­
ports, railway stations and 
motor parks were set upon 
by Northern  ^poldiers and 
civilians armed with ma­
chine guns, rifles, daggers 
and poisoned j arrows, the 
Army and the Police in 
the East were specifically 
instructed to shoot at sight 
any Eastern Nigerian 
found molesting non-East- 
erners living in the Re­
gion.
Non-Easterners
Bv early October, the 
sight of mutilated refu­
gees, orhpaned children, 
widowed mothers and de­
capitated corpses of E a s t ­
e r n  N i g e r i a n s  a r r v i n i
people of Eastern Nigeria 
to solve the crisis, and of 
the bad faith with which  
these attempts have been 
received.
On August 9, 1966, re­
presentatives of the Mili­
tary Governors meeting 
in Lagos made decision 
for restoring peace and 
for clearing the way for 
constitutional talks, nota­
bly the decision that 
troops be all repatriated 
to their region of origin. 
These decesions were not 
fully  implemented.
On September 12, the 
Ad Hoc Constitutional 
Cotiference consisting of 
delegates representing all 
the Governments of the 
Federation met in Lagos, 
and for three weeks 
sought to discover a form 
of association best suited 
to Nigeria having regard 
to the prevailing circum­
stances and their causes, 
and future possibilities. 
This conference was uni­
laterally dismissed by 
Lieutenant Colonel Go- 
won, the Head of the 
Lagos Government.
I t  h a d  ' c-com e th e n  im ­
p o s s ib le  fo r  t h e  S u p r e m e
the Military Leaders 
agreed at Aburi on what 
the Permanent Secretaries 
correctly interpreted as 
confederation, he unila­
terally rejected the agree, 
ment to which he had vo­
luntarily subscribed. When 
in May 1967, all the South­
ern Military Governor- 
and the Leaders of Though 
of their Regions spoke ot 
in favour of confederatioi 
he dismissed the Suprem 
Military Council and prc 
claimed himsef the Diet? 
tor of Nigeria — an ac 
which, to say the least, j 
treasonable.
Following the pogrom of 
1966, some two million 
Eastern Nigerians have re­
turned from other regions, 
refugees in their own coun­
try. Money was needed 
to care for them — not to 
give them mere relief, but 
to rehabilitate them and, in 
time, restore their outraged 
feelings. The Lagos Go­
vernment was urged to 
give the Eastern Nigeria 
Government its share of 
the statutory revenues. Lt. 
Col. Gowon refused to do 
so in the hope that the
lican
geriai
fully
advic
On 
first 
bly a: 
m itte 
Eldei 
repre 
admii 
and < 
sumrr 
relati 
befori 
was a
foil
1
ooC\c*
kwt
lie
dea
whi
ger:
196
2
gra\ 
sur\ 
Rep 
her< 
pow 
take 
that 
to p 
of £ 
the 
of it 
3
IRTH OF BIAFRA REPUBLIC— Continue*
trativne.division in Eastern  
Nigeria -and ofher sectors 
of the ooa&wumity were 
summoned- ®he delegates 
to the Ad Hoc Constitu­
tional 0otQ<fere«oe glaced  
a full report "before them, 
and fey a resolution dated 
October 7, MSS, the Con- 
sulWiJ*e Assem bly and 
the A d^sory Qppunifctee 
of U&iefs apd Eiders ad­
vised as fnllfews:
“1. Rlafies on record its 
deep gratitude to the 
Eastern Nige*ia Delega­
tion to the constitutional 
conference in Lagas for 
the tfflig^mt and faithful 
way in which, under con­
ditions of severe strain, 
tension a^d fear they car­
ried out the mandate 
ghien tp ffaem by the 
Consuitasive Assem bly and 
tlje and Eiders ofEastern,IsSgoria
2. ENDORSES the stand 
of the Eastern Delegation  
at the Dagos eoostrttttional 
cdnfeceneje.
3. URGES that as an 
interipi measure, a begin­
ning be made to imple­
m ent those aspects of the 
recommendations as relate 
to the Awned Forces at 
least to the extent of re­
turning the®? to their 
Regions of' Origin and vest- 
in g jh e  eperafSonai control 
of the co*tfigents 
in tike x^pective Military Go*<seEJ?or-s.
4. RE-AEF1RMS its  
acceptance of the Report 
ot tne comnwutee on the
gattern of aonstitution for astern Nigeria within the Federation of Migaria and 
the add&iooal suggestions 
proposed by the Graham- 
Dougius constitutional 
committee rajsarding the
prised within such area 
the wishes of each such 
grouping must be 
separately ascertained 
and respected.
(d) The population, area 
and economic resources 
of any new state which 
it is proposed to create 
must be reasonably 
commensurate to the 
enormous functions 
which the states will 
be expected to perform 
under the new consti­
tutional arrangements 
envisaged for Nigeria.
7. In view  of the fact 
that the desire on the part 
of the m inority groups for 
self-determination is the 
m otive force behind the 
demand for the creation 
of more states, and since 
in the context of present- 
day Nigeria minorities 
are defined by reference 
to tribe, AFFIRMS its be­
lief that the best hope for 
a satisfactory solution to 
the problems of Nigeria 
lies in the recognition and 
preservation of the se­
parate identity of the 
various tribal or linguistic 
groupings and their right 
to develop each along its 
own line and at its own 
pace; accordingly RECOM­
MENDS that the creation 
of states throughout Nige­
ria should be on the basis 
of tribal or linguistic 
groupings or mutual con­
sent between the linguis­
tic groupings.
Resolutions
8. --D VISES that, until 
the agreements reached 
by the personal repre­
sentatives of the Military 
Governors on Aueust 8
Observing that, even  
though the decision to ap­
point the Ad Hoc Cons­
titutional Conference was  
a unanimous agreem ent of 
the Governments of the 
Federation, yet, the ad­
journment was made w ith­
out consultation w ith  or 
consent by the Eastern N i­
geria Government;
Having also noted that 
the many acts of bad faith  
on the part of the Gowon  
Government and its inabi­
lity  to fu lfil promises or 
implem ent agreements un­
animously reached;
Finding now that there 
is a plot hatched up by 
certain civil servants and 
other officials w ith the ac­
tive involvem ent of Lt. 
Col. Yakubu Gowon to im- 
cit confidence of the peo- 
pose a constitution and 
certain other measures on 
Nigeria;
Re-affirming the impli- 
of Eastern Nigeria in His 
Excellency, Lt. Col. Odu- 
megwu Ojukwu and as­
suring him of the solidari­
ty of Eastern Nigeria and 
their support and admira­
tion for the w ay he has 
handled the present crisis 
facing Nigeria;
Also assuring His Excel­
lency of the admiration of 
the people of Eastern Nige­
ria in the M ilitary Govern­
ment of Eastern Nigeria  
and their desire for its 
continued administration 
u n t i l  it. has achieved its 
objective of creating a new  
society in Eastern Nigeria; 
WE DO HEREBY RE­
SOLVE that our Military 
Governor be advised as 
follows:
/1 ) T o  take any measure
U. .nncirlorc o r>r.rnnriatp
Nigeia. *'
LASTLY, we assure 
Your Excellency that no 
Eastern Nigerian, whether 
living inside or outside 
this Region has the man­
date or support of the 
people of this Region to 
speak for or represent 
them  UNLESS appointed 
with the recommendation  
and approval of Your Ex­
cellency acting on behalf 
of Eastern Nigeria.
Dated 23rd November, L 
1966. *
(A. IRO AUj ** 
CjbLtt-IKM A N 
JEAST.fc.RiN ... m G E R iA  ,, 
i  A  i  iOiN AS- ; t 
SfcMbi^ iG
Since that date, matters 
had pecom e worse; sanc­
tions nad oeen imposed on 
iiastern  N igeria, warlike 
preparations m aae against 
ner; per isolation was 
com plete. M en ana women 
in tne Region, incensed by 
tne treatm ent meted out 
to them by  an unrepentant 
Lagos ana tne North, call­
ed tor the declaration of 
Eastern N igeria as a so­
vereign independent state.
in  these circumstances, 
the joint m eeting of the 
Consultative Assembly and 
the Advisory Committee 
of Chiefs and Elders was 
reconvened for a clear 
statem ent on the future 
course of action. A fter an 
appraisal of the develop­
m ent in Nigerian crisis 
past and present had been 
presented to the joint ses­
sion, a telegram just re­
ceived from the Lagos Go­
vernment was read. The 
full text is as follows:-
TATIVES OF ALL GO­
VERNMENTS CAN MEET 
WITHOUT FURTHER 
DELAY TO PLAN FOR 
SMOOTH IMPLEMENTA­
TION OF THE POLITI­
CAL AND ADMINISTRA­
TIVE PROGRAMME 
ADOPTED BY ALL YOUR 
COLLEAGUES OF THE 
SUPREME MILITARY 
COUNCIL X  “MOST IM­
MEDIATE”
On the evening of 
Saturday, May 27th, 1967 
the joint session of the 
enlarged Consultative As­
sembly and the Advisory 
Committee of Chiefs and 
Elders, after fu ll delibera- 
toiis, passed a resolution 
the text of which is as 
follows:
“We, the Chiefs, Elders 
and Representatives of 
Eastern Nigeria gathered 
at this Joint Meeting of 
the Advisory Committee 
of Chiefs and Elders and 
the Consultative Assembly 
dd. solemnly declare as 
follows: 
i “Whereas we have been 
id the vanguard of the 
national movement for the 
building of a strong, 
united and prosperous N i­
geria where no man w ill 
be oppressed and have 
devoted our efforts, 
talents and resources to 
this end;
“Whereas we cherish 
certain inalienable human 
rights and state onega­
tions such as the right to 
Jtfmy j’.nd *mu3xjiV 
of happiness; the right to 
acquire, possess and de­
fend property; the provi­
sion of security; and the 
establishment of good and 
just government based on 
the consent of the govern-
ral Government; REPU1
“And whereas the m ay e:
object of government is m ent
the good of  the governed ign un
and the w ill of the people remair
its ultim ate sanction, in anj
NOW, therefore, in con- desiroi
sideration of these and w ith  i
other of facts and injus- o f run
tices, w e, the Chiefs, servici
Elders and Representatives and ft
of all the Twenty Pro- m ent
vinces of Eastern Nigeria, .(d )
assembled in this joint that tl
M eeting of the Advisory BIAF1
Committee of Chiefs and a nier
Elders and the Consults- monw
tive Assembly, at Enusu th e
this 27th day of May 1967, Africa
do hereby solemnly. Unite<
(a) MANDATE His sation
Excellency, Lt. CoL Chu- (e)
kwuemeka Odumegwu the ac
Ojukwu, M ilitary Gover- O
nor of Eastern Nigeria h
to declare at the earliest 
practicable date Eastern 
Nigeria a free, sovere­
ig n .;,and independent p
state , ,by the name and persoi
title of the REPUBLIC busim
OF BIAFRA. natioi
(b) RESOLVE that tory.
the new  Republic of (g)
Biafra shall have the unqu:
full and absolute powers th e 1
of a sovereign state, and of Ef
shall ^establish com- Col.
merce, levy  war, con- Odun
elude peace, enter into assur
diplomatic relations, and serve
carry out, as of right, w ay
other sovereign respon- hand]
sibilities. the c
fo '  SVXECT that the S O  2
1
Biafra Festiv 
Match Fix
if  tlie b lam e vviii no t be
.led s11i«--- ours. Gouou will bear the
.it ion ol lull responsibility while
vs been we, for our part, will do
*nia!s on our duly,
standing. "There are twu im-
amDiuon portant asides which one
; always must make- The first and
n 01 the rather pathetic one is that
!i: lie had after purporting to create
o do this two new statese in the
everyone East he has imposed full
mid h a v e  diplomaic, political and
economic sanctions against 
to have £  astern Nigeria including
s in the even his new states.
.“t. he has " The second is that in
intact by his broadcast Gowon stat-
provinces ed as follows: 
ed by Lt "Faced with this final
ian Kut- choice between action to
n of the save Nigeria and acquies-
of States. e n c e  I have assumed
the Mid- the power of Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed 
‘ purports Forces and Head of the
ree states Federal Military Govern-
st-C'entral ment for a short period
the pre- necessary to carry out ail
ion minus the necessary measures
and the now urgently required.”
“At least Gowon has 
ivers Fro- been able to admit public-
1 Nigeria. ly that up to now there
oja Povin- has been no Commander-
of the 20 in-Chief because none was
tern Nige- appointed following Aburi;
ich cover and that there has been
as. no Federal Military Go-
the other vernment since July last
g minority year because no Head
inang, De- existed,
obo, Uyo “This is exactly what
e included the Military Governor of
»d bast- the East has been saying.
It follow's then that ail 
so-called actions hitherto taken in
comprising the name of a non-exist-
Degema. ent Federal Military Go-
Harcourt vernment have been
s transfer- fraudulent. Every right
ie. Bonnv thinking Nigerian will
Joiniv and condemn Gowon’s present
v Divisions action in subverting all the 
led East- laws and constitution of
Nigeria as treasonable.”
to take immSarat'e action " 
in order to avert further 
trouble.
The petition recalled 
that in September 1963, 
the. then civilian Govern­
m ent of the East, ap-. 
pointed a high-powered 
commission headed by Mr 
Justice J. C. Phil-Ebosie, : 
to inquire into the bloody 
riots which broke out 
between Akpo apd Achina 
communities over a pro­
tracted land dispute.
As. a result of the re­
commendation of the 
Commission, the people* 
of Achina who were held 
largely responsible for. 
the . disturbances were- 
fined a total sum of . 
£11,826: 8s: 9d.
Jailed 12 
Years
Chidiegwu Iheukwumere 
24, wa yesterday at the 
Enugu Chief Magistrate 
Court sentenced to 12 
years’ imprisonment with 
hard labour having been 
found guilty of stealing 
the sum of £4, property 
of Sunday John.
Y O U  I  H L L A O U L
T H A N K S
The Biafra Republic Youth League has 
congratulated the 20 newly appointed Provin­
cial Administrators and called upon them to 
justify the confidence reposed in them by doing 
their duties according to the code of conduct 
set for them.
Iheanacho Also 
Commended
In a statement in Enugu 
yesterday,. the Adm inis­
trator of the League, Mr 
S. K. Udensi, thanked the 
■’M ilitary Governor for the 
appointments and assured 
him that the new  adminis­
trators who are members 
of the League will prove 
that no better choice 
could have been made.
He assured the M ilitary  
Governor of the League’s 
continued loyalty and sup­
port in  his task o f ,'build­
ing a neW nation and pro- 
tecting its people and in­
terests with all their 
m ight and power.
The League has per­
sonally congratulated its 
Executive Preside d ,  Mr.
F. O. Ihenacho cm the ap­
pointment.
Other members of the 
League so appointed are 
Mr S. O. Mgbada; Mr P. K. 
Ndem; and Mr D. Njiribe- 
ako.
In a statem ent yester­
day, the Nsukka Federa­
ted Union congratulated 
Mr Francis Onyeke on his 
appointm ent as Adm inis­
trator o f Nsukka and also 
thanked Lt. Col, Odume­
gwu Ojukwu for the ap­
pointm ent.
Biafra Collects £119,500
A total o f £119,526  
w as collected  as rents on 
State Lands in the Repub* 
lie  o f B iafra by the M inis­
try of Lands and Survey 
during the quarter whiefi 
ended on March 31, this 
year. T his w as contained In 
a quarterly bulletin  of 
the M inistry for March 
1967, ju st published hi 
Enugu
The bulletin said that 
during the quarter under 
review £117,928 was rea­
lised from Stamp Duties, 
I’remium, Survey, Deeds 
and Temporary Occupa­
tion Licence fees- 
It further stated that 
the Biafran M ilitary 
Government paid the 
sum of £64,118. 9/- on 
acquisition of land during
the period and £7,933 10s 
6d was paid as rents on 
private governm ent quar­
ters-
It added that a further 
sum of £57,410 was 
spent on development of 
state lands and Town 
Planning, w hile £480: 8 /-, 
was paid out as refund 
of rents to Voluntary 
Agencies.
O U g U l  i v u i i u ,  i  . O .  u u . v
Phone 2886.
T
—
I S T O C K IS T S  o r
|  Machine Tools, Ruston Engines and Gene- 
k rating Set, Pumps, Hand Tools, Welding 
|  Equipment, F lat Sc Vee Belts, Hoses. Pipes 
►j Sc Pipe Fittings, Ropes, Electrical Acces- 
k sories, Drawing Office Equipment Cotton 
|  Waste. Rags, Polishing Cloth. Bolts Sc 
|  Nuts, Brass, Copper Sheets, etc- etc.
i lr u n c h e s
Okpara Avenue 
P. O. Box 709 
& Phone 2780 
|  Enugu.
18 Owerri Road, 
P. O. Box 782 
Phone 21540 
Port Harcourt.
YOUR WAY TO SSF 2 SUCCESS SYNDIC A 
BOX 261, ABA 
Relax Awhile With SSF 2 
MAGIC FIGURE PUZZLE NO. 19 §
Choose any number 1 —  50, NO FRACTIC <*5
ONCE SO that
£2,000 To be Won
16
each:
Vertical 
Horizontal 
Diagonal 
CLOSING 
2nd June, 1967 
Result 3rd June, 
1967
— 48
— 48
— 48 
DATE
Winning Points, 24,
23, 22, 21 & 20.
4 pts awarded to 
you already 
First entry is 2 /-  
additional is 1 /-  
each
ENTRY PAYMENT:
As a result of difficulties in present Postal Order* 
system, entry payment should be (a) Payment in ADVANCE 
by unit of 5 /- 10/- or £1 Currency Notes ReceiDt is issued 
and “ADVANCE PAYMENT ACCOUNT” opened and 
operated in your name. A ll you do is to stake, Quote your 
A/C No. and despatch Form for correction. When the 
money is finishing, if you like, you can make a further 
advance payment. Your BALANCE is refunded with 
pleasure, any time you ORDER.
(b) OPEN POSTAL ORDERS if available.
ATTEMPTS over 100 entries workable Mora entries more 
chances of winning ALWAYS ENCLOSE SELF-ADDRESS­
ED STAMPED LONG ENVELOPE for your result Best of 
luck. GOWON BLOCKADES ARE NON-SENSE.
Printed and Published by the Biafra Information Servi ce Corporation, Works Road. Enugu —  Editor, Gab Idi go, 2 Park Way, Enugu. 30/5/67.
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Bonny, they knew nothing 
of the hinterland, until the 
startling discovery in 1830 
that the Niger entered the 
Bight triggered off their 
interest in the hinterland.
The discovery proved 
bojth an invitation and a 
challenge to them to pene­
trate the interior.
beecroft 
Appointed
On June 30, 1849, Bee­
croft was officially appoint­
ed Her Britannic Majesty's 
Consul for the Bights of 
Benin and Biafra with 
headquarters at Fernand'* 
Po.
He had powers to regu­
late trade between the 
ports of Benin, Brass, New  
and Old Calabar, Bonny. 
Bimbia and the Cameioons 
and above all, to stop the 
slave trade along the ports 
of Biafra.
Immediately after the 
Berlin Conference in 1885, 
Britain declared the Niger 
Delta area the Oil Rivers 
Protectorate.
Palm oil trade in the 
Bight of Biafra was in the 
hands of private merchants. 
The same was true of trade 
along the Niger until 1886, 
the year the Royal Niger 
Company took it over. The 
Company’s monopoly end­
ed in 1900.
In 1893, the British Go­
vernment extended the Oil 
Rivers Protectorate to the 
hinterland and christened 
it the Niger Coast Protec­
torate.
In 1900, the Niger Coast 
Protectorate was proclaim­
ed the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria. In 1914. 
the Northern and Southern 
D m t o r i n r a t e s  w e r e  a m a l g a -
K a d u n a / L a g o s  r e g i m e .  ~v
The people of Eastern 
Nigeria patient to the last 
mandated the Military
Governor with absolute 
powers to declare Eastern 
Nigeria the Democratic 
Republic of Biafra-
One year after the May 
29, 1966 pogrom against 
Easterners, the Governor 
implemented the mandate.
The independent Repub­
lic of Biafra lies east of 
the River Niger and south 
of the Benue valley be­
tween 4° —  7° North and 
o i°  —  94° East and 
covers an area of 29,484 
square miles.
Realistic 
Solution
The physical features 
comprise a Scarpland that 
runs in a north-south 
direction from south of 
the Benue to the valley of 
the Niger; an Eastern 
Highland made up of the 
Oban and Obudu Hills; a 
plain — the Cross River 
Plain; a coastal Lowland: 
and a delta — the Niger 
Delta — of which Mary 
Kingsley wrote: the “great 
swamp region of the Bight 
of Biafra is the greatest in 
the world, and • . . in  its 
immensity and gloom it 
has grandeur equal to 
that of the Himalayas.”
It has a wonderful sys­
tem of natural canalisa­
tion which connects all the 
branches of the lower 
Niger by means of deep 
creeks
With a population of 
over 14,000,000, and an 
average density of 480 
persons per square mile, 
Biafra has one of the 
highest population densi­
t i e s  i n  A f r i c a .  She has ♦'our
ble the ready absorption in 
1966 of two million dis­
placed Biafrans from other 
parts of Nigeria.
Rich Cultural 
Heritage
Biafra has a tropical 
climate tempered down in 
the Eastern parts by Oban 
and Obudu Hills and in 
the northern areas by the 
Nsukka scarplands.
Biafra has a rich cul­
tural heritage that finds 
deep expression in our 
traditional religious arts 
and crafts, music and 
dances, literature and 
architecture. ..
This rich culture suf­
fered a period of de­
cline as a result of the 
activities and misguided 
enthusiasm of the early 
missionaries and their 
converts.
ic u u c u
At the village level, life 
is at its sim plest Strict 
checks are maintained 
against the forces that 
tend to undermine che­
rished values and long- 
established traditions.
Social life  in the towns 
follows the pattern in 
other African towns and 
is characterised by a 
degree of detribalisation 
and sophistication.
Catering establishments 
ranging from ultra mo­
dem  hotels to non­
descript 'pubs’ are a fea­
ture o f the country. Re­
creational f a c i l i ­
t i e s  abound even in the 
remotest areas.
Tourism is a young 
industry in the young 
Republic of Biafra, but 
one that bristles ' with  
prospects of success. The 
establishment of Hotel 
Presidential gave a boost 
to tourism in the Repub­
lic.
weaving respectively.
Natural 
Resources
There are also the va­
rious traditional religious 
and social festivals held 
all the year round 
throughout the country 
which are characterised 
by so much colour and 
pageantry.
The Republic of Biafra 
is blessed with almost 
unlimited natural and 
mineral resources. Biafra 
produced 70 per cent of 
the export produce of 
the now former Republic 
of Nigeria.
Cocoa and rubber were 
recently introduced to 
diversify the economy of 
the young Republic.
Biafra’s crude oil pro­
duction now stands at
364,000 barrels a day or 
65 per cent of the total 
amount of crude petro-
Ironically e n o u g h ,  
other classes of Euro­
peans wrere at the same 
vxs1 sssrsec pew svs sxsrs'a; sssssvjsv* sw  ssy ssv ?sst 2^  S’&.'sw ssk sss:
& % The Republic of Biafra is today one of the |
|  best industrialised countries of Africa.
t  §This remarkable achievement derives from |  i the Government’s prudent industr ia l  policy f 
iwhich allows for the attraction of foreign in- |  
I vestment capi ta l ,  encourages the establish-1 
1 ment of industries by pr iva te  indigenous or |  
1 foreign concerns, and allows for government |
$ 53a narticination in industrial projects. |
 ^
Biafra has three airport3 , 
none of them of interna­
tional standard as a re­
sult of the discriminatory 
policy of the Federal Go­
vernment of the former 
Republic of Nigeria against 
what was then known as 
Eastern Nigeria.
The Republic of Biafra 
has a port of international 
repute — Pori; Ilarcourt. 
Bonny Bar, the Republic’s 
oil loading base was re­
cently dredged to enable 
it take ocean going vessels.
1962 marked a turning 
point in the industrial life 
of the Republic of 
Prior to this da 
industries in 
were financed i o  
foreign capital. ***
Government 
tion in industrial establish­
ments w as minimal be­
cause. of. 'tsL rj?;
w ith the provision of the 
basic services such as com­
munications, education, 
health and water supply 
— all of which, however, 
paved the w ay for indus­
trialisation.
The Republic of Biafra 
is today one of the best in­
dustrialised countries of 
Africa.
This remarkable achive- 
m ent derives from the 
governm ent’s prudent in­
dustrial policy which al­
lows for the attraction of 
foreign investment capital, 
encourages the establish­
ment of industries by pri 
vate indigenous or foreign 
concerns, and allows for 
government p«vt;- wition 
in industrial projects.
Tuesday, May 30, 1957 BIAFr a  SUN
The Bight of Biafra has variously 
been described as ‘an arm of the Gulf 
of Guinea’, ‘an inlet of the Atlantic 
Ocean on the West Coast of Africa’, 
and ‘the innermost bay of the Gulf of 
Guinea’.
t
According to ‘T ravels in West Africa” by 
T. J. Hutchinson published in 1858, it extends 
from Cape Formosa (which an admiralty map 
placed in about 1858 between the Nun and Sen- 
g ana o u t le t s  o f  th e  N ig e r )  in  lat. 4° 21 N . ,  long'.
AND
lu  1922, a Legislative 
Council was established 
for the whole country, al­
though the Governor- 
General in Lagos conti­
nued to legislate for the 
North by Proclamation.
In 1939, the Protecto­
rate of Southern Nigeria 
was split into the Eastern 
and Western Provinces 
with Enugu as the capital 
of the Eastern Provinces.
In 1954, Eastern Nigeria 
achieved full regional 
status following the re- 
gionalisation of the coun­
try. In 1957, she attained 
internal self-government.
Independence for Nige­
ria came in 19K0 and three 
years later, she became a 
Republic. But right from 
1954, she was pl.vjued by 
tribal and religious differ­
ences, and by the poll l i t  a I 
ambition of the North to 
rule the rest of the coun­
try for ever, and their use 
of force to achieve this 
political end
In January 190(5, an 
Army coup which aimed 
at curing Nigeria’s ills 
took place and was widely 
acclaimed
Later in the year a 
series of brutal attacks on 
innocent Eastern A lg e ­
rians in other parts ot' the
on  try  shocked the world
The Ibos and Ijaws have 
their kith and kin i living 
in the Mid-West and West 
ern Regions of Nigeria 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .
time surreptitiously cart­
ing away our best works 
of art which now adorn 
the museums and art
A net-work of Progress 
Hotels and other catering 
establishments provide 
added incentive.
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hence 
oi tiie I 
bar Cei
sons other u i a n  . . .
eip Nigeria to make any impositiOn~Ui------------------
kind or nature upon vuu;
* DETERMINED to dissolve all political and other 
ties between you and the former Federal Republic 
if  Nigeria:
* PREPARED to enter into such association, treatv  
or alliance with any sovereign state within the 
former Federal Republic of Nigeria and elsewhere 
on such terms ana conditions as best to subsei-ve 
your common good:
* AFFIRM ING vour trust and confidence in ME:
* HAVING mandated ME to proclaim on your be­
half, and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a 
sovereign independent Republic,
Now therefore I, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka
mic ties:-------------------- --------- -------------------
(v»ii) we shall protect the lives and property ot~a7T~ 
foreigners residing in Biafra; we shall extend the 
hand of friendship to those nations who respect 
our sovereignty, and shall repel any interference 
in our internal affairs;
Cxi) we shall faithfully adhere to  the charter of the  
Organisation of African Unity and of the United 
Nations Organisation.
(x) it is our intention to  remain a member of the  
Commonwealth of Nations in our right as a 
sovereign, independent nation.
Long live the REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA*
And may God protect ALL who live in HERD
2 a POLITICAL MAP Of REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA
i an »
We are happy  
to announcethat 
as from today, 
the € Nigerian
Outlook9 has 
been re~christe~ 
ned €Biafra Sun9 
- EDITOR
of o progressive people wno 
tending with the forces of reaction and 
despotic feudalism . T hat man is 
Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka 
Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Head of the new 
State of the Republic of Biafra.
W hile rejoicing a t our new lease of 
life, we should not forget both the con­
ditions th a t com pelled and inspired the 
coming into being o f the Republic of 
Biafra and the com pelling implications 
of this glorious phenomena in our his­
tory as a people. This the people of 
Biafra must do in order to make a suc­
cess o f the venture, cherish freedom, 
and defend their independence and 
sovereignty.
W e in the new Republic as well ( 
progressives in the foreign countrii <
w est o f Biafra and in the foreign, en 
my country north of the new State • 
Biafra, are aware of the tragic events 
since May 1966. The mad dogs of 
feudalism and reaction were unleashed.
30,000 of our people murdered and two 
millions more had to flee  the North. 
Up till now the perpetrators of this un-
d e c la ra r io n  « i  s
As we strik 
must be consci 
duties and ot 
tim e th e  pec 
realising whal 
these years -  
erotic societ 
man will be
W e have 
nationhood, 
of deadweic 
elem ents, 
which calls  
forebearan
LONG I
throughout the coun­
try.
(b) The creation of states 
must take place sim ul­
taneously th*o»ghout 
the country.
(c) The creation of any 
new state must be 
based upon the consent 
of the people of the  
a r e a  wHifeh is to be tn-
i n  l i v e  p r o p o s e d
gates to the Ad Hoc Con­
stitutional Conference, and 
our confidence in them, 
and having noted w ith  
regret the indefinite ad­
journment of the m eeting  
of the Ad Hoc Constitu­
tional Conference by Lt. 
Colonel Yakubu Gowon 
for alleged inability to  
agree upon the venue of 
th e  m eetin g  as w ell as 
to  h im . because
M ilitary Leaders and the  
reconvening of the Ad  
Hoc Constitutional Con­
ference under conditions 
of adequate security satis­
factory to  Y our E xcel­
lency.
(9) To ensure that only 
men and women of integri­
ty and m erit are appointed 
to public offices in  the Re­
gion and that a code of 
c o n d u c t  for public officers 
f ''r  Rastern
ESSENTIAL CENTRAL  
GOVERNM ENTS FUNC­
TIONS X  PROGRAMME 
WILL ENSURE FAIR  
PLAY A N D  JUSTICE 
FOR ALL .SECTIONS OF 
TH E COUNTRY X
T H E R E F O R E  I 
EARNESTLY APPEAL TO 
YOU TO CO-OPERATE TO 
ARREST FURHER DRIFT 
fNTO • t'TON’
X ON THE P A CTC 0,7 THE 
FOREGO^G REPRCSEN-
vernment” to im plem ent 
these and other Agree­
m ents notw ithstanding the  
fact that they were freely  
and voluntarily, entered 
into; _  ,
"Wher*M the Federa­
tion of Nigeria ha* for­
feited any claim to our 
allegiance by these acts 
and by the economic, 
political and diplomatic 
sanctions im posed against 
ua by the so-called Fede*
tournament last Saturt 
night when th ey  w on  
return first round me 
in Chicago b y  one goa  
nil.
In the first leg  In Ha 
ton, tha tw o coun 
played a goalless d 
Last Saturday night**
I was scored by right 
■ Rubba Daniels.
Bermuda w ill p lay  
crnala in the n ex t s 
-  (AFPX
GOWON HATES YOU!
„BimT % OOUt
* ' it*;
m r m
Vf:';’:* ''
He loves nobody 
Gouon span s nobody - 
He destroys edl
CM/SW
'eb^H/ow;
(A bove left)
‘G ow on  points the w ay’ : Ogoja, a 
‘m inority’ area o f  Biafra, liberated by 
Federal Nigerian troops during the first 
m onth o f  the war.
(A bove right)
Biafran poster depicting gonocidal fate o f  
the Ibos i f  they surrendered to—or were 
overrun by— the Federal troops.
A popular poster in Federal Nigeria during 
the war: O jukw u’s head under the boot 
o f  unity.
C—N
304
m f m m -mrr. «•!!»
r?s*~z c B m**1***?**.' ******* ■ 
;£*»• >•»■•«/ '  •J»'V->
•:v " '
S am aK M S>■
i » I  
• * « « : «
a s s e s sr>>»-. v-<»'» v-w . % *
S&8 2 S S S
vj.'vV 'W ftio
p & % $ $
n s & p & i™liill'lz*'J :#<•'■ )>*• **<
tC'v7* T*1' '-'■* - •• - t j  Mrv. »  I V'J:v&srMS# £*:££ *? c; . 4 ^ 4
*?Wt
« H
S M S
i p g ^ v w
T r t M ' t:?»>;•: Vi G O V E R N O R ££32&ti
s o w s
krV'* ■**?' *<■*/'. «*arn&4j.^
v» •-**« >1f Vi
.k*j »aa*A aaiaKia
;ir\: - $
Calabar
Fulani
Kaduna
© Nsukka
•  Enugu
Lokoja
® Ibadan O n itsh J®Yoruba
AfikpoBenin e © N new i •  Okigwi
Annabet/e
Owerri • U m uahia
:
DO POO •;/
ross supp/y-ba/e) Ikot EkpaneA hoada
S ta te  boundary
Port HarcourtZZ3 ;:vf! 
2 0 0  mi.
•  O pobo
R n n n w
*
0
^Argungu 
t  ^  SOKOTO
J
D
J NORTH WESTERN
jin^ .  Gwandu 2^-—
V / '€ %
N I G E P ' A
Katsina BORNU
KANO
°MaidugurKDiKwa £ 
 ^ y  ^Katagum
NORTH 
CENTRAL NORTH EASTERN
KQNTAGORA
ZARIA BAUCHIL GOMBE^ B O R G U Numan
BIDA
ABUJA LOWLANDNasarawa
o v a  * A ! 0 R llJr ^  % MURlVPLATEAU
WUKARI
TIV
KABBA
Ekiti ^  Igbirra
SARDAUNA/ 
0
OSHU
IBADAN WESTERN
EGBA (
1JEBU/ON DO
OWO IGALA
Hkambei ^ T / '
Enugu
CENTR
EASTEMID­
WESTERN
\  © iNKa
\W um )
/  R a m o n
V *
Okitipupa
BamendaMamfe^
BIGHT OF BENIN
• v SKumba 
* MAP OF THE
TWPIVP QTATF.c;Ri 1**^
BIAFRA 5INKING. OCTOBER I960
#H»ukKO
EAST CENTRAL 
f  STATE
M I D - W E S T  STATE
i> r d i v i s i o n  
 fcLfl._____ A b a k o llk i•  6 c o m
A w k O[ £as^ *n*
2 n o  DIVISION / # )
-, .na Of
.SOUTH * EAST
in«w i
A /lh p o•ihiota 
•Uli A irp o rt 
* O r lu
Oguha
Okigwl
(_ !«>•*'   — =ISil M*i1 oa‘h3»U»)
'UmuoNo
Oys« it( 6  I A  f  R A
O I C H T  I  
O F  I  
& L H IH C a la b a r
D < < ]cn a 3 r d  M A ftinc COMMANDO 
DIVISION H Q  
T rf r— iv . "  ■ ■ r ■ ■ 1
f r e n N l i n *  
f r d t r o i  Foncaa 
B io fro  G u e rrilla  
f c r u t  
B ig F ren  A rn u  
Fl«gnr» 
k .  J  C r o t i  o n d  
O lr f t f i  R rluF  
f  IHJI.N 
I x J r t t  e ^ i i » l  roundcry
f C 0 ( « al A lO crA D I
L
<-A 
. ^
BIAFRA ON THE OFFENSIVE AGAIN 
J U N E  1 9 6 9
B *nln
*  .  u q o  A U ltn *MI O  -  W 1 3  
• lop«l«
r r w i f - l f n *
V on  I t o B f  » -
IHofrmn Gwjnrtf k# fere**
Raliw+y 
ROOdM 
0 4  P ipalin* 
O ilf& k J i===3 A t C H T  O f  A / A f A A
c -
1
'TD
__ _ ___ _
<-/)
O
<r
99994
BIAFR A’3 FINAL COLLAPSE  
DEC 1969 -  J A N  1970 .- • 'A O o ru  t*<
i i f  orv wa
t n u o uI i f  DIV
ABOtuMIW
2 n d  OIV 
M.a BIA fK A N
<u >c * w l l a »  /
a
A/iKpO
S O U T H - E A S T
rtrritwl
M I D - W E S T  
S T A T E A ro c *v *w u  t£*vu*
cut off U iM lw l  Cw> 
l»»  6- 3~« Om
inh h o  in  Lhnuohia
OfWtOSUirfCl
.VforH
S T A T E
f i f l r d  PIV
▼ IkftOM3 rd  CODO—  .c u n
B I G H T
H OA 
^  f t  C H I N O r onV iR 5 F*dorai focon 
f r o n f .l ln c  
gd itw ay 
5 RooOm —
MARINE COMMANDO
B IG H T  O f  BJA.fRA
?»f '-mmum, i*aara^ '^5^: '‘A^ «Kiassa«s*£; MMEBSSBBSsi&B
i
O
v  •—
C/O
VJ
VO
100%
90 
801— 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0L l
Newspaper; Radio; interpersonal TV.
communication;
Fig. 1. The most consistently used media for information during the entire dura­
tion of the Nigerian Civil War among the Urban Opinion Leaders (N — 30)
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Fig. II. The most consistently used media for information during the entire dura­
tion of the Nigerian Civil W ar among the Rural Opinion Leaders (N —20).
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